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Public interest litigation is generally aimed at securing concrete remedies for individual 
complainants, as well as more general reforms of policy and institutional practice. Such 
changes are not easily won in even the most developed domestic jurisdictions, so the 
notion of public interest litigation in international and regional human rights systems 
may strike some as fanciful. After all, these systems are relatively new, have fewer 
resources, and rest on less-settled juridical foundations than their domestic counter-
parts. And yet, the number of cases filed with, and judgments delivered by, such bodies 
steadily increases. To what end? What is the record of implementation of these deci-
sions? What procedures exist to monitor and promote implementation? And how can 
these systems be improved? 
These questions prompted the Open Society Justice Initiative to embark on an 
extensive study of judicial decisions in the three major regional human rights sys-
tems—African (including the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the nascent African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights); American (composed of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights); and European (including the European Court of Human Rights and 
the Committee of Ministers)—and the United Nations treaty bodies, with a particular 
focus on the Human Rights Committee. These procedures, established as part of the 
protective mandates of both the United Nations treaty body system and the regional 
human rights regimes, have been fueled by the hope that, where a person is unable to 
obtain redress at the national level, recourse to an international or supranational legal 
body would compel a state to make good on its human rights obligations. 
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The Justice Initiative engages in litigation around the world: representing appli-
cants, intervening as a third party, and providing technical assistance to local counsel. 
We have a specific interest in learning how to make our own litigation more effective, 
including through full and expeditious implementation of court judgments. And as 
advocates promoting the rule of law, we have a more general interest in fostering well-
functioning regional and international courts as essential elements of a global open 
society.
In 2007, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued a 
groundbreaking ruling in D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic, finding that the segregation 
of Roma within Czech schools violated the European Convention on Human Rights.1 
The Grand Chamber ordered the Czech government to end its discriminatory education 
practices and provide redress to those affected. Yet nearly four years later, the situation 
for Roma schoolchildren remains largely unchanged: the “special schools” into which 
they are shunted have been renamed, but the segregation persists.
In 2005, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in Yean and Bosico v. Domin-
ican Republic, found the Dominican government responsible for racial discrimination 
in its citizenship policy, in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights.2 
The court ordered the Dominican citizenship law changed. But since that judgment, 
the Dominican Republic’s citizenship laws and policies have become more—not less—
restrictive, including a constitutional amendment that directly undermines the Inter-
American Court’s ruling.
In Marques v. Republic of Angola, the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
determined, in 2005, that Angola had violated the petitioner’s freedom of speech by 
holding him incommunicado and imprisoning him for writing articles critical of the 
Angolan president.3 In March 2005, the committee found that Angola had violated 
Marques’ rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that 
Marques’ arrest and detention violated his due process rights. Yet, five years later, the 
committee’s opinion remains substantially unenforced: many colonial-era provisions 
restricting free speech and media freedom remain on the books. 
In 2000, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights found the 
government of Mauritania responsible for massive human rights violations in Malawi 
African Association et al. v. Mauritania.4 The commission found numerous violations of 
the African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights arising from a wave of ethnic 
violence that involved widespread detentions and killings as well as the forced expulsion 
of approximately 70,000 black Mauritanians into Senegal and Mali. Six years after the 
ACHPR’s ruling, Mauritania agreed to repatriate and reintegrate the expellees, but to 
date only a small percentage of these refugees have been permitted to return, and scores 
of grave human rights violations have gone unaddressed.
The implementation of its judgments is the central measure of a court’s efficacy. 
Without it, the situation of those who should be helped by the court’s ruling does not 
improve. Even the best and most profound jurisprudence may be deemed ineffective 
if not implemented, and the very legitimacy of the court itself may fall into question. 
As the cases summarized above demonstrate, an implementation crisis currently 
afflicts the regional and international legal bodies charged with protecting human 
rights. The goal of this report is to help address that crisis by exploring implementa-
tion: the conditions under which states implement the decisions of the various human 
rights systems, the extent to which procedures to monitor and promote implementation 
exist, and how they can be improved.5 
Despite the struggles over implementation cited in this report, it is important to 
note the successes that regional and international human rights bodies have recorded, 
and the broadly positive arc that bends toward greater rights protection. Since their 
founding, the treaty bodies and the regional systems have played an essential role 
in defining and protecting human rights, thus providing the impetus for significant 
improvements in the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights has issued 
thousands of binding judgments that have touched nearly every aspect of legislation 
on the European continent, ranging from reformed pretrial detention procedures to the 
treatment of the mentally ill and improved fair trial guarantees. The Inter-American 
Commission and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have achieved regional 
consensus on the illegality of amnesty provisions for members of authoritarian regimes 
that perpetrated grave human rights violations, developed a progressive framework for 
the protection of indigenous lands, and advanced the issue of freedom of expression 
throughout the region. On the African continent, dozens of political prisoners have 
been freed, and expelled persons returned to their homes, at the recommendation of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Similarly, the United Nations 
treaty bodies have spurred change in national anti-discrimination laws, gender equality, 
and the rights of non-citizens. 
There can be no question that these procedures matter. They represent not only 
the last, best hope for many people whose national laws have failed them but, more 
fundamentally, they manifest “a shift of emphasis towards the more effective imple-
mentation and enforcement of existing human rights standards.”6 
Yet despite such successes, genuine and complete implementation is one of 
the most nettlesome problems that the international human rights system confronts. 
Indeed, “[h]uman rights is the subject matter area in international affairs where the 
largest enforcement deficit exists, inasmuch as the costs of enforcement appear high 
and the benefits seem low by traditional state interest calculations.”7 As proof of this 
deficit, critics cite implementation rates as low as 10 percent for some of these legal 
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bodies, and point to the persistence of human rights violators who remain apparently 
unfazed by the threat of international judicial scrutiny. 
The commitment to abide by a judicial (or quasi-judicial) judgment is crucial 
to the integrity of any legal system, domestic or international. Experts writing in the 
context of the European Court have noted that implementation of judgments is the 
“acid test of any judicial system,” important for “enhancing the interpretive authority 
and impact of the Court’s case law,” as well as the system’s authority and credibility.8 
Furthermore, just as research has shown that states with poor human rights records 
are often unwilling to ratify human rights treaties, “a sorry record of compliance with 
the judgments of regional and international courts correlates with poor human rights 
performance generally.”9
Implementation also underscores the distinctiveness of regional and international 
human rights bodies, highlighting the dichotomy between the unique hope that they 
represent for those within their jurisdiction and the bodies’ lack of enforcement author-
ity. These institutions are notable in our international order precisely because they have 
the authority to regulate national sovereigns but, at the same time, they generally lack 
recourse to an international sovereign power to enforce those orders. Consequently, 
international human rights law, more than any other field of international law, must 
rely heavily on the cooperation of states, buttressed, as one commentator has noted, “by 
such moral and other influence as countries are prepared to exert.”10 
Fortunately, efforts by scholars and advocates to examine state compliance 
with the broader mandates of international human rights conventions have grown in 
sophistication and scale over the past decade, as part of an emerging wave of empiri-
cal scholarship in international law and international relations. Yet, to date, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the degree to which, and under what conditions, states 
implement the judgments of the legal bodies designed to interpret and enforce those 
conventions. This oversight is regrettable because, as two commentators have noted in 
the context of the Inter-American Court, a disproportionate focus on the mere fact of 
these institutions’ existence “may lead us to overlook the actual degree of success that 
such tribunals have had in the countries subject to their jurisdiction.”11
The four human rights systems explored in this report are significant because 
they frequently serve as examples to other human rights institutions, and their deci-
sions often have the broadest jurisprudential impact. Furthermore, while these systems 
are appreciably different in many ways, they share a number of similar characteristics 
that bear on the question of implementation and lend themselves to cross-system analy-
sis. With these considerations in mind, this report aims to consolidate existing informa-
tion on implementation, identify trends where they exist, explore certain successes and 
challenges, and formulate strategic recommendations for how interested actors—civil 
society organizations, government agents, and officials of the supranational institutions 
themselves—might work together towards the more expeditious and complete imple-
mentation of international legal and quasi-legal decisions. 
It should be noted that, although this report occasionally uses the terms “compli-
ance” and “implementation” interchangeably, our emphasis is on the latter. While these 
terms are closely related, implementation, as two commentators have noted, is “the 
process of putting international commitments into practice,” whereas compliance is a 
“state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule.”12 Thus, 
states may implement judgments in order to achieve compliance; however, compliance 
can also exist without implementation. This can occur, for instance, when an interna-
tional commitment already matches current practice, rendering implementation unnec-
essary, or where, as Harold Koh notes, “no causal relationship exists between a ruling 
and subsequent implementation by a state.”13 Indeed, as this report details, states have 
often (partially) satisfied court judgments while making clear that they are only doing 
so on an ex gratia basis,14 or have come into compliance with a human rights judgment 
for reasons unrelated to that decision.15 Implementation, on the other hand, occurs in 
response to international obligations, and when those obligations are articulated in 
human rights judgments, implementation is observable and measurable. Thus, because 
implementation more fully captures the impact (or lack thereof) of human rights judg-
ments on state behavior, we employ that term here to capture the deliberate process of 
adopting specific remedial measures in order to give substantial effect to a judgment.
It in no way undercuts the importance of implementation to note that interna-
tional human rights judgments can have significant intangible impacts, even where 
they are not implemented. Many of these decisions, for instance, can trigger vital policy 
discussions at the national level, both in and outside of the government, despite the fact 
that domestic implementation remains lacking. Likewise, many decisions, even if not 
enforced at the level of the individual litigant, serve an important function insofar as 
they contribute to an international jurisprudence that may deter (or punish) future viola-
tions or from which domestic courts can develop their own rights jurisprudence. Thus, 
implementation, though the most important indicator of an effective system of human 
rights protection, is not the only one. Nor is this report’s emphasis on implementation 
and its highlighting of the four systems’ implementation failures meant to suggest that 
these bodies are necessarily weak or ineffectual. To the contrary, they are essential pillars 
of the international human rights regime. The intent is thus to focus an honest light 
on one aspect of their performance, in the hopes that they may be made stronger still.
With this goal in mind, each of the four chapters below explores issues pertain-
ing to the implementation of decisions of human rights bodies in the European, Inter-
American, African, and UN treaty body systems. While each discussion is framed in a 
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way that best highlights the relevant implementation issues in each of the systems, the 
chapters were developed around common questions so as to provide consistent devel-
opment of certain issues and enhance the basis for comparative analysis. Each chapter 
is intended to provide an overview of the current state of the implementation of judg-
ments in a particular system, and offer some measure of historical perspective on how 
implementation has developed over time. Each chapter also endeavors to examine some 
of the factors that influence implementation, consistently addressing the relationship 
between implementation and the remedial framework utilized by each system, and in 
some circumstances exploring other issues such as the relationship between implemen-
tation and the rights at issue in a decision. The procedures in place in each system to 
monitor implementation and follow-up with states are also a centerpiece of this report, 
as are past and current initiatives to improve implementation, and the lessons that can 
be learned from successfully implemented decisions. At the end of each chapter, the 
report includes conclusions and recommendations to improve implementation in that 
particular system. The concluding chapter attempts to pull together those points of 




The European System of Human Rights
An incredibly dynamic body, the European Court of Human Rights is the judicial organ 
responsible for interpreting the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights, to which the 47 states of the Council of Europe are party. In the past thirty years, 
the court’s individual petitions procedure has expanded from a modest, discretionary 
system to one that is now struggling under the weight of its own success: the court 
currently faces a backlog of almost 120,000 cases. As its caseload has grown, the imple-
mentation of the court’s judgments has slowed. In January 2007, the year that execution 
of the court’s judgments began to be monitored and made public, over 5,000 judgments 
were still listed as pending before the Committee of Ministers, the political branch of 
the Council of Europe responsible for supervising the court’s judgments. By the end of 
2009, that figure had risen to 7,887. In the past two years alone, the number of pend-
ing cases has risen at an annual rate of 18 percent, far outpacing the number of cases 
that have been closed. It has also become clear that certain states—Russia, Italy, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, in particular—pose problems for the European system because they 
lack the capacity or political will to implement judgments. As a result, a number of 
those cases where implementation remains pending are, in fact, “repetitive” cases—the 
result of states having failed to comply with their earlier implementation obligations. 
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Rights, Remedies, and the Court’s Evolving Remedial Framework
Where the court awards money damages, or “just satisfaction,” compliance with the 
court’s decision remains quite high; with few exceptions, states continue to pay the 
ordered sums on time and without controversy. Likewise, compliance with interim 
measures ordered by the court is quite high. Few of the court’s judgments, however, are 
limited entirely to damage awards; rather, they include individual and general measures 
as well. Individual measures are designed to restore the applicant to the position he or 
she enjoyed prior to the violation, while general measures are designed to prevent the 
same abuse(s) from happening again. In these cases, implementation is harder to moni-
tor and often more protracted because general measures typically require wide-ranging 
reforms, such as changes to a state’s legal code, which can challenge institutional power 
or run contrary to public opinion. 
In the face of such intransigence, the court has at times adopted a more prescrip-
tive approach to remedies, which has assisted the Committee of Ministers and occasion-
ally resulted in more effective execution. Most representative of this shift is the court’s 
application of the pilot judgment procedure, used as a way to dispose of a large class 
of similarly situated cases. States have also begun to respond to calls by the Committee 
of Ministers and other Council of Europe organs to better address implementation of 
judgments at the local level. The United Kingdom’s Joint Committee on Human Rights 
has been a model institution in this regard and, more recently, Italy and Ukraine have 
passed laws that seek to strengthen parliamentary oversight of implementation. 
Overall, however, general measures present the greatest challenge for the Euro-
pean system, and there are numerous instances in which full implementation has not 
been achieved. Another worrisome trend is the widespread failure by states to imple-
ment orders to investigate and prosecute gross human rights violations—an area the 
court has addressed more often since the accession of post-Soviet states. Other problem 
areas for the Committee of Ministers have been the satisfactory resolution of cases 
involving the unreasonable length of proceedings and the failure to execute domestic 
judgments, which collectively comprise the vast majority of cases pending before the 
committee. As a result, implementation continues to lag where there is political resis-
tance to, or a lack of public support for, the measures ordered by the court. Moreover, 
because general measures are time consuming and frequently complicated, states often 
treat them as a lower priority, choosing instead to pay just satisfaction and then delay. 
For instance, in 115 cases involving human rights violations in Chechnya, Russia has 
paid damages to the applicants in the vast majority, but failed to undertake any pub-
lic investigations and prosecutions despite the court’s ordering that it do so. In such 
cases, Strasbourg’s pressure is not enough; active participation from local civil society 
is needed to overcome political resistance and move public opinion. 
Implementation Monitoring in the Council of Europe
As set forth by Article 46 of the European Convention, the Committee of Ministers is 
the statutory body tasked with monitoring the court’s judgments. The committee, whose 
supervision is based on “constructive and co-operative dialogue between states,” meets 
four times a year and is assisted in its oversight duties by the Department for the Execu-
tion of Judgments. Another important monitoring body is the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, whose Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights reports 
regularly to the assembly on compliance-related matters. Notably, the Committee of 
Ministers has recently emphasized the importance of developing synergies in the imple-
mentation monitoring process among the committee, the Parliamentary Assembly, and 
the European Commissioner for Human Rights, whose mandate it is to promote aware-
ness and respect for human rights throughout the Council’s member states.
In response to the challenges of implementation, the Committee of Ministers has 
adopted an increasingly rigorous approach to implementation and its own monitoring 
powers. Rules of procedure, amended as of 2006, require that states against which a 
judgment is pending submit a plan for implementation to the Committee of Ministers 
within six months of the court’s decision, although this timeframe may be reduced in 
urgent cases, systemic cases, or cases of very serious violations. Cases are then placed 
on the agenda of the committee’s subsequent meetings and reviewed regularly until 
a final resolution closing the case is adopted. The committee’s deliberations are not 
open to the public (unless it decides otherwise), although victims are now entitled to 
communicate in writing with the committee about the implementation of individual 
measures, and non-governmental organizations and national human rights institutions 
are entitled to make written submissions on both individual and general measures. New 
working methods adopted in 2004 by the committee also include the use of publicly 
accessible “status sheets” summarizing the status of implementation, as well as more 
frequent meetings between the committee’s secretariat and state representatives.
While compliance is pending, the Committee of Ministers may adopt interim 
resolutions, in order to provide information on the progress of implementation, or to 
express concern or make suggestions; on occasion, the committee also issues public 
memoranda explaining what steps a state should undertake in cases raising structural 
violations. Where necessary, the committee may seek to put more pressure on a respon-
dent state through compliance meetings, undertake more frequent examinations of a 
case, or adopt public interim resolutions condemning the failure to implement. Nota-
bly, Protocol 14, effective as of June 2010, also expands the Committee of Ministers’ 
monitoring powers in two important ways. First, it permits a two-thirds majority of the 
committee to seek interpretive rulings from the court if the meaning of a judgment is 
unclear; second, it provides that a two-thirds majority may bring “infringement proceed-
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ings” before the court in cases where a state has failed to comply. In exceptional cases 
of persistent non-implementation, the committee may sanction states by ultimately sus-
pending or expelling them from the Council of Europe. However, suspension has been 
an exceedingly rare occurrence and, to date, no member state has ever been expelled 
from the Council.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Protocol 14 and the reforms being put into place by the European Court of Human 
Rights to secure its long-term effectiveness are important steps. But the growing chal-
lenges of implementing the court’s judgments remain of primary concern. To address 
these challenges, the following conclusions and recommendations are offered:
• The Committee of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, and the European Com-
missioner of Human Rights should continue to improve their respective working 
methods, in addition to developing increasingly formalized synergies in their 
monitoring rules. The Committee of Ministers, in particular, should prioritize 
and agglomerate cases against those states that contribute most to the implemen-
tation backlog. Greater clarification about the pilot judgment procedure, espe-
cially regarding the respective role of the court and the committee in evaluating 
compliance at the national level is also needed. The Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Committee on Legal Affairs should continue to develop its reporting work on 
implementation and capitalize on its status as a parliamentary body, one that per-
mits greater possibilities for dialogue with national legislators. The commissioner 
should conduct on-site visits to countries against which cases have been brought, 
and provide the court with information about alleged violations and proposed 
remedies. 
• Further training on communicating with the Committee of Ministers is needed, 
particularly in states where civil society is less active and states that have the low-
est implementation rates. Litigants and interveners alike can also play a role in 
urging the court to identify cases that pose an underlying systemic problem.
• The court should continue to seek to supplement the committee’s monitoring and 
enforcement role, by continuing its cautious trend towards greater specificity in 
its approach to remedies. Further application and refinement of the pilot judg-
ment procedure is important in this regard; likewise, proposals for adding collective 
redress mechanisms, such as a class action procedure, should be considered anew.
• Consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, states must enhance their ability to 
effectively implement court judgments. All Council member states should have 
a system in place for responding to court judgments, in addition to establishing 
greater parliamentary scrutiny of legislation to ensure it is consistent with court 
jurisprudence. Where such systems are already in place, more research is also 
needed on their impact and effectiveness. The establishment of robust national 
human rights institutions in each member state should be required by the Council 
of Europe as a way to develop effective mechanisms of reception at the national 
level; likewise, the establishment of a standing judicial training institute should be 
considered, in order to improve application of the convention at the national level. 
The Inter-American Human Rights System
While the Inter-American human rights system has had a tremendous and positive 
impact on the legal and socio-political development of the region over the past quarter 
century, the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court have nevertheless 
struggled with low levels of implementation of their final recommendations and orders. 
As the effort to promote broader and more consistent implementation of decisions has 
evolved, so have procedures and mechanisms to monitor and promote implementa-
tion. Such procedures and mechanisms have provided a means to identify the most 
problematic areas of implementation and to support the design of strategies to address 
these problems. While the design of these procedures and mechanisms is imperfect, 
their utility is unquestionable, and efforts to perfect them—driven by an honest under-
standing of the implementation problem—should be central to the regional human 
rights agenda.
Implementation, Inter-American Remedies, and Success Stories
In reviewing the implementation crisis in the Inter-American system, a recent study 
found a 29 percent rate of total implementation of the remedies ordered by the Inter-
American human rights bodies, a 12 percent rate of partial implementation, and a 59 
percent rate of non-implementation. The Inter-American remedial framework can be 
roughly divided into three: pecuniary damages and other individual remedies, orders 
to investigate human rights violations and punish the perpetrators, and general mea-
sures of non-repetition for purposes of analysis. It is important to consider the rates of 
implementation for each category.
With regard to pecuniary damages, the rates of implementation are quite high, 
and there are impressive examples of states such as Guatemala and Colombia imple-
menting orders to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for grave violations of human 
rights, payments by Panama and Peru for labor and property rights violations, and pay-
ments by Honduras and the Dominican Republic to discriminated minorities. In the 
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late 1990s, the Inter-American Court began to develop a much more complex remedial 
framework and ordered a wide range of symbolic and equitable remedies. For example, 
the court will now order the erection of memorials and other measures to commemo-
rate victims of human rights abuse, and such remedies are implemented approximately 
50 percent of the time. Implementation of equitable remedies restitution and rehabilita-
tion has also been relatively good, where orders to release detainees, reverse arbitrary fir-
ings, or grant certain security measures are implemented almost 40 percent of the time. 
Orders to investigate the circumstances of human rights violations and prosecute 
and punish those found responsible, known as “justice” measures, present the biggest 
challenge for implementation. Indeed, in all of the cases in which the Inter-American 
Court has issued an order to investigate and punish, only one has been fully imple-
mented. Similarly disappointing are the rates of implementation associated with gen-
eral measures of non-repetition, which are implemented at a rate of approximately 25 
percent. Inter-American bodies will order legal reforms and training of state officials in 
those cases where systematic abuses have been detected and it is determined that such 
violations result from widespread ultra vires activity, or routine abusive discretionary 
decisions. Rates of implementation, however, are also low. Finally, the court has ordered 
creative general measures designed to address human rights violations suffered by 
certain communities, often indigenous, and while compliance has generally been low 
in this regard, there have been some notable successes.
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua is remarkable both because 
it was the first time a regional tribunal recognized indigenous peoples’ communal right 
to their ancestral land and because the reparations were implemented despite the tech-
nical and political complexity of demarcating and titling indigenous lands. Ultimately, 
it took the passage of a law on land demarcation in January 2003, and the election of 
President Daniel Ortega, who is sympathetic to the plight of the country’s indigenous 
communities, to effect the conveyance of more than 70,000 hectares to the Awas Tingni 
community in December 2008. This resonates with another exceptional case decided 
by the court in 2006, Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, which established the right of access 
to information as a fundamental right. In 2008, Chile promulgated a law on access to 
information, with the support of President Michelle Bachelet, which was the culmina-
tion of years of work by the transparency movement in Chile.
Initially, Awas Tingni and Claude Reyes et al. appear to have little in common other 
than their status as landmark cases that advanced novel legal propositions and, ulti-
mately, reached full implementation. However, these exceptional cases do provide some 
lessons for further efforts to promote implementation generally. First, each decision is 
important because it employed an international law framework to remedy a domestic 
struggle. Second, in each case the international law framework was translated into 
the national legal regime. In the case of Awas Tingni, implementation was contingent 
on the formation of inter-agency commissions and, ultimately, a national law on land 
demarcation. In the case of Claude Reyes et al., the law on access to information both 
represented the necessary normative shift for implementation to occur, and provided 
for the establishment of an office to train public officials. Finally, each case relied on the 
support of the presidents in power. Undue emphasis should not be placed on this last 
element, however, which is often the tendency. Had there been no domestic regime for 
implementation, based on the international framework provided by the Inter-American 
Court decisions, there would have been no way to channel the support of either state. 
Accordingly, mechanisms and procedures should always exist to capitalize on the politi-
cal will to implement the decisions of the human rights bodies, particularly because it 
is often unclear when the will might manifest, and how long it will last.
Initiatives to Promote Implementation Mechanisms
For the past decade, the crisis of implementation in the Inter-American system has 
steadily received more attention. Efforts by the court and the commission to collect 
data about implementation, coupled with initiatives of civil society organizations and 
academics to systematize and analyze that information, provide a relatively accurate 
picture of the implementation problem in the Inter-American system, and a few key 
strategies to address that problem. Four types of initiatives in particular are worthy of 
note: (1) efforts to establish a working group on implementation in the political bod-
ies of the OAS; (2) the establishment of an implementation reporting mechanism by 
the Inter-American Commission; (3) the development of an implementation phase to 
litigation before the Inter-American Court; and (4) the promulgation of national laws 
on implementation.
During his tenure with the Inter-American Court, Judge Cançado Trinidade con-
sistently urged the OAS to establish a permanent political body to monitor and promote 
implementation. The General Assembly of the OAS has never taken up this proposal 
in a serious way, nor has it done more to advance implementation, other than issuing 
annual resolutions highlighting its importance.
In 2001, the Inter-American Commission established a mechanism to monitor 
state implementation of final merits decisions and friendly settlement agreements. 
While this mechanism is merely a system of data collection, it has provided a fairly 
substantial pool of data that facilitates an understanding of both rates of implementa-
tion as well as what types of initiatives have been successful in promoting compliance. 
For its part, the Inter-American Court has steadily developed what is now a fairly robust 
approach to implementation litigation, where it orders the victim’s representatives, the 
state, and the commission to submit regular reports on implementation; calls the par-
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ties to private and public hearings; and issues resolutions articulating certain actions 
that the state should take to effectively implement its decisions. The court has recently 
developed certain innovations in this phase of litigation such as ordering the state to 
identify specific actors to answer for implementation responsibilities, and considering 
the consolidation of cases against a single country.
Arguably the Inter American system’s most significant implementation-related 
development is the promulgation of legal and legislative mechanisms at the national 
level to facilitate the implementation of decisions by the commission and court. Peru 
has articulated perhaps the best example of such legislation, which establishes the 
specific steps that should be taken in order to give effect to the decisions of suprana-
tional courts that order pecuniary damages or declaratory relief. Similarly, in Colombia, 
national legislation provides a process for the payment of pecuniary damages ordered by 
international human rights bodies. Further processes to develop comprehensive imple-
mentation legislation are ongoing in Argentina and Brazil.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Despite recent initiatives to promote implementation, there is an implementation crisis 
in the Inter-American system that threatens its legitimacy and its viability as a method 
of obtaining redress for violations of human rights. The following conclusions and rec-
ommendations are formulated to support initiatives that enhance the likelihood states 
will implement the decisions of the Inter-American bodies:
• The resolution issued by the General Assembly every year on the Inter-American 
system is a prime opportunity for advocacy to involve the political bodies of the 
OAS in promoting implementation. Interested parties should promote the idea of 
an annual conference on implementation convened by the Permanent Council, a 
study on implementation by the Department of Legal Services, and the establish-
ment of an implementation-working group in the Committee on Juridical and 
Political Affairs.
• While the commission established an important mechanism for the passive col-
lection of implementation data around the time of its 2001 rules reform, it has 
done little to develop its implementation activities since then. Interested parties 
should urge the commission to develop an implementation monitoring process, 
including reporting requirements for all parties, public and private hearings, and 
the issuance of resolutions.
• The court’s effort to develop an implementation stage of litigation over the last 
decade is a substantial accomplishment and should be applauded. Interested par-
ties should continue to test the court’s willingness to include state implementa-
tion objectives in its compliance orders, and to hold public and private hearings 
as a means to promote implementation of its decisions. 
• National legal regimes governing implementation constitute the best hope for 
addressing the implementation problem in the Inter-American system. Interested 
parties should strategize and collaborate at the regional level to develop models 
or guiding principles for the establishment of such regimes, and at the national 
level to improve existing laws, support ongoing legislative processes, or foster 
them where they have yet to take hold. 
The African System on Human and Peoples’ Rights
The African System is the youngest of the regional human rights systems, and it con-
tinues to struggle to boost its exposure and promote access of those who most need the 
system’s protection. Since its establishment, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights has experienced low levels of implementation of its recommendations. 
While explanations for this vary, many cite the commission’s lack of an institutional-
ized follow-up mechanism and the non-binding character of its recommendations as 
principal reasons. The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights was established 
with the hope of reinforcing the regional system of human rights protection. However, 
the commission has yet to refer a case to the court, which is virtually inactive at present. 
Significantly, these issues are addressed in new rules of procedure for the commission 
and court. As those invested in the success of the African system strategize about how 
best to support its development, it is important to look back on the 25 years of the com-
mission’s work to identify important trends, and articulate how those trends can inform 
litigation and implementation strategies under the new procedural rules.
Implementation Successes, Rights, Remedies and Follow-Up Activities
Because the African System’s work has, until now, been fairly limited, there has been 
little effort to systematize information on implementation. Nevertheless, scholars have 
cited seven African Commission cases as examples of implementation success: Pag-
noulle v Cameroon; Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria; Centre for Free Speech v Nigeria; 
Forum of Conscience v Sierra Leone; Modise v Botswana, Amnesty International v Zambia; 
and Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lakwot and 6 Others) v Nigeria. 
Considering the commission has only issued approximately 60 decisions finding states 
in violation of their obligations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, these seven cases represent an implementation rate of 12 per cent. A review of 
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these implementation successes sheds light on the relationships among rights, imple-
mentation and follow-up activities.16
Of the cases in which the commission found a violation of the charter, 50 percent 
involve civil and political rights, such as the rights to free expression and association; 25 
percent involve economic, social, and cultural rights; and only five percent involve group 
rights. In the implementation successes cited above, the remedies have addressed the 
violations of basic civil and political rights, while violations of group economic, social, 
and cultural rights have been largely incidental in the outcome. It is therefore fair to say 
that cases principally involving traditional civil and political rights have a better chance 
of being implemented than those involving economic, social, cultural, or group rights. 
With regard to remedies, an analysis of the 60 cases indicates that the commis-
sion applies no consistent remedial framework. Indeed, the commission has issued 
a wide variety of rulings, ranging from no recommendations at all to a wide array of 
individual and general measures. Arguably, in those cases where the commission finds 
a violation but makes no specific recommendation, the remedy is implicit under gener-
ally accepted norms of international human rights law. This, however, is only true of a 
limited set of individual remedies, the implementation of which is much less complex 
than systemic reform. Indeed, this is reflective of the African system generally, where 
implementation successes are limited to those cases in which the commission has 
either not specified a remedy, or the remedy has been very limited and full implemen-
tation has required a single executive act, such as releasing a detainee or permitting 
repatriation. This speaks to the difficulty of implementing the much rarer instances in 
which the commission recommends that a state amend its legislative framework, not 
to mention the cases that implicate a broad set of remedies to address systematic or 
generalized human rights violations. 
A review of the African Commission’s work shows that while rights and remedies 
are certainly important aspects of the implementation calculus, it is the follow-up activi-
ties of civil society organizations, the African Commission, state officials, and other 
concerned parties, that are most determinative of implementation. Professor Obiora 
Chinedu Okafor writes of the importance of “activist forces” in bringing about compli-
ance with charter obligations in Nigeria under General Sani Abacha. Similarly, intense 
advocacy led the commission to reopen Modise v Botswana in 1993, and Mr. Modise’s 
lawyers were able to secure his right to nationality after years of negotiations with offi-
cials in the Justice and Foreign Affairs Ministries of Botswana. In Forum of Conscience 
v. Sierra Leone and Amnesty International v. Zambia, cases in which the commission 
articulated no specific remedy, implementation advanced as a result of promotional 
visits made by the commission to Sierra Leone and Zambia. Finally, the importance of 
follow-up activities is apparent in Malawi African Association et al. v. Mauritania, a case 
in which the commission did provide a robust set of remedies that have not yet been 
fully implemented, but which provided an excellent framework for civil society and the 
commission to work with the Mauritanian government on implementation.
The 2010 Rules of Procedure and a New Follow-Up Framework
In 2010, the commission adopted new rules of procedure that provide both a compre-
hensive follow-up process for the recommendations it makes, and establish a process to 
refer cases to the African Court where implementation does not result. Under Rule 115 
of the commission’s new rules, there are specific timelines for states to respond to the 
commission on matters of implementation. Further, matters are to be assigned to spe-
cific commissioners, who will then become the Rapporteur for Follow-Up in a particular 
case and who will be responsible for advancing issues of implementation and reporting 
on them both orally and in writing. While it remains to be seen how this new follow-
up framework will be put into practice with no apparent increase in the commission’s 
budget to support these activities, the new rules represent a significant opportunity to 
improve the commission’s poor implementation record. 
Perhaps even more important is the prospect for the submission of cases to the 
jurisdiction of the African Court. The new rules provide the impetus for the court and 
commission to work together to advance the protective mandate of the African system; 
they also promotes a fluid working relationship that has historically been absent. The 
rules further establish that the exhaustion of the Rule 115 follow-up procedures in a 
given case may result in referral to the court, providing both an incentive for states to 
implement the decisions and a significant recourse for litigants when they do not. This 
shift will thereby address the criticism that the commission has no follow-up frame-
work, as well as the concern that its decisions are not binding. Moreover, there is an 
indication that the African Court will aspire towards an enforcement mechanism like 
that used in the European system, where the political body of the African Union would 
oversee implementation of the court’s judgments.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The commission and court’s new rules of procedure provide an opportunity for inter-
ested parties to push for a more rigorous implementation regime. The following conclu-
sions and recommendations are offered to aid the process of improving implementation 
in the African system:
• The commission’s new rules provide a basic framework for an implementation 
reporting mechanism that could be important in recording implementation suc-
cesses and challenges, as well as in generating pressure for states to implement 
decisions. The reporting mechanism should be used to facilitate comparative 
analysis and pressure states to improve implementation. 
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• The establishment of a system of case-specific implementation rapporteurs is 
significant, but there is a concern that it will not provide the opportunity to cen-
tralize information about best practices. Interested parties should address this 
by encouraging the sharing of experiences during commission sessions and the 
collection of implementation-related information and reporting. Advocates should 
also request implementation hearings.
• The first referrals to the court present a tremendous opportunity to improve the 
implementation of decisions in the African system, both because states may 
engage in the implementation of commission decisions in order to avoid refer-
ral, and because they will feel more compelled to implement court decisions, 
which are legally binding. Interested parties should watch these first cases very 
closely, as they will define many aspects of court litigation in the near future, and 
litigants should develop implementation strategies in tandem with their litigation 
strategies.
• The commission is currently undecided about whether it will apply its new imple-
mentation procedures retroactively, but it has decided as a matter of internal 
policy that it will only refer cases to the court that have been decided under the 
new rules. Advocates should encourage the commission to apply its implementa-
tion procedures to previously decided cases and to refer certain unimplemented 
cases to the court. 
United Nations Treaty Bodies: 
The Human Rights Committee
The individual communications procedure allows the United Nations treaty bodies to 
consider, in a quasi-judicial manner, complaints of human rights violations by any 
individual within the jurisdiction of those states that have consented to the procedure. 
Currently, five UN treaty bodies can receive such communications: the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the Committee on the Elimi-
nation of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (CEDAW), and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. Because the HRC has adjudicated the greatest number of communications 
thus far, and because the other committees have largely modeled their follow-up proce-
dures on the HRC’s, its practice is examined in the greatest detail here.
Follow-Up Monitoring and Implementation of “Views”
In 1990, the HRC became the first treaty body to create the position of Special Rap-
porteur for Follow-up on Views, with a two-year renewable mandate to monitor a state’s 
implementation of the decisions, or “Views,” of the committee. Once the HRC’s deci-
sions are published, states are expected to reply within six months, explaining how they 
intend to implement the committee’s proposed remedial scheme. When a state’s reply 
is received, it is transmitted to the member(s) of the committee who authored the deci-
sion and to the victim or his/her representative, who may respond to the state’s submis-
sion. A summary of the state’s response and the HRC’s comments are subsequently 
published in the committee’s annual report to the UN General Assembly. Where the 
state’s reply is deemed inadequate, the committee will typically state in the report that 
it regards the dialogue as “ongoing.” Thereafter, the special rapporteur may conduct 
follow-up consultations with diplomatic representatives to facilitate implementation. As 
a general matter, those states most targeted for follow up have several communications 
registered against them that they have failed to address. Although the special rapporteur 
is the one who conducts these discussions, the Treaty Bodies Division of the Office of 
the High Commissioner Human Rights (OHCHR) determines which states should 
receive follow-up and coordinates the rapporteur’s agenda during one of the commit-
tee’s three yearly sessions. 
According to data compiled by OHCHR’s Petitions Section (the division that pro-
vides administrative support to the treaty bodies), compliance with the decisions of the 
treaty bodies is generally quite poor. Based on data submitted in its 2009 annual report, 
of the 546 cases in which the HRC found violations of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, only 67 cases—approximately twelve percent—have received 
a “satisfactory” response. Of the remaining cases, the state’s response was either “unsat-
isfactory,” in that it failed to address the merits of the committee’s findings, or the state 
never responded at all. Currently, the committee considers dialogue with states parties 
to be “ongoing” in just over half of the 546 cases, with some of these open cases dating 
back to the mid-1980s. In another 35 percent of the cases currently being monitored 
by the committee, the state of follow-up is unclear. The situation is less grim for the 
CAT, which has a nearly 50 percent rate of compliance and is the only other treaty body 
to have adjudicated a comparatively large number of communications. CEDAW has 
registered only 24 communications to date, although it has had a few successes with 
implementation, while the CERD has heard ten cases that resulted in findings of a 
violation, three of which have been satisfactorily implemented. 
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Factors Affecting Implementation 
One enduring challenge to the implementation of UN treaty body decisions is that they 
are not legally binding, although a number of commentators have argued that states, 
having accepted the jurisdiction of the communications procedure, remain duty-bound 
to respect their treaty obligations. At the same time, compliance with the committee 
need not be tethered to the fact that a state considers itself legally bound to implementa-
tion. In a number of cases, for instance, states that have expressed disagreement with 
the committee, or been negligent in follow-up procedures, nevertheless compensated 
claimants on an ex gratia basis or issued a financial remedy which, while not correcting 
the policy or practice that gave rise to the violation, offered some measure of compensa-
tion to the individual grievant. This has often occurred in cases of gross violations of 
human rights, where states have paid damages but not undertaken public investigations 
or prosecutions. It has also occurred in the area of immigration law, where detainees 
who were otherwise facing deportation have been granted permanent resident visas. 
There is not a clear relationship between the committee’s approach to remedies 
and implementation. In certain cases, the committee’s reluctance to propose specific, 
pragmatic remedies has abetted negligent implementation; yet in other cases, more 
detailed recommendations have been ignored. And in still other examples, successful 
(if partial) implementation has resulted from the committee’s saying little to nothing 
in its decision about remedies. 
Generally, successful implementation has occurred in cases with high political vis-
ibility and cases brought against states with a sophisticated rule of law tradition. Where 
implementation has taken place, it is frequently due to a strong civil society capable of 
complementing the committee’s follow-up efforts and applying other domestic pres-
sures. Even where states have not strictly complied with the committee’s Views, there 
are examples of successful dialogue between the state party and the committee, suggest-
ing that the treaty body system serves an important persuasive function that can build 
momentum for larger reforms. Some of the more particularized treaty bodies, such 
as CAT and CEDAW, have been comparatively more successful with implementation. 
CEDAW’s more rigorous approach to follow-up, and its highly prescriptive approach 
remedies, is particularly notable in this regard. 
Despite these qualified successes, the failures of implementation are many. A 
review of the committee’s recent annual reports reveals that several states have failed 
to respond at all to the committee’s decisions. Still other states have responded to the 
committee only belatedly, and have merely used the opportunity to contest anew the 
basis for the individual communication, or raise objections they did not make when 
the case was first under the committee’s consideration. These failures are perhaps the 
most troubling, because they represent the state’s fundamental unwillingness to engage 
in the review and follow-up process. Even in some states, such as Spain and Colombia, 
where domestic procedures have been established as a means to implement interna-
tional court decisions, the procedures have had a limited effect on implementation. 
Finally, despite some modest successes by the special rapporteur regarding follow-up, 
many states have failed to implement the HRC’s Views, or else have taken years to do 
so. Thus, while the special rapporteur can play an important role in pressuring states, it 
is clear that the office has inadequate time and resources to monitor its entire follow-up 
docket. Indeed, in spite of the committee’s repeated requests for greater funding to sup-
port the special rapporteur’s mandate there remains far too little financial commitment 
to both the follow-up role and the treaty body system in general. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Like the regional human rights systems, the UN treaty bodies suffer from an implemen-
tation deficit. Due in part to this fact, reform of the treaty monitoring bodies has been 
a topic of debate for many years, with much discussion focused on greater integration, 
and possible unification, of the treaty bodies’ procedure. As these proposals continue 
to be debated, there are a number of other steps that can be undertaken to improve 
implementation of the treaty bodies’ decisions:
• Greater resources must be allocated to support the Follow-Up Rapporteur; the 
current commitment is insufficient to the scale of implementation monitoring 
required. Improving the visibility, accessibility, and accuracy of information per-
tinent to implementation is also essential. 
• In addition to developing a more sustained approach to follow-up within OHCHR, 
there should be greater collaboration between the UN’s treaty-based bodies and 
charter-based bodies, particularly the UN Human Rights Council. Similarly, there 
should be systematic coordination between the treaty bodies and the UN Special 
Procedures mandate-holders so that they may address, where appropriate, the 
issue of implementation. 
• Because there are numerous means by which individual complaints may be reg-
istered with the UN systems, advocates should carefully consider which treaty 
body is the best forum for litigation. Depending on the nature of the violation in 
question, advocates should also consider whether other UN mechanisms, such as 
the Special Procedures, might be more effective. Follow-up in these other systems 
should also receive greater priority.
• Where possible, advocates should plead treaty body decisions before domestic 
judiciaries, in order to press more aggressively for implementation at the national 
level. At the same time, treaty bodies should endeavor to ensure thorough and 
comprehensive reasoning in their decisions and, where appropriate, rely on 
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pertinent national jurisprudence. Furthermore, states must concentrate resources 
at the national level in order to give greater effect to international human rights 
norms at the domestic level. 
 Conclusion: Improving Implementation through 
 Cross-System Dialogue
Europe, the Americas, and Africa, while appreciably different, have all struggled to 
create regional systems of human rights protection. Fortunately, the last decade has 
seen an increase in dialogue among the human rights systems on a range of issues. 
Implementation should be an integral part of this conversation. The findings of this 
report suggest three specifics areas that could be the focus of a cross-system dialogue 
on implementation.
 First, the structure and resourcing of the three regional human rights systems 
informs the implementation of judgments. While Europe decided to replace its two-tier, 
commission-court model for adjudicating human rights complaints with a permanent 
human rights court and the Inter-American system is working to make communica-
tions between its commission and court more efficient, both systems are wrestling with 
unmanageable caseloads. Meanwhile, the African Union recently established a human 
rights court that can receive petitions from the African Commission and in some cases 
from individuals. But its future is unclear and the African system could certainly benefit 
from a cross-system dialogue to exchange experiences, examine challenges, and share 
best practices. For its part, the UN treaty body system differs substantially from the 
regional systems in structure but, like the other systems, the Human Rights Commit-
tee shares the problem of an overwhelming caseload that affects its ability to effectively 
follow-up on the implementation of its decisions.
A second important topic for cross-system dialogue is the design of implementa-
tion mechanisms and procedures. Many experts agree that the Council of Europe has 
designed one of the most effective enforcement mechanisms operating to date, and it 
notably stands alone as the only system that relies on its political body to monitor the 
implementation of judicial decisions. Proposals to do something similar in the Inter-
American system have thus far been ignored, but the Protocol of the African Court 
seems to indicate that it will follow the European model when it begins the fundamental 
work of deciding cases on the merits. Similarly, there have been proposals, which this 
report supports, that the UN treaty bodies refer information on unimplemented deci-
sions to the Human Rights Council. Additionally, while the extent of victim participation 
in the process of implementation varies across systems, each system has a comparable 
method of communicating with states, which are ultimately responsible implementa-
tion. The systems would certainly benefit from an exchange of best practices in this 
area. Additionally, while the European and Inter-American systems are largely con-
sistent in the remedies they order, the African and UN systems are not, which begs a 
conversation about which practices best promote implementation. Finally, the Human 
Rights Committee and African system have both struggled with using rapporteurships 
to support implementation of their recommendations—another potentially fruitful area 
for comparative analysis and discussion. 
A third topic for cross-system dialogue is how different countries, as member 
states of the relevant regional or international systems, structure their implementation 
efforts once a decision is issued by a human rights body. As the decisions of human 
rights bodies often include recommendations or orders directed to the executive, judi-
cial, or legislative branches of the state structure, a lack of formalized channels of com-
munication among these different branches in matters relating to implementation often 
results in inaction. Perhaps the most effective model for creating a national mechanism 
to ensure implementation of regional decisions is the United Kingdom’s Human Rights 
Act, which established a Joint Committee on Human Rights that is responsible for 
monitoring implementation and ensuring proposed legislation conforms to the Euro-
pean Convention. Discussing this model together with examples of legislation from 
civil law jurisdictions such as Peru and Colombia, as well as proposals from federated 
states, would generate a rich dialogue from which other countries would surely ben-
efit. An equally important part of this discussion is the tremendous role that national 
human rights institutions and/or other human rights ombudspersons have to play in 
the implementation process. 
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I. The European System of 
 Human Rights
Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights (“European Court” or ECHR), as judicial guard-
ian of the European Convention on Human Rights, is generally regarded as the cor-
nerstone of one of the most successful human rights regimes in the world today. What 
was once an agreement among a small group of Western European states to guarantee 
core civil and political liberties by means of an optional judicial review mechanism has 
now been supplemented by 14 protocols, which have expanded the scope of rights guar-
anteed by the convention and recast the court as a “permanent [body] with compulsory 
jurisdiction over all member states to which aggrieved individuals enjoy direct access.”17 
With the accession of the former Soviet bloc states to the Council of Europe and, in 
1999, of Russia itself, there are now more than 800 million people with access to the 
court, spanning 47 states. The court’s reach is a testament to the European system’s 
significant achievements, but it also poses significant challenges.18 
The prompt and effective execution of the court’s judgments is one such chal-
lenge. As the Committee of Ministers (the political branch of the Council of Europe 
responsible for supervising the court’s judgments) has noted, the “speedy and efficient 
execution of judgments is essential for the credibility and efficacy of the [court] as a 
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constitutional instrument of European public order on which the democratic stabil-
ity of the Continent depends.”19 Yet according to the most recent report of Christos 
Pourgourides, the current Rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, “[T]he problem of non-implementation and/or delay 
in the implementation of Strasbourg judgments is far graver and more widespread than 
previous reports have disclosed.”20 Moreover, the relationship between the effective 
implementation of judgments and the court’s own overburdened docket underscores 
the larger, structural problems confronting the court. As Michael O’Boyle, the court’s 
deputy registrar, recently noted, “[T]he achievements of the Court are under threat by 
its own extraordinary popularity,” threatening “the prompt enforcement of judgments 
as the Council’s understaffed Execution Department struggles to keep abreast.”21 
The implementation of judgments has been a growing concern of the European 
system for some time, and has acquired particular urgency in the past decade. Indeed, 
in 2001 a Reflection Group for “Guaranteeing the Long-Term Effectiveness” of the court 
was established to debate, over the course of three years, a variety of issues ranging from 
the enforcement and supervision of court judgments to improving implementation at 
the national level. This initiative, in turn, provided the basis for the recent, long-delayed 
passage of Protocol 14 to the European Convention, which, in addition to simplifying 
the procedures for determining the admissibility of complaints, strengthens in several 
important ways the committee’s and court’s involvement in the implementation pro-
cess. Shortly after Russia—which had long been the only hold out—ratified Protocol 
14, an international conference, also designed to ensure the “long-term effectiveness” 
of the court, was held in Interlaken, Switzerland in February 2010. The fruit of this 
conference was the Interlaken Declaration, which, like Protocol 14, “stresses that full, 
effective and rapid execution of the final judgments of the Court is indispensable” to 
its successful functioning.22 To that end, the declaration calls on member states to 
produce specific proposals for reform by June 2012, and for a fuller implementation 
of the “subsidiarity principle,” which recognizes the primary role of states themselves 
in implementing court decisions.23 Properly conceived, implementation is thus a twin 
strategy: not only must the mechanisms for supervising the execution of judgments be 
strengthened at the Council level, but national governments, too, must prioritize the 
domestic implementation of judgments and the European Convention more generally.
This chapter examines the prospects for improving implementation of the Euro-
pean Court’s judgments in the wake of Interlaken and Protocol 14. In so doing, it takes 
a closer look, based on the European Court’s own data, as to the nature of the imple-
mentation crisis currently confronting the system. In addition to examining the factors 
contributing to this problem, it seeks to examine the court’s evolving approach to rem-
edies, explain the procedures that have evolved within the Council for monitoring the 
implementation of judgments, and lessons that might be learned from the implementa-
tion picture as it stands. The final section provides recommendations moving forward, 
emphasizing ways to strengthen enforcement mechanisms at the Council level, while 
also echoing the call for states to more effectively execute their own implementation 
obligations. 
The European Court at a Crossroads
Currently, the docket of the European Court reflects both the convention system’s 
immediate post-World War II history—when it was largely populated by more or less 
securely entrenched, liberal Western European democracies—and its post-Cold War 
period, when the events of the early 1990s led to a rapid increase in the Council of 
Europe’s membership. The convention, to which 22 states had previously been party, 
has been ratified by 25 new member states since 1990, auguring a rise in not only the 
number of petitions the court has received, but also the kinds of petitions that make 
up its docket. This rapid enlargement was coupled with the ratification of Protocol 11, 
which changed the institutional structure of the European system considerably, merg-
ing the European Commission (whose primary responsibility was judging the admis-
sibility of interstate and individual applications) into the court and granting individuals 
standing to file cases directly.24 At the same time, the Committee of Ministers, which 
had previously been entitled to decide, in certain cases, whether there was a violation 
of the convention, was tasked with the sole role of monitoring the implementation of 
judgments. 
Thus, as Professor Ed Bates has argued, “It is only really since the mid-1990s, 
and the entry into force of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, that the monitoring of the 
execution of Court judgments by the Committee of Ministers has become a cause for 
greater concern.”25 For much of this time, the consensus of most commentators had 
been that the court’s judgments “[were] routinely followed by the national courts of the 
states parties to the Convention, their legislatures, and their national governments.”26 
Yet such assertions of effective implementation are undermined by the fact that the 
court, as one scholar has noted, “has long been studied almost exclusively by legal 
scholars and has only recently attracted greater attention by social scientists interested 
in the issues of compliance with, and the effectiveness of, international legal institu-
tions.”27 Similarly, Eric Posner and John Yoo recently complained that “good data” was 
unavailable to determine if “compliance with ECHR judgments has been high or low.”28 
Such data has become increasingly available in the past five years, however, 
and there is now compelling evidence that, aside from those cases resolved through 
“friendly settlements,” implementation of court rulings has grown increasingly slow 
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and inconsistent.29 Furthermore, it has become clear that certain states pose particular 
problems for the convention system due to their capacity or willingness to implement 
court judgments. By the start of 2010, there were nearly 120,000 applications pending 
before a decision body of the court, an enormous backlog that continues to increase.30 
Indeed, the court’s caseload has “multiplied by a factor of ten” in the past decade, 
such that more than 90 percent of the court’s judgments have been delivered between 
1998 and 2008 alone.31 Furthermore, of the pending cases, five states—Russia, Turkey, 
Romania, Ukraine, and Italy—account for over 60 percent (69,100 applications) of the 
court’s workload.32 
As the volume of applications reaching the court has outstripped its capacity for 
speedy determination, the Committee of Ministers’ ability to supervise the implementa-
tion of judgments has diminished as well. In January 2007, the year that the execution 
of ECHR judgments began to be systematically monitored and made public by the 
Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, over 5,000 judgments (includ-
ing decisions rendered under the pre-1998 regime) were still listed as pending before 
the Committee of Ministers; by the end of 2009, that figure had risen to 7,887.33 Thus, 
in the past two years alone, the number of pending cases has risen at an annual rate of 
18 percent, far outpacing the number of cases that have been closed. This means that 
the Department for the Execution of Judgments was called upon to examine over 1,500 
new cases decided by the court in 2009 (including 204 “leading” cases—those revealing 
systemic problems), and assisted the Committee of Ministers in monitoring the prog-
ress of execution measures in 7,887 cases overall.34 Notably, the vast majority of these 
cases—nearly 90 percent—are “repetitive” or “clone” cases related to systemic problems 
that have already been adjudicated by the court; these cases are usually grouped together 
for the purposes of the committee’s examination.35 For example, Italy represents 31 per-
cent of the total number of pending cases in 2009 (nearly all of which are connected 
to one issue—the excessive length of judicial proceedings), followed by Turkey, Russia, 
Poland, Ukraine, and Romania.36 
These figures represent a growing problem for the court, one that has compounded 
itself over time. Andreas Von Staden notes that a review of all judgments issued by the 
now defunct commission and court between 1960 and 2005 show that all judgments 
rendered up to 1995, save one, had been implemented.37 (The 1991 case still pending, 
F.C.B. v. Italy, was closed in 1993 but later reopened.) Beginning in 1996, however, 
the first non-implemented judgments began to appear, and the number has increased 
steadily, such that they are now a relatively frequent occurrence. For example, in 1996, 
only 12.5 percent of cases that had been adjudicated by the court were still awaiting sat-
isfactory implementation; however, by 2005, that figure had risen to 63 percent.38 Based 
on these data, von Staden argues that a “bifurcated picture” emerges, in which there is 
“near-perfect compliance” with those judgments rendered up to 1995 (qualified by the 
fact that the Committee of Ministers during that time tended to be “relatively timorous” 
and “more lenient and trusting in the pledges made by respondent states”), followed 
by a progressive downward trend in implementation from 1996-2005.39 Importantly, a 
number of settled democracies—Italy, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom—now 
have judgments pending for more than six years as well. Currently, 63 percent of the 
“leading” cases pending before the committee have been pending for fewer than two 
years, while 22 percent have been pending for two to five years and 15 percent for five 
years or more. This latter figure represents an increase of four percent from 2008.40 
The Court’s Evolving Docket
Beyond these statistics, there are a number of factors related to the court’s docket that 
inform the implementation debate as well. As the Directorate General of Human Rights 
and Legal Affairs recently remarked, the court’s “workload problem is not just a ques-
tion of figures,” because it has also seen in recent years a “number of cases relating to 
complex and sensitive issues, which need much more time to resolve.”41 Several general 
trends in the court’s docket exemplify these complexities.
First, procedural rights, those provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the conven-
tion, have been most frequently invoked by applicants, particularly as they relate to the 
essential characteristics of a “fair hearing” and the length of judicial proceedings; as a 
result, these cases consume a significant portion of the Committee of Ministers’ work 
and, with particular respect to Article 6, “disclose an extensive array of positive obli-
gations.”42 Applications alleging excessive length of proceedings have been registered 
against a number of state parties but have reached “epic proportions” in Italy, where a 
civil case can take between 26 and 46 months to be completed. Likewise, complaints 
about the length of judicial proceedings is a common phenomenon in many Central 
and Eastern European states, as are complaints alleging Article 13 violations for the 
non-implementation of domestic judgments.43 
Second, as many scholars have argued, prior to the 1990s the European Court’s 
docket dealt primarily with “lifestyle issues” and were “nonviolent, administrative in 
character,”44 meaning the court was predominantly occupied with protecting individuals 
and groups from “good-faith limitations on liberty.”45 These so-called negative obliga-
tions, which essentially require states not to interfere in the exercise of rights, “have 
always been regarded as inherent in the European Convention.” However, positive obli-
gations have assumed an increasingly larger role in the court’s jurisprudence as well. 
According to Alistair Mowbray, the principal circumstances in which the court has 
derived positive obligations from the convention’s provisions include the duty upon 
states, under Article 10, to take operational measures (such as deploying police or mili-
tary personnel) to protect individuals from infringement of their convention rights by 
other private parties; the obligation, under Article 13, to provide an effective domestic 
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remedial mechanism; and the obligation, under Article 3, to provide appropriate medi-
cal care for detainees.46 Notably, these cases often require a significantly greater expen-
diture of public resources and can raise contentious political questions, making them 
more difficult for states to implement and for the committee to monitor.
Third, the nature of complaints that have come before the court in the past ten 
years has changed dramatically, involving more frequent allegations of systematic 
human rights abuses. In 2009, for instance, the Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights identified cases concerning “death or ill-treatment 
which took place under the responsibility of state forces and lack of an effective inves-
tigation thereof” as those that raise the most prevalent implementation problems.47 To 
this point, Christian Tomuschat notes that the “conclusion seems to be warranted that 
the centre of gravity of the ECHR has shifted toward Eastern Europe,” resulting in both 
an increased workload for the court as well as a “very different membership to the Con-
vention … compared to just 10 or 15 years ago.”48 Here, Russia and Turkey, in particular, 
loom large, as cases against both countries have included such serious allegations as the 
destruction of villages, the prohibition of political parties, and the torture or disappear-
ance of detainees in Chechnya and the southeastern Kurdish regions.49 Other categories 
of structural violations that have filled the court’s docket include overcrowding in deten-
tion facilities, delayed or inadequate compensation for expropriation, problems with 
remand proceedings, and State Security Court proceedings taking place in Turkey.50 
Fourth, minority rights have assumed a more prominent place in the court’s 
docket since the late 1990s, including complaints from ethnic groups alleging, inter 
alia, discrimination, lack of official recognition, and restrictions on effective partici-
pation in public and political life.51 While the largest groups of such cases have been 
brought by Kurdish victims, litigation over Roma rights also features prominently on 
the court’s docket. The European system, in particular, has “charted a legal revolution of 
sorts in recent years,” recently striking down a nationwide system of racial segregation 
in Czech schools that left Roma children languishing in “special schools” for students 
who were, at the time, termed “mentally deficient.”52 Since then, two more decisions 
have struck down similar systems of racial segregation in education as Roma commu-
nities, the vast majority of whom reside in Central and Eastern Europe, have sought to 
“reframe and rearticulate the myriad social problems they [are] suffering as violations 
of their fundamental human rights.”53 
In view of these developments, the current situation presents a variety of chal-
lenges to the European human rights system, not least of which is the effective and 
prompt implementation of judgments. The following section describes in greater detail 
the remedial framework the court applies to cases and its relationship to implementa-
tion, before examining the mechanisms and working methods of those entities respon-
sible for the monitoring of court judgments.
 
ECHR’s Remedial Framework and Its Relationship 
to Compliance
In Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, the European Court reiterated that a judgment finding 
a breach “imposes on the respondent state a legal obligation not just to pay those con-
cerned the sum awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to choose, subject to super-
vision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual 
measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found 
by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects.”54 When assessing whether or 
not a state’s proposed measure satisfies the court’s judgments, the rules prescribe an 
obligation on the committee to examine three questions:
1) Whether any “just satisfaction” (often a combination of pecuniary losses, non-
pecuniary losses, courts costs, and interest payments) awarded by the court under 
Article 41 of the convention has been paid;
2) Whether individual measures have been taken to ensure that the violation in 
question has ceased and restitutio in integrum achieved—in other words, that the 
injured party is restored, to the extent possible, to the same situation he or she 
enjoyed prior to the violation; and
3) Whether general measures have been adopted, so as to prevent “new violations 
similar to that or those found putting an end to continuing violations.”55 
Just Satisfaction
Just satisfaction is the only measure that the court can order a state to take under the 
terms of the convention itself.56 As noted, the payment of sums can be ordered by the 
court, or provided for by a judgment that takes note of a friendly settlement between 
the parties; in both cases, however, payment is expected within three months after the 
judgment has become final. Since January 1996, the court has also included an order 
to states to pay simple interest, calculated on a daily basis, from the expiry of the three 
months until payment. Clare Ovey and Robin White, authors of an authoritative treatise 
on the court, further note that if a respondent state is unable to supply proof of payment, 
“the case will return to the agenda at every subsequent meeting until the Committee is 
satisfied that the money has been paid in full.”57
Professor Elizabeth Lambert-Abdelgawad contends that, as a general matter, the 
obligation to pay “just satisfaction raises few difficulties: it is an obligation that can be 
clearly and immediately fulfilled,” and, to a large degree, it is.58 According to the Com-
mittee of Ministers’ 2008 annual report, payments made after the three-month deadline 
are the exception, making up only five percent of all payments in 2008 (although this 
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figure doubled to 11 percent in 2009, according to the report).59 Unsurprisingly, most 
of those countries with the highest awards of just satisfaction—Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, 
Romania, Russia, and Turkey—were also those that had the highest numbers of cases 
in which payment was not made within the deadline set by the judgment.60 
Although state compliance with the payment of just satisfaction is generally high, 
problems have nevertheless arisen. Most recently, in a rare case of defiance, the Turkish 
government objected to the court’s award of compensation in the case of Loizidou v. 
Turkey, where the court found that the denial to a Greek Cypriot of access to her prop-
erty in Northern Cyprus violated the right to peaceful enjoyment of property under the 
convention.61 The court issued its decision in Loizidou in 1998; however, Turkey refused 
to pay the awarded sum, leading the Committee of Ministers to adopt an interim resolu-
tion in July 2000, stating that Turkey’s refusal to satisfy the judgment “demonstrates a 
manifest disregard for its international obligations.”62 The committee issued yet another 
resolution—perhaps its strongest yet—in 2001, declaring its “resolve to ensure, with 
all the means available to [it], Turkey’s compliance with its obligations.”63 Ultimately, 
Turkey complied with the ordered payment in 2003, which, although delayed, suggests 
that the committee’s use of interim resolutions has been successful, at least regarding 
just satisfaction orders. 
Individual Measures
Where the adverse consequences of a violation are not adequately remedied by the pay-
ment of just satisfaction, the Committee of Ministers will also examine whether it is 
necessary to impose individual measures. The committee recently stressed the need to 
take such measures “considering the seriousness of the violations found and the time 
that has elapsed since the European Court’s judgments became final.”64 Individual mea-
sures depend on the nature of the violation and the applicant’s situation. One notable 
example includes the reopening of domestic judicial proceedings, which the European 
Court has held to be a measure as close to restitutio in integrum as possible. Alternately, 
although less common in practice, the committee may order “positive obligations” that 
a respondent state is obliged to undertake, such as ordering the destruction of police 
files that the court determined had been obtained in breach of the right to privacy,65 
the recognition of a church that had previously been refused official status,66 or the 
reinstatement of an employee who was unlawfully excluded from the civil service.67 
With respect to the reopening of proceedings, this measure arises primarily in 
connection with criminal proceedings, either as a result of the court’s having deter-
mined that a procedural injustice in the applicant’s original trial gave rise to a breach 
of Article 6, or because a criminal law of a particular state was substantively incompat-
ible with the European Convention.68 In response to certain implementation problems 
caused by the lack of appropriate national legislation authorizing the reopening of judi-
cial proceedings, the Committee of Ministers recommended, in 2000, that member 
states ensure that there exists at the national level adequate mechanisms for reopening 
cases.69 
General Measures
General measures aim to prevent the recurrence of a violation of the convention. They 
serve a preventive rather than remedial function, one which, in the court’s words, “must 
be such as to remedy [a] systemic defect … so as not to overburden the Convention sys-
tem with large numbers of application deriving from the same cause.”70 Significantly, 
general measures were not initially considered to fall under the Committee of Minis-
ters’ purview; it was not until 1983 that the committee indicated that its competence 
to review a judgment’s execution extended beyond the individual case to encompass 
general measures as well, although this practice has been followed ever since.71 To date, 
member states have adopted more than 350 constitutional, legislative, or regulatory 
reforms, or other general measures to comply with ECHR judgments. More than 400 
of these reforms are currently under the Committee of Ministers’ supervision. 
Ovey and White contend that over half of the general measures supervised by the 
committee to date involve changes to legislation, while other measures have included 
“administrative reforms, changes to court practice or the introduction of human rights 
training for the police.”72 As others have noted, however, what the committee regards as 
sufficient evidence that a state’s proposed general measures are sufficient varies from 
cases to case “with little apparent rationale.”73 For instance, in certain cases, the com-
mittee has accepted a mere promise by a respondent state that the offending practice 
will not happen again, but on other occasions the committee has awaited actual enact-
ment of proposed legislation before issuing a final resolution. Despite these variations, 
Lambert-Abdelgawad notes that there are certain measures “to which the Committee 
… has been wedded from the outset,” including the translation of the court’s judgment 
and dissemination to national authorities, as well as the “translation of interim resolu-
tions of the Committee of Ministers into the language of the country concerned.”74 In 
yet other cases, general measures undertaken by states have included the construction 
of new detention centers,75 enhanced training of child welfare workers,76 the estab-
lishment of a national commission for policing ethics,77 and increased recruitment of 
judicial officers.78
An Evolving Remedial Framework
Until recently, the European Court adhered to a modest conception of its remedial 
powers.79 Indeed, the court “did not even consider [itself ] competent to remedy the 
consequences of the treaty violation,” other than its enumerated power to award just 
satisfaction.80 However, there has been a shift in the court’s position on this issue in 
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recent years, as it has “begun to develop a practice whereby it specifies in the opera-
tive part of its judgments the specific measures to be taken by the respondent State 
to redress the violation … in a manner as close to restitutio in integrum as possible.”81 
This shift owes, in part, to the enormous increase in applications reaching the court, as 
well as the court’s perceived lack of clarity in specifying remedial measures.82 Indeed, 
after growing criticism over this issue, the Committee of Ministers, in 2004, issued a 
resolution inviting the court, “as far as possible, [to] identify in its judgments … what 
it considers to be an underlying systemic problem and the source of this problem, in 
particular when it is likely to give rise to numerous applications, so as to assist states 
in finding the appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the 
execution of judgments.”83 
The court took up the committee’s challenge one month later, in the first of what 
has since come to be known as the “pilot judgment” procedure. In the case of Broniowski 
v. Poland, the court held that the expropriation by the Polish government of property 
belonging to the applicants east of the Bug River, which Poland had ceded to the Soviet 
Union after World War II, constituted a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because 
inadequate compensation had been paid.84 Doctrinally, Broniowski did not represent a 
significant departure from the court’s restitution jurisprudence; however, in the opera-
tive part of the judgment, the court expressly stated that the violation of the applicant’s 
right “originated in a widespread problem which resulted from a malfunctioning of Pol-
ish legislation and administrative practice and which has affected and remains capable 
of affecting a large number of persons.”85 Thus, the court required the Polish govern-
ment to adopt appropriate measures to secure an adequate right of compensation not 
only for Broniowski, but for the 67 similarly situated applicants who had pending cases, 
and the 80,000 potential applicants as well. Moreover, in the ensuing judgment, the 
court further assessed not only the settlement between the applicant and Poland, but 
also the general measures taken by Poland to remedy the systemic defect.86 In so doing, 
the court stated that “it is evidently desirable for the effective functioning of the Conven-
tion system that individual and general redress should go hand in hand.” 
In effect, Broniowski stands as the court’s “creation of international law’s first class 
action mechanism,” one which has been largely welcomed for its time and labor-saving 
effects.87 According to Professor Steven Greer, there are three distinct advantages to 
the court’s increased specificity about the kind of systemic action required by national 
authorities: (1) implementation is “less open to political negotiation” in the Commit-
tee of Ministers; (2) it is easier for the committee (as well as other NGOs and human 
rights bodies) to monitor objectively; and (3) a state’s failure to implement is easier to 
enforce by the original litigant, and others, “through the national legal process as an 
authoritatively confirmed Convention violation.”88 
However, in addition to criticisms over the legal basis of the pilot judgment pro-
cedure, commentators have also pointed to the practical problems that this approach 
might pose during the execution phase, as it would “entail stringent remedial measures 
to address the structural problems of domestic legal systems which may prove very dif-
ficult for the Committee of Ministers to monitor.”89 Critics have also expressed concern 
that, unlike Broniowski, where the court passed judgment on the effectiveness of the 
Polish government’s legislative scheme, more recent applications of the procedure have 
been subject to less scrutiny. For instance, in two recent cases, the court evaluated the 
respondent government’s compliance with the procedure by reviewing only the proposed 
text of new legislation, and relying on the contention that the proposed remedies were 
“in principle” capable of providing redress and avoiding future violations.90 It should 
also be noted that the success of Broniowski was due, in part, to the Polish government’s 
“constructive attitude” to the court’s remedial scheme, which may not be the case in 
other circumstances. Indeed, in a subsequent pilot judgment concerning the inadequa-
cies of housing legislation, the Polish government challenged the application of the 
procedure before the Grand Chamber of the court on the grounds that the applicant’s 
circumstances were not those of a typical landlord.91 Finally, the timeliness of a state’s 
response to a pilot judgment is critical, a fact that the court acknowledged when it laid 
down a specific timetable for implementation in its most recent pilot judgment, Burdov 
v. Russia (No. 2), concerning Russia’s failure to honor judgment debts to applicants who 
had suffered from radioactive emissions in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster.92
The court has subsequently, if cautiously, applied the pilot judgment procedure 
to civil and political rights violations in other member states,93 although its applicability 
to different situations is unclear. Still, as Laurence Helfer argues, the pilot judgment 
procedure represents a significant shift in the ECHR’s own powers, in that the court has 
claimed the authority to scrutinize the legislative and administrative regulations that 
national governments adopt to comply with its remedial orders and recommendations. 
In other words, the court has “arrogated to itself the power to monitor compliance with 
its most far-reaching judgments, a power that was previously the exclusive province of 
the Council of Europe’s political bodies.”94 While more research and experience with 
this process is clearly needed, this shift in the court’s orientation is a welcome step, one 
that, as one commentator has noted, “Is a promising way to channel the cooperation 
between national and Strasbourg institutions to improve compliance with the ECHR.”95
Finally, in certain areas of rights—particularly those related to property restitution 
and unlawful detention—the court has taken a more prescriptive approach to remedies, 
one that has been welcomed by a number of advocates as an important step towards 
more effective implementation.96 The earliest such case, Papamichalopoulos and Others 
v. Greece, came in 1995, where the applicants established a violation of their rights as 
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a result of the Greek Navy’s occupation of their land.97 In its judgment, the court held 
that the Greek state must return the land in question or pay compensation equal to its 
current value, in order to “put the applicants as far as possible in a situation equivalent 
to the one in which they would have been if there had not been a breach [of the Con-
vention].”98 The court has shown a similarly proactive approach in ordering remedies 
for violations of the right to a fair trial. For example, whereas the court historically 
refused to find that an Article 6 violation should lead to an automatic annulment of the 
penalties imposed by the domestic proceedings, more recent judgments confirm that 
the court now considers the reopening of those proceedings to be the most appropriate 
form of redress.99 
Furthermore, in two cases in 2004, the court’s Grand Chamber ordered the 
respondent states to release applicants who had remained in custody in circumstances 
that the court deemed unlawful under Articles 5 and 6. In the first case, Assanidze 
v. Georgia, the petitioner was arrested on suspicion of illegal financial dealings and 
remained in detention for three years after the Georgian Supreme Court had acquitted 
him and ordered his release. The Grand Chamber found that Assanidze’s continuing 
detention was arbitrary and, in view of the need to end the continuing convention viola-
tions, ordered Georgia to “secure the applicant’s release at the earliest possible date.”100 
In doing so, the court reasoned, “by its very nature, [that] the violation found in the 
instant case does not leave any real choice as to the measures required to remedy it.”101 
The court came to a similar conclusion in Ilascu, Ivantoc, Lesco and Petrov-Popa v. Mol-
dova, when it found that the four applicants had been, and continued to be, unlawfully 
detained in the Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria. Here, the court went further than 
it did in Assanidze, stating that the sentence could not “be regarded as ‘lawful deten-
tion’” and ordered the respondent states to “take every measure to put an end to the arbi-
trary detention of the applicants still detained and to ensure their immediate release.”102 
As Professor Philip Leach, director of the European Human Rights Advocacy Cen-
tre, and several other commentators have argued, the court’s judgments in both Assani-
dze and Ilascu were important not only because of the nature of the redress stipulated 
by the court, “but also because the respondent states were not given a choice as to the 
means of complying with the judgments; the requirement to release the applicants was 
in addition to an obligation to pay compensation.”103 In Assanidze, the approach worked; 
Georgia fulfilled its obligation and released Assanidze four days after the court delivered 
its judgments.104 In Ilascu, however, only one applicant was released in the wake of the 
court’s judgment. Lesco was not released until 2001, at the expiry of his sentence, while 
Ivantoc and Petrov-Popa remained in custody until 2007.105 
Despite this disregard for the court’s order, the court’s willingness to move 
towards a more prescriptive approach is notable, particularly as the cases in which it 
has done so the most often—expropriation, unlawful detention—often pertain to viola-
tions of a continuing character, such that the remedial duty is unambiguous and aimed 
at securing immediate cessation of the wrongful act; in the court’s words, “the nature of 
the violation found may be such as to leave no real choice as to the measures required to 
remedy it.”106 The court’s inclusion of the release of the applicants in the operative parts 
of its Ilascu judgment (and elsewhere) is also significant insofar as it means that the 
remedy itself is legally binding; indeed, Petrov-Popa and Ivantoc, while still in detention, 
filed a new application before the court, alleging that Russia and Moldova’s failures to 
comply constituted a violation of their duty under Article 46 of the European Conven-
tion.107 This is the first such application to reach the European Court and may well pave 
the way for future enforcement litigation, in addition to the anticipated infringement 
proceedings under Protocol 14, which are discussed further below. 
Implementation Monitoring in the Council of Europe
Because the European Convention system is founded on the principle of subsidiarity, 
decisions of the court are declaratory in nature, meaning that it is for the contracting 
states, in the first instance, “to decide how best to secure the substance of the Conven-
tion rights in their domestic legal system, and also to choose the means by which they 
comply with judgments of the Court.”108 At the same time, Article 46(1) of the conven-
tion requires that states “undertake to abide by the final judgment of the court in any 
case to which they are parties” and to amend, if necessary, domestic law or practice 
should a judgment of the court so require.109 The court itself is not empowered to over-
rule national decisions or annul national laws; rather, “states must work backwards 
from the violation to understand what must be changed to remedy the violation in the 
specific case and to avoid what future cases might also arise.”110 
The Committee of Ministers and the Department for the Execution of Judgments
As set forth by Article 46(2) of the convention, the Committee of Ministers is the statu-
tory body tasked with monitoring state compliance with judgments of the court.111 The 
committee currently meets four times a year, usually once at the ministerial level but 
otherwise at the level of deputies—the permanent representatives of member states of 
the Council of Europe.112 As Steven Greer notes, “[v]irtually all the Committee of Min-
isters’ responsibilities with respect to the supervision of the execution of judgments 
are discharged by Deputies and the ministers themselves are likely to intervene only in 
particularly sensitive inter-state cases.”113 (Notably, this applies to the general composi-
tion of the Committee of Ministers; deputies themselves meet three times monthly in 
working sessions, in addition to the quarterly meetings.) While the Committee of Min-
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isters is a political body that sees the supervision of the implementation of the court’s 
judgments as “essentially—and successfully—based on constructive and co-operative 
dialogue between states,” the supervision process is itself a legal mechanism relating 
to, in Philip Leach’s words, “the enforcement of a legally binding judgment.”114 To that 
end, the committee, in addition to having its own Secretariat, is assisted in its duties 
by the Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs (one 
of five Directorates General), and, since the late 1990s, by the specialized Department 
for the Execution of Judgments, which is housed within the Human Rights and Legal 
Affairs Directorate. 
According to Andrew Drzemczewski, the responsibility of the Human Rights 
and Legal Affairs Directorate is “to provide the Committee of Ministers [with] logistic 
and secretarial assistance […], liaising with State authorities via their delegations in 
Strasbourg, analyzing national legislative texts in order to verify their conformity with 
the Court’s findings, and helping, where necessary, to draft proposals for adoption by 
the Committee.”115 Significantly, the Department for the Execution of Judgments is typi-
cally the first point of contact for information concerning the execution of judgments. 
Furthermore, unlike the committee, the Department for the Execution of Judgments is 
staffed with legally trained professionals, thus assuring that the cases are legally evalu-
ated before the committee makes a decision as to whether or not to close them. 
 While the European Convention is silent as to how implementation of the court’s 
judgments should be supervised, rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers in 2001 
(and amended in 2006) set forth its procedures for monitoring compliance.116 Within 
six months of the court’s judgment becoming final, the respondent state is required 
to provide information about the implementation measures taken, or that it intends to 
take, and to provide an “action plan” with a specified time frame for its envisaged com-
pliance.117 The case is then, in principle, placed on the agenda of the committee’s next 
meeting, or of a meeting to take place no more than six months later, until such time as 
a final resolution is adopted. A judgment is deemed “executed,” or fully implemented, 
when a final resolution issues. 
While regarded as one of the most effective enforcement mechanisms within the 
Council of Europe, much of the Committee of Ministers’ work remains confidential. 
Fortunately, the committee’s operating rules have become significantly more transpar-
ent in recent years.118 To that end, the agenda and information provided to the committee 
“by the state concerned, together with the accompanying documents, are made public, 
as are the agenda and annotated proceedings of each meeting containing information 
about progress recorded in executing judgments.”119 However, under Article 21 of the 
Statute of the Council of Europe, the deliberations of the committee itself are private, 
unless it decides otherwise.120 Furthermore, in 2007 the committee began publishing 
an annual report on supervision of the implementation of judgments, which details the 
number of cases that have been closed and those still pending review. A user-friendly 
website now presents information on the status of implementation in most cases.121 
Significantly, victims and their advocates play only a limited role in the implemen-
tation monitoring process and, until 2006, they played no role at all. Now, however, 
under Rule 9 of the Committee of Ministers’ amended rules of procedure, victims 
and/or their representatives are entitled to communicate with the committee about the 
implementation of individual measures, including the payment of just satisfaction.122 
Furthermore, non-governmental organizations and national institutions for human 
rights (NHRIs) may make written submissions regarding individual and general mea-
sures, which the Secretariat “shall bring, in an appropriate way… to the attention of the 
Committee of Ministers.”123 Unfortunately, as several commentators have noted, these 
expanded participatory rights have yet to be used to their full effect, as “NGOs and 
[NHRIs] across Europe are not fully aware of the possibilities, nor of the mechanics, of 
engaging in this process.”124
Where a case is pending before the Committee of Ministers, the committee may 
adopt interim resolutions, “in order to provide information on the state of progress of 
the execution” or “to express concern and/or to make suggestions with respect to the 
execution.”125 (The committee adopted nine such resolutions in 2009.126) Interim reso-
lutions may be adopted with various objectives, including, inter alia, urging authorities 
within a particular state to conclude ongoing reforms; to express concerns about any 
perceived negligence or delay in implementing the court’s judgment; or to provide an 
indication of what execution measures the committee expects to be implemented.127 
The latter is known as an “informative” resolution, and, as Murray Hunt notes, the 
committee is “increasingly adopting” such resolutions in order to “insist on specific 
individual measures … to remove as far as possible the effects of violations.”128 Similarly, 
the committee has also undertaken the relatively new process of issuing memoranda, 
which are meant to explain the steps the committee considers a state should under-
take in cases related to structural violations.129 These documents may either precede or 
follow the committee’s adoption of an interim resolution or, as Lambert-Abdelgawad 
has noted, as “a way of avoiding interim resolutions which might not be followed by 
concrete measures.”130
Beyond these measures, new working methods aimed at improving compliance 
were prepared under the responsibility of the Norwegian delegation, adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers’ deputies in 2004, and subsequently built upon.131 One such 
reform was to establish implementation timetables early in the supervision process, 
accompanied by the use of publicly accessible “status sheets” that would include infor-
mation about the status of implementation and whether the committee had proposed 
any particular action.132 Furthermore, where the measures required for the execution 
of a judgment are not self-evident, the committee’s secretariat has begun to send let-
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ters to respondent states proposing measures to be undertaken. Meetings between the 
Execution Department and the states’ representatives based in Strasbourg and, occa-
sionally, with representatives of the applicants, have also become more frequent. They 
aim to establish, as early as possible in the execution process, the plan to be followed 
in individual cases, as well as planning the execution of the country’s docket of cases.133
Taken together, these reforms reflect a recognition of “competing needs,” includ-
ing a need for flexibility in establishing a compliance timeline, “as against ‘the interests 
at stake for the individuals’ and the imperative of preventing new applications to the 
Court following judgments concerning systematic violations.”134 For instance, while 
the initial phase of supervision usually lasts six months, the committee determined 
that such timeframes may be reduced in urgent cases, systemic cases, or cases of “very 
serious violations.”135 Furthermore, if all the requisite general measures will not be car-
ried out in six months to one year, the committee has resolved to consider adopting “a 
more robust framework for execution.”136 To that end, the committee has developed a 
non-exhaustive list of criteria for the purposes of highlighting cases in which debate is 
warranted, including, inter alia: whether or not an applicant’s situation warranted spe-
cial supervision, whether a judgment reflected a new departure in case law, if a potential 
systemic problem was at stake, where the committee and state “are not agreed about 
the measures required,” or if debate had been requested by another state delegation.137 
Where implementation is delayed, the committee may seek to put additional pres-
sure on a respondent state by undertaking more frequent examinations of the case, 
increasing communications between the committee chair and the minister of foreign 
affairs of the state in question, and by adopting a public interim resolution. Where 
there is persistent failure to implement, the committee may adopt successively more 
strongly worded interim resolutions—as it has most notably done in the cases of Italy 
and Turkey—and issue appeals to other member states, urging them to take appro-
priate action to ensure compliance. Ultimately, the Statute of the Council of Europe 
empowers the Committee of Ministers to sanction non-compliant states by suspending 
or expelling them under Articles 3 and 8; however, the committee has rarely resorted 
to these measures and many have argued that such extreme measures “would prove 
counter-productive in most cases.”138 Thus, as Lambert-Abdelgawad notes, there are “no 
immediate measures between light weapons (such as interim resolutions) and the heavy 
artillery of [suspension and expulsion].”139
Importantly, the ratification of Protocol 14 provides some additional measures 
that seek to fill this gap.140 One innovation permits the committee, by a vote of two-
thirds of its representatives, to seek an interpretive ruling from the court where there 
is disagreement as to the meaning of an original judgment. Another new measure 
gives the committee, also subject to a two-thirds vote, the authority to bring infringe-
ment proceedings against a recalcitrant state (having first served it with a notice to 
comply).141 This infringement procedure, as the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 
notes, “does not aim to reopen the question of a violation,” nor does it provide for the 
payment of financial penalties by a party found to be in violation of Article 46. Rather, 
it was thought that the “political pressure exerted by proceedings for non-compliance in 
the Grand Chamber and by the latter’s judgment should suffice to secure execution of 
the Court’s initial judgment by the state concerned.”142 However, as commentators have 
noted, infringement proceedings will not be without risk because the method, as pres-
ently conceived, would remove the committee’s jurisdiction over supervision pending 
the court’s findings and would require the committee to close the case if the court found 
no Article 46 breach.143 Moreover, even assuming the court did find a failure to comply, 
it is not yet clear what the consequence of doing so would be, because the case would 
ultimately return to the Committee of Ministers. At the same time, both interpretation 
and infringement proceedings could be of crucial importance. As Alastair Mowbray 
notes, they may prove particularly useful “for pilot judgments where no friendly settle-
ment has taken place,” insofar as they would “be a useful tool for the Committee to 
employ as a way of assisting or encouraging [a] state to introduce key reforms.”144
The Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 
In addition to the Committee of Ministers, the Council of Europe’s other main statu-
tory body is the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE). PACE is composed of delegations 
from the member states’ parliaments and also engages on matters of compliance with 
court judgments.145 The agenda of one of PACE’s four annual sessions now includes 
the implementation of judgments, regarding which various resolutions and recom-
mendations are adopted. The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, a sub-
committee of the Parliamentary Assembly, is responsible for reporting to the assembly 
on implementation-related issues. In addition to the sanctions that the Committee of 
Ministers may impose, the assembly may also sanction Council members for their 
“persistent failure to honor obligations and commitments accepted … by adopting a 
resolution and/or a recommendation,” or by the non-ratification of the credentials of a 
state’s parliamentary delegation.146
PACE’s increased involvement in the execution of judgments dates back to 1993, 
when it instructed the Legal Affairs Committee to report to it “when problems arise on 
the situation of human rights in member states, including their compliance with judg-
ments by the European Court,” and adopted a monitoring procedure to that effect.147 
Furthermore, in 1997 the assembly established a monitoring mechanism—the Assem-
bly Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States 
of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee)—responsible for “verifying the ful-
fillment of [member state] obligations” under the terms of the Statute of the Council 
of Europe, as well as the European Convention.148 While less frequently engaged with 
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compliance-related efforts than the Legal Affairs Committee, the Monitoring Committee 
has included the implementation of judgments in several of its reports on the honoring 
of obligations and commitments by member states.149
Currently, the Parliamentary Assembly’s role in supervising the execution of 
judgments takes several forms. First, as Lambert-Abdelgawad notes, members of the 
assembly “have no hesitation in using written questions to obtain explanations from the 
Committee of Ministers concerning the failure to execute certain judgments,” which, 
in turn, requires the committee to provide a written answer.150 Second, under PACE 
Resolution 1226, the assembly decided to “adopt recommendations to the Committee of 
Ministers, and through it to the relevant states, if it [noticed] abnormal delays,” and to 
hold an “urgent debate,” if necessary, “if the state in question [had] neglected to execute 
or deliberately refrained from executing the judgment.”151 
To this end, in 2002, the Legal Affairs Committee was assigned open-ended 
terms of reference to pursue its monitoring activities, a mandate that allows its current 
rapporteur, Christos Pourgourides, “to work on the implementation of the [Conven-
tion] on an open-ended basis.” Since assuming office in June 2007, Pourgourides has 
largely extended the working methods of his predecessor, Erik Jurgens, in develop-
ing a monitoring procedure for non-compliant states that is guided by two criteria: (1) 
the time elapsed since the ECHR’s decision, defined as judgments that have not been 
“fully implemented more than five years after their delivery;” and (2) decisions that 
raise “important implementation issues, whether individual or general,” as highlighted, 
notably, by the Committee of Ministers’ interim resolutions.152 Based on these criteria, 
Pourgourides sought information from the national parliamentary delegations of eleven 
member states and, based on this information, made in situ visits to the following: 
Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Although the 
visits are not yet complete, a progress report released in September 2009 highlights the 
increase in cases of “particularly problematic instances of late and of non-execution.”153 
As a result, the Legal Affairs Committee has decided that the thrust of its work will 
address judgments that “raise prevalent implementation problems,” including cases 
of the non-implementation of domestic judicial decisions, excessive length of judicial 
proceedings, and deaths or ill-treatment under the authority of state forces and lack of 
an adequate investigation into them.154 
While the Parliamentary Assembly’s engagement in implementation has been 
generally welcomed, it is worth noting, as Andrew Drzemczewski does, that “the 
Assembly was never actually intended to be a body for monitoring the execution of 
judgments.” Rather, it has “taken an interest in the matter, given its general powers.”155 
Currently, however, the assembly’s role in monitoring the execution of judgments is 
accepted and well-regarded, to the point that the Committee of Ministers has invited 
assembly participation in drawing up various implementation-related recommenda-
tions.156 Furthermore, in Lambert-Abdelgawad’s view, the significance of the assembly’s 
involvement “lies in particular in the public nature of the denunciation of recalcitrant 
states,” which, she contends, “can only be salutary, … as it entails close coordination 
with the Committee of Minister’s and complements the latter’s role.”157 Indeed, since 
2000, the assembly has adopted six reports and resolutions and five recommendations 
on the subject of implementation, in order to help states comply with ECHR judg-
ments. PACE also has a crucial part to play insofar as its members fill a dual role as 
members of their respective national parliaments and of the assembly; thus, they are 
well placed to draw national parliamentary actors into closer contact with the court’s 
jurisprudence and bring legislative pressure to bear on governments where compliance 
is still outstanding.158 
The European Commissioner for Human Rights
In addition to the Parliamentary Assembly, the European Commissioner for Human 
Rights (currently Thomas Hammarberg) is another important office worth highlighting 
in the context of implementation monitoring. Established by the Council of Europe in 
2000, the commissioner, in addition to promoting education and awareness of human 
rights generally in member states, is empowered to identify possible shortcomings in 
the law and practice of member states with regard to human rights compliance, and 
to provide assistance and information on the prevention of human rights violations, 
including encouraging the establishment of national human rights structures.159 The 
commissioner is also charged with cooperating with other international institutions 
in the protection of human rights and, in so doing, has the authority to visit member 
states and contact governments directly. However, the commissioner does not have any 
investigative power or binding dispute-resolution power. 
Recently, efforts to bring the commissioner, PACE, and the Committee of Minis-
ters closer together have borne some fruit, as the committee decided in 2006 to set up 
annual tripartite meetings among the three, in order “to promote stronger interaction 
with regard to the execution of judgments,” although it is unclear the extent to which 
these meetings are taking place.160 Encouraging this development, Steven Greer notes 
that the commissioner could assist in the enforcement of the court’s judgments by, 
“for example, monitoring implementation and by seeking to identify to the Commit-
tee of Ministers the domestic legal and administrative changes necessary to increase 
the prospects of compliance.”161 Indeed, Protocol 14 provides an increased role for the 
commissioner in relation to the European Court, insofar as he or she will be allowed 
to participate in all cases before the court. As Protocol 14’s Explanatory Report states: 
“The Commissioner’s experience may help enlighten the Court on certain questions, 
particularly in cases which highlight structural or systemic weaknesses in the respon-
dent or other High Contracting Parties.”162
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Compliance Challenges and Lessons Learned
In comparison to other regional human right systems, the overall rate of compliance 
with the European Court’s judgments is impressive, as is the larger transformative 
effects of the court’s jurisprudence in shaping other international and national court 
systems. Furthermore, it is encouraging that the Committee of Ministers has grown 
increasingly robust and probing in its supervision of the implementation of judgments. 
Whereas the committee’s initial practice was once described as “relatively timorous,”163 
it has now become quite rigorous, despite the increasing amount of time spent moni-
toring implementation. To that end, it is not so much the non-implementation of judg-
ments that is of concern, but in the words of one interlocutor, “partial and delayed 
enforcement,” that threatens to compromise the integrity and functioning of the sys-
tem.164 The fact that the monitoring process now allows the public better access to infor-
mation about the implementation of judgments is also a positive development, as is the 
committee’s prioritization of cases involving general measures and systemic problems.
In light of the welcome evolution of the court and committee, several general 
successes with respect to state compliance can be identified. First, as noted, compli-
ance with the court’s just satisfaction orders continues to be quite high and, with few 
exceptions, states continue to pay the ordered sums on time and without controversy. 
(Although not discussed herein, “friendly settlements” have also enjoyed a high rate 
of compliance that should not be overlooked.) Moreover, it is encouraging to note that 
compliance with the payment of sums is due, in part, to the court’s own ruling that 
default interest could be assessed on untimely payments, which has served as an effec-
tive coercive measure.165 
Second, while the court has historically adopted a restrictive attitude in assess-
ing individual remedies, the Committee of Ministers, aided in certain instances by the 
specificity of the court’s judgments, has adopted a more robust and vigorous supervi-
sory process to ensure that, in addition to the payment of damages, restitutio in inte-
grum is also achieved. This appears to have worked well in certain applications of the 
pilot judgment procedure, which offers the court an “effective way to … [deal] with the 
large number of repetitive applications that clog its docket.”166 Finally, despite the fact 
that general measures are undoubtedly the most difficult to implement and monitor, 
hundreds of such measures have successfully resulted in the creation of new, or sig-
nificantly modified, laws and public institutions designed to prevent the recurrence of 
future convention violations.167 
Nevertheless, the implementation of judgments remains a challenge and there are 
numerous instances in which full compliance has been slow to obtain. The Parliamen-
tary Assembly has identified seven factors it attributes to complicating the implementa-
tion of judgments: “political reasons; reasons to do with the reforms required; practical 
reasons relating to national legislative procedures; judgments drafted in a casuistical or 
unclear manner; reasons relating to interference with obligations deriving from other 
institutions.”168 Similarly, interviewees tended to cite political reasons and the scale of 
reforms required as the principal impediments to prompt implementation. Speaking 
in the context of Bulgaria and other Eastern European states, Yonko Grozev, an attorney 
who has litigated a number of cases before the European Court, notes that because the 
adoption of general measures is a time consuming and frequently complicated process, 
it is treated as a relatively low priority by the governments of Council states.169 Further-
more, where implementation has been protracted it is often because the proposed gen-
eral measures were politically unacceptable, likely because they challenged institutional 
powers, were contrary to established political interests, or were ideologically contrary to 
public opinion. In the United Kingdom, for example, certain cases—the court’s finding 
that the physical punishment of children amounts to ill-treatment, judgments concern-
ing the actions of security forces in Northern Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s,170 and 
its holding that the denial of prisoner’s voting rights violated the convention171—have 
struck a political chord and proved particularly nettlesome, despite the country’s rela-
tively strong record on implementation. 
Thus, while states undertake a range of legislative and administrative measures 
in response to judgments, many do not take all of the actions that could follow from 
these judgments. As a result, the overall picture is often one of “limited corrective 
measures that avoid broad comprehensive reform.”172 These failures of implementation 
are particularly pronounced in several areas of the court’s jurisprudence. One area is 
ethnic minority rights, where many of the general measures that flow from the ECHR’s 
judgments have not been fulfilled due to a lack of political will and public support. 
Moreover, ethnic minorities’ litigation raises violations of a diverse number of basic 
rights, which has “made the analysis of the implementation and the broader political 
effect of that litigation more difficult.”173 For instance, several recent decisions by the 
court—have drawn attention to Roma rights in the area of education equality, but have 
yet to be implemented. 
Investigating and prosecuting gross human rights violations is another area in 
which implementation has largely failed. In Dinah Shelton’s view, this “indicates the 
limitations of the judicial process in resolving systemic failures of the rule of law.”174 
To its credit, the court itself has undertaken important fact-finding missions in several 
cases alleging large-scale human rights violations, effectively taking on the role of a first 
instance domestic court. Yet despite the court’s repeated findings of violations, the duty 
upon states to investigate these crimes and undertake prosecution has been met with 
resistance, if not hostility. Opposition to these investigations is often linked to conten-
tious domestic politics—as with the Kurds in Turkey, the Chechens in Russia, or the 
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court’s judgments finding violations by British security forces in Northern Ireland—as 
well as a strong reluctance by states to undertake reform of their security apparatus at 
the direction of Strasbourg.175 In a recent report on this topic, Human Rights Watch 
found that of the 115 judgments issued to date on cases concerning serious human 
rights violations in Chechnya, Russia has failed to ensure effective investigations and 
hold perpetrators accountable in even a single case.176
A perennial problem for the European system is the resolution of cases involving 
unreasonable length of proceedings and the failure to ensure the domestic execution of 
judgments. As noted, the Committee of Ministers has not dealt satisfactorily with the 
extreme delay experienced by many litigants in Italy, and other countries as well, despite 
the passage of numerous resolutions requiring that states address the matter.177 Walter 
Schwimmer, secretary general of the Council of Europe, notes that such continuing 
complaints are a “worrying signal of [a state’s] incapacity or unwillingness to rapidly 
and effectively remedy the underlying structural problems,” while other commentators 
have argued that “the problem[s] within the Italian legal system are so deep-rooted 
and pernicious that there is a limit to what the Government can do to … bring about 
effective reform.”178 The Italian example demonstrates as well that much of the court’s 
overwhelming docket is, in fact, comprised of repetitive applications arising from either 
a failure to implement earlier ECHR decisions or an approach best described as “mini-
mal compliance” with court judgments. As the United Kingdom’s Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Human Rights has noted, this “exacerbates the problem … because it 
leads to future litigation which can culminate in predictable findings of violation.”179 
The persistence of these cases, and the burden they continue to pose on the 
European system, underscores the urgency that the Interlaken Declaration attached to 
the development of member states’ domestic capacity to execute ECHR judgments.180 
Indeed, the declaration’s focus on the principle of subsidiarity stands as further endorse-
ment of a number of recent recommendations passed by the Committee of Ministers 
and Parliamentary Assembly, both of which have prioritized improving domestic capac-
ity as a way to speed the implementation process. In one recommendation, member 
states were told to ensure that there are appropriate mechanisms for verifying the com-
patibility of draft national laws with the convention, while another called upon states to 
ensure that there are proper domestic remedies in place for anyone who brings a claim 
of having his convention rights violated.181 States are also encouraged to review the 
effectiveness of their existing domestic remedies where the court has, in its judgment, 
pointed to structural or general deficiencies in national law or practice. 
In response to these recommendations, some Council member states have 
created national institutions dedicated to monitoring compliance with both adverse 
judgments and the European Convention more broadly. Perhaps most notable of these 
is the United Kingdom’s Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on Human Rights 
(Joint Committee), which is generally regarded as a model for other countries to follow. 
Established in 2001 after the passage of the Human Rights Act, the Joint Committee is 
empowered to monitor the implementation of judgments in the U.K. by corresponding 
with the relevant ministers about steps taken to execute the court’s judgments. It 
then publishes that inter-agency correspondence and analyzes the progress made.182 
The Joint Committee also implemented a new process in 2006 wherein it publishes 
yearly progress reports examining the status of implementation.183 The committee’s 
mandate further permits it to scrutinize proposed legislation and, where it considers 
that a provision can be improved to better ensure compatibility with the European 
Convention, it makes recommendations that the legislation be remedied to “make the 
relevant human rights standard explicit.”184 As Anthony Lester notes, “This reduces the 
need for judicial interpretation of the scope of the new provision, providing greater legal 
and administrative remedy.”185 One example of the Joint Committee’s involvement at an 
early stage of a bill was the Draft Gender Recognition Bill, which dealt, in part, with the 
issue of legal recognition in the acquired gender for transsexual people.186 The pace at 
which the bill was reviewed owed largely to increased pressure that was placed on the 
issue by the Joint Committee following the European Court’s 2002 decision in Goodwin 
v. United Kingdom, which led to it being brought before Parliament by July 2003, only 
one year after Goodwin had been decided.187 
Such an approach, however, remains the exception rather than the rule. As Drzem-
czewski notes, only six parliaments—those of Croatia, Finland, Hungary, Romania, 
Ukraine,188 and the United Kingdom—have indicated that they possess a special body 
for supervising the implementation of judgments.189 While the existence of such special 
bodies is a welcome development, many of these procedures are relatively recent and 
thus, little is yet known of their actual impact at the national level. In addition, only 12 
of 47 states have indicated that they possess procedures to inform national parliamen-
tarians of adverse judgments by the European Court: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom.190 (Notably, with the exception of Italy, most of these 
states are not the chief source of non-implementation at the Strasbourg level.) Of these 
twelve, the Netherlands law has been regarded as a model because it requires Dutch 
parliamentarians to be briefed on implementation of judgments against not only The 
Netherlands, but other countries as well.191 Less well known, but still important given 
its role in the implementation debate, is Italy’s 2006 passage of the “Azzolini Law,” 
which provides that the Presidency of Italy’s Council of Ministers shall coordinate the 
execution of ECHR judgments.192 The Azzolini Law also requires that the judgments be 
transmitted to the Italian Parliament, so that the competent commission can scrutinize 
them. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers shall further submit an annual report 
on implementation, as in the U.K. model, to Parliament on a yearly basis. 
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Finally, a focus on the domestic arena as a site for improved implementation 
would not be complete without noting the crucial role that national human rights insti-
tutions have to play in improving compliance. Interestingly, the Draft Declaration for 
Interlaken failed to discuss the role of NHRIs in any significant depth, a fact that was 
noted by the European Group of NHRIs, which submitted a response expressing “great 
concern with the lack of mention of the role [that they] can play in the reform of the 
European Court.”193 This oversight is unfortunate, particularly as commentators have 
noted that the European system of national institutions remains “underdeveloped,” and 
that most European countries lack a “broadly based national institution to monitor and 
review human rights issues in a strategic and structured way.”194 Greer, a particularly 
eloquent advocate of urging the Council of Europe to develop its policy of encouraging 
member states to establish NHRIs, notes two principal roles for these institutions. First, 
they could serve to “domesticate” the debate over how to give effect to the convention’s 
standards by “providing a form of nationally institutionalized pressure, particularly on 
executive institutions, to take more effective action” in honoring convention obligations. 
Second, they would “Europeanize” national human rights debates by “providing the 
European Commission for Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and 
the Committee of Ministers with reliable, comprehensive, and regular accounts of key 
domestic Convention-related issues and controversies.”195 Such a regular exchange of 
information would not only better ensure the rapid and complete implementation of 
ECHR judgments, but would put pressure on the relevant authorities to amend other 
practices that the court has deemed incompatible with the convention.
Conclusions and Recommendations
As the new measures of Protocol 14 are put into place and the European Court of 
Human Rights embarks on further reforms in the wake of the Interlaken, the growing 
challenges of compliance with court judgments must be of primary concern. To that 
end, the following recommendations are offered:
Encourage the Progressive Development of More Efficient Working Procedures
While the Committee of Ministers is the primary Council body charged with the imple-
mentation of court judgments, a plurality of actors are concerned with compliance at 
large. To this end, the committee, the Parliamentary Assembly, and the commissioner 
of human rights should continue to improve their own working methods, in addition 
to developing increasingly formalized synergies in their respective monitoring rules, 
particularly regarding judgments revealing the existence of systemic problems. 
With respect to the Committee of Ministers, a lack of resources is hindering the 
effective execution of its duties: as several interlocutors indicated that the Department 
for the Execution of Judgments remains under-resourced in light of its vast workload. 
Furthermore, the committee should strive to improve its working procedures, includ-
ing prioritizing and, as much as possible, agglomerating those cases that contribute 
most to the pending backlog before the committee.196 The emphasis should therefore 
be on those states (Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Italy, and Romania) that are the sources of 
the most applications, and those cases (failure to investigate human rights violations, 
excessive length of proceedings, systematic discrimination, failure to enforce domestic 
remedies) where the compliance deficit is greatest. As Philip Leach suggests, these cri-
teria might include applications that are likely to establish important legal precedents; 
lead case(s) posing a particularly serious problem in a country or region; cases that 
represent “a large group of cases relating to endemic violations;” or cases where non-
implementation is systemic.197 Finally, as the court continues its application of the pilot 
judgment procedure, the committee must take all possible measures to ensure that the 
manner of implementation “genuinely affords an effective remedy for similarly situated 
persons,” not only in principle, but in practice as well.198 To that end, both the Com-
mittee of Ministers and the court must take adequate steps to ensure the proper level 
of scrutiny of any proposed remedial scheme and, given that the procedure effectively 
freezes numerous other cases pending successful implementation, they must enforce 
the timeliness of any deadlines imposed on states through the process.
As to the other Council of Europe actors, PACE’s Committee on Legal Affairs 
should continue to develop its invaluable work on implementation and to capitalize 
on its unique status as a parliamentary body, one that permits greater possibilities for 
dialogue with national legislators. It would be particularly useful for PACE to undertake 
a closer examination of the impact and effectiveness of a number of the national imple-
mentation and monitoring laws that have recently passed in Council member states, 
including Ukraine and Italy; currently, not enough is known about whether these mod-
els are, in fact, improving implementation rates. The committee should also continue 
to highlight the lamentable lack of parliamentary involvement at the domestic level in 
far too many aspects of implementation and call upon national parliaments to increase 
their level of engagement with the court’s jurisprudence, so as to ensure that national 
legislation is consistent with the European Convention. 
Finally, as noted, the European Commission for Human Rights has an increas-
ingly important role to play in the work of the court, as reflected by the new competen-
cies bestowed on the office through Protocol 14. The commissioner’s ability to now 
participate as amicus curiae in judicial proceedings, in particular, provides an opportu-
nity for greater synergy with the court. For instance, the commissioner could, where 
needed, conduct on-site visits to countries against which cases have been brought. 
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The commissioner could also and provide the court, whose ability to conduct its own 
fact-finding is already constrained, with information about alleged violations and pro-
posed remedies. The commissioner can also serve as a clearinghouse for national best 
practices with respect to implementation, making information and know-how available 
to other Council states seeking to develop national reforms for better enforcement of 
decisions. Lastly, as one interlocutor noted, the commissioner’s independence and the 
neutrality of the office opens up a useful political space in which the commissioner may 
press recalcitrant states to comply with court judgments. 
Enhance the Use and Awareness of the Committee of Ministers’ Communication 
Procedures 
Unlike other regional human rights systems, the participatory rights of victims and 
their advocates in the enforcement of European Court judgments is relatively mod-
est. This is unlikely to change. Indeed, the stiff resistance with which the proposal 
to allow even written submissions was first met suggests that expanding the scope of 
victims’ participatory rights is unlikely. Still, the advances of Rule 9 are a significant 
development, as they represent an important expansion of the range of information to 
which the committee is now privy. As Fredrik Sundberg, deputy head of the Depart-
ment for the Execution of Judgments, has noted, the Committee of Ministers is not 
“well equipped to supervise the real effects of norms enacted and depends to a great 
extent on information submitted by the respondent state.”199 Such dependence risks 
presenting a skewed picture of implementation, as the information that governments 
provide is, as Leach notes, “too frequently … incomplete or unclear.”200 Moreover, the 
delays in providing such information can be considerable and, at present, states are not 
obliged to disclose their action plans, further disadvantaging victims’ advocates in the 
implementation process.201
Thus, given the importance of communicating with the committee, advocates 
should take full advantage of all opportunities to keep the ministers informed about the 
status and sufficiency of a state’s implementation efforts. While several interlocutors 
indicated that the Rule 9 procedures are being increasingly utilized, the degree to which 
advocates are aware of the Committee of Ministers’ supervisory role over implementa-
tion and of their access to the committee during this process is not clear. Leach notes, 
for instance, that NGOs and NHRIs “are not fully aware of the possibilities, nor the 
mechanics, of engaging in this process,” while Professor Basak Cali, who is currently 
undertaking a review of the domestic impact of the European Court’s decisions, has 
remarked that a number of human rights lawyers and NGOs do “not know how to use 
the Committee of Ministers effectively.”202 Further research is therefore needed into this 
question in order to determine how well understood and utilized the Rule 9 procedures 
are. Similarly, workshops and seminars that can facilitate civil society engagement in 
the implementation process are also needed. Such training is particularly necessary in 
states where civil society is less active and in states that have the greatest rate of non-
implementation. Advocates should also insist that a state’s action plan be submitted to 
them for scrutiny at the same time it is to the committee. 
Litigants and interveners alike can also play a role in urging the court to identify 
cases that pose an “underlying systemic problem.203 Such a designation would not only 
better position a case for greater scrutiny before the committee during the monitor-
ing and execution phase, but engage the other Council of Europe enforcement organs 
(notably the Parliamentary Assembly) as well. Advocates should also press for more 
information about the pilot judgment procedure, especially regarding the respective 
roles of the court and the committee in evaluating the implementation of pilot judg-
ments at the national level.
Continue to Develop an Enhanced Role for the European Court
While the European Court’s functions have been cordoned off from the Committee 
of Ministers for many years, the court should continue to seek, where appropriate, to 
supplement the committee’s monitoring and enforcement role. Although limitations on 
the court’s role in the implementation of judgments are textually evident in the conven-
tion itself and should be respected, if the court is to preserve its role as Europe’s human 
rights guarantor, then, as one commentator has noted, “it will have to demonstrate a 
more acute awareness of its connections to the wider institutional system [of ] which it 
is [a] part.”204 
To that end, the movement towards greater specificity by the court in its approach 
to remedies should be encouraged, while recognizing that greater specificity in itself 
does not guarantee implementation. Thus, as other working groups have suggested, 
the court’s use of the pilot judgment procedure, and its efforts to be more prescriptive 
regarding the remedies states should undertake, are important initiatives for improv-
ing compliance and should be continued.205 As Anthony Lester notes, Broniowski was 
important in enabling the court to deal with repetitive complaints that highlight such 
practices.206 Similarly, Fredrik Sundberg argues that the precision of states’ obligation 
to enact general measures is crucial for the effectiveness of the convention system and 
“intimately linked with the coherence of the Court in its decision-making.”207 Related to 
the development of the pilot judgment procedures, serious consideration should also be 
given to adding a collective redress mechanism—such as a class action procedure—to 
the European system. While this proposal has been raised before and rejected, it should 
be debated anew in the wake of Interlaken. 
Another area in which implementation might be furthered is litigation under 
Article 46 of the convention, which the European Court is currently considering in the 
Ilascu case. Historically, as Lambert-Abdelgawad notes, the court has refused to find a 
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state in breach of Article 46, in the absence of express provisions giving it jurisdiction 
to this effect.208 If the court were to do so here, it would conceivably open an avenue for 
other litigants to file similar complaints. This approach is not without risks, however, 
as such litigation would add to the court’s already significant caseload. Moreover, after 
Ilascu filed his new application, the Committee of Ministers suspended its examination 
of the case pending the court’s decision. The passage of Protocol 14, particularly the 
infringement proceedings process, offers similar opportunities to more vigorously press 
for implementation, although similar risks apply. 
Strengthen Implementation and Monitoring at the National Level
Enhancing the capacity of state institutions and national governments to effectively 
implement ECHR judgments, and its case law more generally, is essential. Although the 
passage of Protocol 14 represents an important step forward in the Council’s attempts 
to more effectively manage the court’s caseload and address a growing implementation 
deficit, states still have the ultimate role to play in the execution of the court’s judg-
ments. 
Each Council member state should have, at the least, a system or process in place 
for responding to court judgments. Enhanced parliamentary scrutiny of a state’s “action 
plan” for implementation is also crucial to increasing the pressure for compliance at 
the domestic political level. Finally, the establishment of robust NHRIs in every state 
should be required by the Council of Europe, rather than merely encouraged, as a way to 
further develop “effective mechanisms of reception” at the national level. In particular, 
the role of the European Commissioner for Human Rights should be examined in this 
context, as a way to maximize the mandate of that office. Other initiatives worthy of con-
tinued support include the Human Rights Trust Fund Project, established by Norway, 
whose aim it is to “support national efforts of member states through specific projects 
to consolidate the rule of law, by strengthening the action of the European Court of 
Human Rights.” Currently, the Trust Fund focuses on six member states in particular: 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine.209 Thus 
far, €785,000 has been allocated to finance execution-related activities, but additional 
resources would allow the fund to extend its reach further. 
Better knowledge of the court, and of state obligations to conform legislation 
to Strasbourg case law, is also essential. For instance, more frequent translation of 
all judgments into the local language of Council-member countries, not only those 
rendered against a particular state party, would do much to deepen the knowledge and 
awareness of court decisions and the convention, at the national level. If a judgment is 
available in a state’s formal language, it is more like to be considered by the national 
courts and incorporated into domestic adjudication. Moreover, if the court is to become 
a constitutional court for Europe—one whose judgments carry res interpretata, if not res 
judicata, effect—then translation is a key measure for member states to undertake. This 
recommendation was highlighted by an earlier working group, which recommended 
that translated material “should be distributed as widely as possible, particularly within 
public institutions such as courts, investigative bodies, prison administrations, and 
non-state entities such as bar associations and professional organizations.”210 Attention 
should also be focused on improving trainings for lawyers and judges in states with 
poor compliance records. For instance, the European Court’s former registrar, Paul 
Mahoney, has suggested that the Council should establish a European Judicial Training 
Institute on Human Rights, one whose expertise could be “plugged directly into each 
national judicial circuit, for dispending, coordinating, and facilitating [ judicial] training 
and for ensuring a ‘like-minded’ approach in each country.”211 Such a useful proposal 
is worthy of support. 
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II. The Inter-American 
 Human Rights System
Introduction
The Inter-American Human Rights System, the regional human rights system of the 
Americas, is composed of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The system thereby provides two instances for 
the consideration of individual complaints against member states of the Organization 
of American States (OAS), and two opportunities for regional human rights authorities 
to provide guidance to states on how to comply with their obligations that arise under 
such instruments as the American Convention on Human Rights.212 
While the Inter-American system has had a tremendous and positive impact on 
the legal and socio-political development of the region over the past quarter century,213 
the commission and court have struggled with low levels of implementation of their 
final recommendations and orders in contentious cases.214 As the conversation about 
the challenges to promoting broader and more consistent implementation with these 
decisions has evolved, so have procedures and mechanisms to monitor and compel 
implementation on the regional and national levels.215 Such procedures and mecha-
nisms provide a means to identify the most problematic areas of implementation and 
to design strategies to address these problems. While the procedures and mechanisms 
are imperfect, their utility is unquestionable, and efforts to perfect them—driven by 
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an honest understanding of the implementation problem—should be central to the 
regional human rights agenda.
This chapter discusses the implementation of decisions in the Inter-American 
system with an eye towards assessing current implementation procedures and mecha-
nisms and supporting their continued development. In order to provide a framework 
for this discussion, this chapter offers a detailed analysis of the varying rates of imple-
mentation across the wide-ranging remedial framework of the Inter-American human 
rights bodies together with anecdotal insight, so as to highlight the specific challenges 
to achieving complete implementation. The chapter goes on to review some of the more 
notable implementation successes of the Inter-American system in the hopes of extract-
ing some important lessons that can be used to direct future implementation efforts. 
The chapter then provides an overview of important initiatives to create mechanisms 
and procedures to address the implementation problem in the Inter-American system 
and traces their development at the level of the OAS, the commission, the court, and 
nationally. Finally, it concludes that certain efforts, either because they have provided 
notable results or because they have the clear potential to do so, should be progressively 
developed, and it provides some recommendations for how to carry this out. 
Overview of the Implementation Problem
While scholars have rightly cautioned against a purely quantitative approach to measur-
ing implementation,216 the data published by the Inter-American human rights bodies 
themselves are instructive and provide a useful backdrop to a discussion about impedi-
ments to full implementation and initiatives to effectively address the current problem. 
The Inter-American Commission, a quasi-judicial body with both promotion and protec-
tion functions, has processed individual petitions against all 35 member states of the 
OAS.217 To date, the commission has received over 14,000 such petitions,218 and it was 
processing 1,450 cases at the end of 2009.219 Based on information about implementa-
tion published in the commission’s 2009 annual report, of the 128 cases that have been 
resolved through friendly settlement agreement or final merits decision since 2000 
(when the commission first began collecting such data), states have fully complied with 
recommendations in 12.5 percent of cases, taken some steps towards compliance in 
69.5 percent of cases, and refused to comply with any recommendations in 18 percent 
of cases.220 Part of the problem with implementing Inter-American Commission deci-
sions is that the Inter-American Court itself has stated that while states should comply 
with such recommendations in good faith, only the court issues binding decisions.221 
The Inter-American Court receives contentious cases through referral from the 
commission where the offending state has ratified the court’s jurisdiction.222 By the end 
of 2009, the court had issued a total of 118 merits decisions, and found the respon-
dent state in violation of its obligations under the American Convention in all but two 
of those cases.223 In its 2009 annual report to the OAS, the court reported that it was 
monitoring compliance with 104 of the 116 reparations decisions it had issued, which 
translates into a “total compliance” rate of approximately 9 percent.224 While the court 
does little to provide more complete raw data about this apparently low rate of imple-
mentation, it has indicated that the low rate could be attributed to states’ failure to com-
ply with their obligations to investigate the circumstances of human rights violations 
and punish those responsible—commonly referred to as “justice” measures.225 
There is a growing body of scholarship analyzing implementation of the decisions 
of the Inter-American bodies and attempting to identify the factors that contribute to 
implementation.226 A particularly important quantitative study by the Association for 
Civil Rights (Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, or ADC) provides an implementation 
analysis of 462 remedies recommended in final merits decisions and friendly settle-
ment agreements of the Inter-American Commission and ordered in reparations deci-
sions of the Inter-American Court between 2001 and 2006.227 Looking specifically at 
the court, the study found a 29 percent rate of total implementation with the differ-
ent types of remedies ordered, a 12 percent rate of partial implementation, and a 59 
percent rate of non-implementation. The study found that the commission, in turn, 
suffered from an 11 percent rate of full implementation, an 18 percent rate of partial 
implementation, and an unfortunate 71 percent rate of non-implementation of recom-
mendations in final merits decisions. At the same time, however, the commission has a 
54 percent rate of implementation of remedies articulated in friendly settlement agree-
ments, and corresponding 16 percent and 30 percent rates of partial implementation 
and non-implementation.228 A closer look at the implementation rates of different types 
of remedial orders, considered together with anecdotal information on the topic, reveals 
many of the problem areas regarding implementation in the Inter-American system.
The Relationship between Implementation and Remedies
The remedial scheme utilized by the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American 
Court is considered by many to be among the most comprehensive and progressive, 
and as it has evolved over time, trends in implementation have evolved with it.229 The 
first case decided by the Inter-American Court, Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,230 set 
a baseline for reparations in the Inter-American system and it provides a useful way to 
frame a discussion of the implementation problem. In Velásquez Rodriguez, the Inter-
American Court found a systematic practice of forced disappearance in Honduras, and 
its decision reverberated throughout a region that was grappling with gross, systematic 
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human rights violations associated with military dictatorships and their violent repres-
sion of opposition forces.231 The court ordered “just compensation” to be paid to the 
families of the victims, and in its reparations decision detailed the exact amounts to be 
paid and specified the “form and means of payment of the indemnity.”232 Significantly, 
pecuniary damages were the only remedy the court mentioned in the operational por-
tion of its reparations decision, at the conclusion of which it provided that it would 
“supervise the indemnification ordered and shall close the file only when the compen-
sation has been paid.”233 
In its reparations decision, the court considered the Inter-American Commission’s 
request that it specifically order Honduras to investigate and punish those responsible 
for the violations of human rights identified by the court in its merits decision.234 The 
court, however, found it unnecessary to make such an order explicit in its reparations 
decision, and merely declared in dicta that the duty to investigate the forcible disap-
pearances of the victims would continue until their whereabouts were known.235 In a 
similar vein, the court declared that implicit in a finding that forcible disappearance was 
a systemic violation was an order that the state “prevent involuntary disappearances” 
generally.236 While the Inter-American Court closed Velásquez Rodriguez in 1996 after 
Honduras paid the pecuniary damages outlined in its reparations decision,237 significant 
questions remain about whether the state complied with its obligations to investigate 
and punish those responsible for the forced disappearances or to prevent similar viola-
tions from occurring in the future.238 
This brief analysis of the Inter-American Court’s first reparations decision high-
lights a number of important themes in the discussion about implementation in the 
Inter-American system, namely: (1) the success in achieving implementation of orders 
to pay pecuniary damages and other individual measures of reparation; (2) the general 
failure of states to investigate and punish those responsible for human rights violations; 
and (3) the challenges to implementing general measures to guarantee non-repetition.
Pecuniary Damages and Other Individual Measures
Just as Honduras implemented the court’s reparations decision in Velásquez Rodriguez, 
states have usually implemented orders to pay monetary reparations issued by the 
human rights bodies. Indeed, according to the ADC study, states fully implemented 
monetary reparations ordered by the commission and court at a rate of 58 percent, 
partially implemented 15 percent of such orders, and failed to implement 27 percent of 
such orders. There is a fairly substantial difference between the implementation rates of 
the court and the commission: states were found to fully implement monetary repara-
tions ordered by the court at a rate of 48 percent, compared to 17 percent for commis-
sion recommendations. However, the implementation rate for monetary reparations in 
friendly settlement agreements is as high as 88 percent, highlighting the importance 
of the commission’s procedure to achieve negotiated outcomes.
Anecdotally speaking, there are examples from Guatemala and Colombia in which 
those states have implemented orders to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for grave 
violations of human rights,239 payments by Panama and Peru for labor and property 
rights violations based on the real value of salaries or pensions denied,240 and payments 
by Honduras and the Dominican Republic to discriminated minorities.241 While it is 
true that monetary payments to individual victims may not be the ultimate goal of inter-
national human rights litigation in many cases, implementation of orders to pay large 
sums of money, provide compensation for violations of economic and social rights, or 
give redress to members of marginalized groups, is not insignificant.
When the composition of the Inter-American Court changed in the late-1990s, it 
began to develop a wide range of individual remedies, including symbolic and equitable 
remedies.242 The court has since elaborated a variety of symbolic measures aimed at 
making whole the victims of human rights abuse, as well as their next-of-kin and com-
munities. For example, the court will now order the erection of memorials and other 
measures to commemorate victims of human rights abuse. In Villagran Morales v. Gua-
temala, Guatemala complied with an order to name a school after a group of massacred 
street children.243 Similarly, it named a street and established commemorative univer-
sity scholarships in compliance with the court’s order in Mack Chang v. Guatemala, 
in order to honor the prominent sociologist who was extrajudicially executed by state 
agents.244 States will often comply with orders to hold ceremonies to ask for forgiveness 
for human rights violations, as Guatemala did in Villagran Morales and Mack Chang, 
and Peru did in Huilca Tesce v. Peru, a case involving the extrajudicial execution of a 
union leader.245 More often than not, states also comply with separate orders to publish 
the facts section of a case in a newspaper of national circulation, as part of its formal 
recognition of the violation. The ADC study indicates that such symbolic reparations 
represent 21 percent of all remedies ordered by the Inter-American Commission and 
Inter-American Court, and that they are implemented 52 percent of the time.246
Countries such as the Dominican Republic and Venezuela that are generally hos-
tile to the oversight of the Inter-American bodies resist compliance with measures that 
require them to acknowledge wrongdoing in a public ceremony, even if they are willing 
to pay pecuniary damages.247 This is likely because such remedies lie at the intersec-
tion of individual measures and general measures, which arise from countries’ obliga-
tions associated with non-repetition.248 Furthermore, the perceived political cost for 
such governments to humble themselves under pressure from regional human rights 
bodies is high. 
Implementation of other equitable remedies of restitution and rehabilitation has 
been relatively good. Orders to release detainees, reverse arbitrary firings, leave local 
judicial decisions without effect, or grant certain security measures represent nine per-
cent of those remedies ordered (in the cases studied by ADC)and are implemented at a 
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rate of 36 percent.249 Indeed, states have pardoned people through executive decree in 
response to decisions of the commission and court, and national courts have reopened 
proceedings with new evidence produced during Inter-American proceedings.250 Nev-
ertheless, with a rate of non-implementation exceeding 50 percent, negative anec-
dotes abound. For example, while the court acknowledged the importance of restoring 
“options for personal fulfillment” of victims of human rights abuse in Loyaza Tamayo 
v. Peru,251 as of February 2008 Peru had not implemented the court’s orders to reinstate 
the victim to her prior teaching position or to provide her with retirement benefits she 
would have otherwise enjoyed had she not been arrested and detained.252 
Similarly, the court ordered in Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru that Peru reestablish a busi-
nessman whose property had been seized as a majority shareholder in his company, 
after concluding that the state had arbitrarily stripped him of his nationality.253 As of 
November 2009, however, Peru had not complied with this aspect of the order despite 
its payment of all of the money damages ordered by the court.254 Significantly, the other 
aspect of the court’s reparations decision in Ivcher Bronstein that remains unimple-
mented more than eight years after judgment is the court’s order that Peru investigate 
the violation of the victim’s rights and punish those responsible.255 
Investigation and Punishment
Any conversation about implementation in the Inter-American system must include the 
low rates of investigating and punishing those identified by the Inter-American bodies 
as responsible for human rights abuses. In 1996, the court explicitly ordered for the 
first time in the operative portion of its reparations decision in El Amparo v. Venezuela 
that “the State of Venezuela shall be obliged to continue investigations into the events 
referred to in the instant case, and to punish those responsible.”256 The court is still 
monitoring compliance in that case,257 and it has since only found one state (Peru) to 
have fully implemented an order to investigate and punish those responsible for viola-
tions of human rights.258 This problem pervades the Inter-American system; indeed, 
the ADC study discussed above indicates that remedies requiring investigation and 
punishment have been implemented at a rate of only 10-14 percent.259
Viviana Krsticevic, in her comprehensive volume on the implementation of Inter-
American Commission and Court decisions, highlights three challenges that have 
arisen in compelling implementation of orders to investigate and punish: (1) amnesty 
laws promulgated to absolve abusive regimes of atrocities; (2) statutes of limitation 
for crimes that ultimately give rise to international responsibility; and (3) complica-
tions related to the principle of non bis in idem (“double jeopardy”).260 The court first 
cemented its position on the obligation to investigate and punish perpetrators of human 
rights violations despite the existence of amnesty laws in Castillo Paez v. Peru,261 and 
subsequently applied this rationale in cases against Guatemala, Argentina, Colombia, 
Chile, and Paraguay.262 Nevertheless, because amnesty laws exist in the national legal 
framework they have presented additional implementation challenges, as they have 
required other legislative reform or a decision from the nation’s constitutional court. 
It is interesting to note that the Inter-American Commission recommended the repeal 
of the amnesty laws in Argentina in a 1992 case,263 but it was not until 2005 that the 
Argentine Supreme Court nullified the 1987 amnesty law protecting those who com-
mitted crimes during the rule of that country’s military junta.264 Significantly, when it 
did so, Argentina’s high court relied on the Inter-American Court’s decision in Barrios 
Altos v. Peru in deciding to nullify its own amnesty law, not the 1992 Inter-American 
Commission decision, though there is little question that the commission decision 
influenced the outcome.265
Statutes of limitation have presented another stumbling block in the push to ensure 
that individuals who have participated in human rights violations are held accountable. 
While international law is clear on the inapplicability of statutes of limitations to certain 
grave violations of human rights,266 statutes of limitations have provided a basis for some 
of the resistance to national investigations into past human rights abuse.267 Similarly, the 
principle that no legal action can be instituted twice for the same crime (non bis in idem) 
has presented a challenge where the court issues a decision to investigate certain human 
rights violations for which the state has already held persons accountable.268 Problems 
have also arisen in cases before the Inter-American Court, where certain individuals who 
are widely known to have been involved in the commission of human rights violations 
have already been absolved of crimes by domestic courts. Nevertheless, while the cases 
and rationales have differed, the Inter-American Court has consistently found that the 
obligation to investigate human rights violations and prosecute those responsible may 
persist even after domestic courts have purportedly resolved the issue.269
While it is true that the Inter-American system has dealt with these challenges 
as they have arisen, and that the Inter-American Court has had tremendous success 
in cases involving amnesty laws, blanket non-compliance with orders to investigate 
and punish continues to be an impediment to justice for human rights abuses in the 
Americas. Similarly, general measures of non-repetition, despite some successes, have 
been implemented in a very limited fashion.
General Measures of Non-Repetition
The Inter-American bodies, particularly the Inter-American Court, have taken a creative 
approach to engineering general measures to address the root causes of human rights 
violations when the facts of certain cases indicate that the problem may be systemic 
in nature. The commission and court have ordered varying degrees of legislative and 
policy reform, training and education programs for state officials, and community-
wide remedies.
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The court has discussed states’ obligations to promulgate, amend, or repeal certain 
legislation in many different contexts. For example, in Loyaza Tamayo, discussed above, 
the court ordered “Peru [to] adopt the internal legal measures necessary to adapt Decree-
Laws 25,475 (Crime of Terrorism) and 25,659 (Crime of Treason) to conform to the Ameri-
can Convention.”270 In Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, the 
court ordered that “the State [] abstain from applying the Offences Against the Person Act 
of 1925 and within a reasonable period of time should modify said Act to comply with 
international norms of human rights protection [relating to capital punishment].”271 In 
Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, the court ordered the Dominican state “[t]o adopt 
within its domestic legislation, in accordance with Article 2 of the American Conven-
tion, the legislative, administrative and any other measures needed to regulate the pro-
cedure and requirements for acquiring Dominican nationality based on late declaration 
of birth.”272 However, none of these measures have been implemented by the respective 
states, and in the second two examples, the situation has arguably worsened—in Trinidad 
and Tobago because it has withdrawn from international scrutiny on the matter, and in 
the case of Dominican Republic because it has recently passed a constitutional reform that 
will further entrench the problem of systematic discrimination identified by the court.273 
While these developments are troubling, the more common response by states to gen-
eral measures is inaction. Indeed, while the ADC study indicates that nine percent of 
the reparations ordered by the commission and court include some type of legal reform, 
states make no effort to implement approximately 75 percent of such orders.274 States do, 
however, implement 14 percent of orders to reform national laws, and decisions of the 
commission and court have helped to consolidate efforts to promulgate laws on domestic 
violence in Brazil,275 and on the protection of minors in Guatemala.276
The Inter-American bodies will also order training of state officials in those cases 
where it is determined that systematic human rights violations result from widespread 
ultra vires activity, or routine abuse of discretionary powers by state actors. The ADC 
study found that reparations orders to train state personnel, which represent only three 
percent of the remedies ordered, were fully implemented 42 percent of the time.277 
All cases of implementation of this type of remedy arise in the context of judgments 
issued by the Inter-American Court. For example, in Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia, the 
court ordered the state to “implement, within a reasonable term, permanent education 
programs on human rights and international humanitarian law within the Colombian 
Armed Forces, at all levels of its hierarchy,” along the lines specified by the court in 
its reparations decision.278 As a result, Colombia entered into a cooperation agreement 
with the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights and hired consultants 
to study the training of the Colombian Armed Forces. The result was a “Comprehen-
sive Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Policy” implemented by the 
Ministry of Defense in January 2008.279 
While the Colombian example can be considered a success, the statistics indicate 
that there are many more examples of disappointment. One example can be found 
in the implementation phase of Tibi v. Ecuador, where the court ordered the state to 
“establish a training and education program for the staff of the judiciary, the public 
prosecutor’s office, the police and penitentiary staff, including the medical, psychiat-
ric and psychological staff, on the principles and provisions regarding protection of 
human rights in the treatment of inmates.”280 Seeking to guarantee that the training 
program was effective, the court also ordered that the “[d]esign and implementation of 
the training program must include allocation of specific resources to attain its goals, 
and it will be conducted with participation by civil society.”281 When Ecuador failed to 
implement this order, the court, in an attempt to guide the process, provided further 
direction in a compliance order, requiring that Ecuador “establish an inter-institutional 
committee to define and execute the training programs on human rights and treat-
ment of inmates.” Ecuador still has not implemented the court’s order.282 Nevertheless, 
efforts by the court to structure states’ implementation activities are significant, as will 
be highlighted below.
Other creative general measures ordered by the court include those designed to 
address human rights violations suffered by certain communities. In Plan de Sanchez v. 
Guatemala, the court ordered the state to implement a comprehensive set of programs 
in 13 different indigenous communities, including: (1) the commission of a study of 
the Maya-Achí culture by the Guatemalan Academy of Mayan Languages or a similar 
organization; (2) the initiation of public works such as road construction and the devel-
opment of a sewage system and potable water supply; (3) the supply of teachers with 
intercultural and bilingual training to the communities; and (4) the establishment of a 
health center with adequate personnel and conditions to provide medical and psycho-
logical care to certain victims of human rights abuse.283 While Guatemala paid a portion 
of the monetary damages, implemented some of the symbolic reparations, and even 
took the step of establishing a health care center in the village of Plan de Sanchez, it 
nevertheless failed to implement most of the programs ordered by the court.284
The court developed a similar community-centered remedial framework in Moi-
wana v. Surinam, ordering that the state “adopt such legislative, administrative, and 
other measures as are necessary to ensure the property rights of the members of the 
Moiwana community in relation to the traditional territories from which they were 
expelled, and provide for the members’ use and enjoyment of those territories.”285 The 
court ordered that “these measures shall include the creation of an effective mechanism 
for the delimitation, demarcation and titling of said traditional territories.”286 The court 
also directed that Surinam take action to “guarantee the safety of those community 
members who decide to return to Moiwana Village,” and to “establish a community 
development fund,” in order to address the impact of past violations on the community 
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as a whole.287 Although Surinam has complied with the court’s order to pay money dam-
ages, it has failed to date to implement any of the general measures.288 
These last two cases both touch on the rights of indigenous communities, and 
while indigenous rights have been a centerpiece of the Inter-American human rights 
bodies’ work over the past decade, such communities continue to be among the most 
marginalized groups on the continent. This makes the remarkable story of full imple-
mentation of the court’s landmark indigenous rights case Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua 
an important case study, and highlights the importance of identifying those cases in 
which implementation was truly exceptional and attempting to identify any lessons to 
be learned from such successes.
Implementation Successes and Lessons Learned
In Velásquez Rodriguez, the court was able to close the case upon payment of pecuniary 
damages because it had not required the investigation and punishment of those respon-
sible or the institution of measures of non-repetition. Notably, the court took the same 
approach in the Godinez Cruz v. Honduras reparations order,289 which it issued on the 
same day as Velásquez Rodriguez, and closed at the same time.290 The Inter-American 
Court followed this same pattern in its next two reparations decisions: Aloeboetoe et al. 
v. Suriname—a case involving seven members of a Maroon ethnic community that had 
been killed by members of the military291—and Gangaram-Panday v. Suriname, a case 
of a man who died in military detention.292 While the orders in all of these cases were 
fully implemented, it is difficult to say that they are exceptional because, as noted, the 
payment of pecuniary damages is relatively common. After the court began in 1996 to 
require implementation of a wider variety of remedial orders before it would close a 
case, only four other Inter-American Court cases have been fully implemented.293 These 
four are: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, “The Last Temptation of 
Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Claude Reyes v. Chile, and Ricardo Canese v. Para-
guay. That so few of the court’s 116 reparations orders have been fully implemented 
requires a review of these four to discern any lessons of general application.
Indigenous Rights in Nicaragua
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua is remarkable not only because 
it was the first time a regional tribunal recognized indigenous peoples’ communal right 
to their ancestral land, but because the reparations order was implemented despite the 
technical and political challenges of doing so. In April 2002, when the Nicaraguan 
government and the representatives of the Awas Tingni community met for the first 
time to discuss implementation of the Inter-American Court order, they formed two 
joint commissions with representatives from the community and the government, 
each assigned to give effect to a different part of the court’s reparations order.294 One 
joint commission was responsible for the investment of $50,000 for the benefit of the 
community, while the second joint commission was responsible for the more difficult 
task of beginning to delimit, demarcate, and title the territory, while also protecting it 
from intrusion by third parties. The first joint commission succeeded in carrying out 
its mandate when, in February 2003, the government funded the construction of an 
Awas Tingni student boarding house. In contrast, the second joint commission failed 
in carrying out its mandate: the government attempted to induce community members 
to agree to inferior reparations agreements, even as third party invasions into the Awas 
Tingni territory increased. A second attempt at implementation was initiated in January 
2003 when the Nicaraguan legislature enacted a land demarcation law known as Law 
445.295 While the Awas Tingni insisted that their right to demarcation existed beyond 
the confines of the law, the community agreed to submit to the process established by 
the law in November 2003. The effectiveness of the process was undermined by then-
President Enrique Bolaños, and distracted by land conflicts between the Awas Tingni 
and other indigenous communities. A decisive change came about, however, with the 
election of President Daniel Ortega, and the state officially conveyed more than 70,000 
hectares to the Awas Tingni community in December 2008 pursuant to Law 445.296 
Two lessons from this case study should be highlighted. First, while the Awas 
Tingni community correctly asserted that their communal right to their indigenous 
lands was not dependant on the process established under Law 445, the importance of 
a national law to aid the process of implementation should not be overlooked. The joint 
commissions that were initially established were positive developments, and for the por-
tion of the reparations order that required a monetary investment in the community, 
such a model was sufficient. However, the joint commission assigned to oversee the 
demarcation and titling of the territory and protect against encroachment on the Awas 
Tingni territory was incapable of fulfilling its mandate. Had the Nicaraguan legislature 
never passed Law 445, it is very possible that the reparations order would not have been 
fully implemented. Second, the election of President Ortega, historically a friend of the 
indigenous rights movement, was essential, underscoring the positive impact on imple-
mentation of political officials who are engaged with the process. While a supportive 
president is a somewhat extreme example (though not without precedent; the election 
of Roberto Reina, a former Inter-American Court judge, as president of Honduras, was 
integral to implementing the Velásquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases297), it is clear 
that the support of state officials in implementation efforts is crucial.
These lessons are particularly significant when they are considered in the general 
context of indigenous rights in the Americas and the more specific context of compli-
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ance with decisions of the Inter-American Court. The Moiwana v. Surinam and Sara-
maka People v. Surinam decisions, in which the court ordered Surinam to demarcate and 
title the lands of those respective communities, have yet to be implemented.298 Simi-
larly, the court’s orders in the cases Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay 
and Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, requiring Paraguay to recognize the 
ancestral land rights of those communities, have also gone unimplemented.299 Without 
the conditions that abetted the Awas Tingni implementation, it appears virtually impos-
sible for those historically marginalized groups to vindicate their rights, even with an 
order from the Inter-American Court. In a discussion about the failure by Surinam 
and Paraguay to implement the Court’s decisions, the historical marginalization of 
groups should not be understated. The Awas Tingni implementation appears even more 
unusual when one considers that the three other cases of full compliance all concern 
the arguably less controversial right of freedom of expression.
Freedom of Expression in Chile
In another unprecedented case of full compliance, Chile amended its constitution to 
eliminate the censorship of movies and promulgated Act No. 19,846 regarding the 
classification of films—leading to the exhibition of the film “The Last Temptation of 
Christ”—in response to the Inter-American Court’s 2001 reparations order in “The Last 
Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile.300 The court closed that case, the only 
one to result in constitutional amendment, in 2003.301 Indeed, many refer to this case as 
the ultimate example of compliance because of Chile’s willingness to alter its constitu-
tion in order to implement the decision of a regional human rights body—a clear and 
decisive manifestation of political will to implement a human rights obligation. This 
case should also be understood as the beginning of a very important process in Chile to 
develop one of the region’s most progressive legal guarantees of freedom of expression.
Another significant moment in this process was the issuance of the court’s 2006 
reparations order in Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, which led Chile to promulgate the Law 
on Transparency in Public Office and Access to Information on State Administration 
(Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información de la Administración del Estado), regu-
lating Article 8 of the Political Constitution of Chile and establishing a procedure to 
secure access to state-held information.302 The passage of this law was the culmination 
of years of work by Chile’s transparency movement, which benefitted from tremen-
dous resources and political support. Indeed, when Michelle Bachelet was running for 
president, she committed to supporting the law as one of her campaign promises, and 
followed through once elected.303 Significantly, the law established the Council for Trans-
parency, a state institution dedicated to the promotion and protection of the right of 
access to information. Juan Pablo Almero, the lawyer principally responsible for bring-
ing Claude Reyes et al. before the Inter-American Court, currently directs that institution. 
It is important to compare these two Chilean cases with the fourth case of full 
implementation, Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, which also involved freedom of expres-
sion.304 While full implementation is a significant achievement in the Inter-American 
system, the court in Ricardo Canese limited its reparations order to requiring the state 
to pay money damages,305 a form of reparations that is regularly implemented. Accord-
ingly, rather than support for the proposition that freedom of expression cases enjoy 
higher rates of implementation regionally, Ricardo Canese stands for the uncontroversial 
proposition that states regularly implement the monetary aspect of the court’s repara-
tions orders. Moreover, the fact that the two other freedom of expression cases that 
were fully implemented originated in Chile raises questions about whether this is a 
country-specific phenomenon.
In this regard, it should be noted that Chile is one of the only states to fully 
implement the recommendations issued by the Inter-American Commission in a final 
merits decision; that case, Alejandra Marcela Matus Acuña et al. v. Chile, also involved 
freedom of expression.306 Specifically, the commission found that Chile had violated the 
American Convention when it censored a journalist’s book entitled Black Book of Chilean 
Justice and initiated judicial proceedings against her. The commission reported that 
Chile paid the victim 30 million pesos and “promulgated Law No. 19,733, repealing the 
crime at Article 6(b) and the measures at Article 16 of Law on Internal State Security, 
No. 12,927, and Article 41 of Law No. 16,643 on Abusive Advertising, making it pos-
sible to dismiss with prejudice the criminal case against her, and to lift the confiscatory 
measures and prohibition that affected her book.”307
Interestingly, another recent Inter-American Court case concerning freedom of 
expression issued against Chile, Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, has yet to be fully imple-
mented.308 That case involved a naval mechanical engineer who published a book 
entitled “Ethics and Intelligence Services,” despite the naval authorities’ denial of his 
request to do so, and who was subsequently subject to criminal proceedings before a 
naval court. The Inter-American Court found a series of violations and ordered a range 
of individual remedies, including the return of the seized books and the cessation of 
the criminal proceedings against the victim, and general remedies, including an order 
to limit the scope of military jurisdiction. The topic of military jurisdiction is substan-
tially more controversial in Chile, so it is not surprising that the state has been slower 
to implement general measures of non-repetition on this topic.309 A process is currently 
under way, however, to make the necessary legislative changes to implement the Inter-
American Court order, which would be a legal breakthrough in the region.310
It is possible to extrapolate a number of lessons from these freedom of expres-
sion cases. One way to achieve something as significant as a constitutional amend-
ment is to bring a case on film censorship, which taps into a strong public sentiment 
against repression connected to Chile’s experience with dictatorial rule.. The transpar-
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ency movement, empowered by its experience with the Inter-American system in “The 
Last Temptation of Christ” case, was able to compel then presidential candidate Bachelet 
to support legislation in the novel area of freedom of information in Claude Reyes et al. 
Advocates then, in a fairly intentional way, capitalized on the openness by the Chilean 
state to implement measures of non-repetition in cases involving freedom of expres-
sion and brought Palamara-Iribarne, a freedom of expression case that also addressed 
the more contentious issue of military jurisdiction. It appears Chile is currently on the 
verge of limiting the application of military jurisdiction, which would be an unprec-
edented and important step forward. The Chilean transparency movement has therefore 
developed an institutional dialogue with the state through its litigation before the Inter-
American bodies, capitalizing on strong public support for freedom of expression, and 
used that right as a touchstone to advance the cause of human rights more generally. 
Lessons Learned from Awas Tingni and Claude Reyes et al.
Comparing the implementation experiences of Awas Tingni and Claude Reyes et al., 
both landmark cases that represented substantial developments in international human 
rights law, it is possible to discern some important lessons on advancing the imple-
mentation of cases generally. First, the decisions of the highest regional human rights 
authority represented the culmination of intense advocacy by the Awas Tingni indig-
enous people and the Chilean transparency movement, and such decisions were use-
ful in legitimizing their positions. Moreover, in both cases, the remedial framework 
articulated by the Inter-American Court aided the groups in channeling their advocacy 
efforts, and supporting the further articulation of their advocacy agendas. 
Second, in both cases, the affected communities were able to translate the reme-
dial framework provided by the court into national initiatives. In the case of the Awas 
Tingni, they created the joint commissions in collaboration with the government, one of 
which was successful in fulfilling its mandate to identify an opportunity for investment 
in a communal resource. In order to implement the order to demarcate and title the ter-
ritory of the Awas Tingni, the community had to submit to a process established under 
the national land demarcation law. In the case of the Chilean transparency community, 
simultaneous to their litigation of Claude Reyes et al., advocates had worked to develop a 
legislative proposal for freedom of information, which included in it the establishment 
of an oversight office to carry out the trainings required by the Inter-American Court. 
Third, both cases enjoyed key political support that made implementation possi-
ble, but in both cases, the political support may not have been sufficient to reach imple-
mentation if the international obligations had not been translated into a national legal 
framework. The election of President Daniel Ortega was unquestionably a significant 
factor in finally demarcating the Awas Tingni lands, but without the national demarca-
tion law it would have been considerably more difficult for President Ortega to translate 
his support into implementation of the Inter-American Court’s order. Similarly, Presi-
dent Michelle Bachelet did not create new legislation to comply with Claude Reyes et al.; 
rather, she supported a legislative proposal that advocates had already developed. The 
proposal was presented to her at a moment when it was politically convenient to sup-
port it, and then she was encouraged to follow through when she won the presidency 
with the support of the transparency community. In this regard, a framework for imple-
mentation of decisions appears to be as important as the political will to implement. 
While implementation is virtually impossible where there is no political will to do so, 
degrees of political will translate into degrees of implementation, and implementation 
mechanisms can facilitate that process. For this reason, the next section focuses on the 
types of mechanisms that have been used to promote implementation.
Procedures and Mechanisms to Promote 
Implementation
The implementation crisis in the Inter-American system has received increasing atten-
tion over the past decade. Efforts by the commission and court to collect data about 
implementation, coupled with efforts by civil society organizations and academics to 
systematize and analyze that information, provide us with a relatively accurate picture of 
the implementation problem in the Inter-American system, and elucidate key strategies 
for capitalizing on the willingness of states to comply with their international human 
rights obligations. 
Organization of American States
For the last decade, the General Assembly of the OAS has issued resolutions highlight-
ing the importance of implementation. It its Thirtieth Regular Session in 2000, the 
General Assembly issued a resolution reiterating that states parties to the American 
Convention must comply with the Inter American Court’s rulings in all cases to which 
they are party.311 The General Assembly went a step further in its next regular ses-
sion in 2001, issuing a resolution instructing the OAS Permanent Council to focus on 
implementation of the decisions of the Inter-American Court and the recommenda-
tions of the Inter-American Commission.312 The resolution urged member states to take 
the necessary steps to “comply with the decisions or judgments of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and make every effort to implement the recommendations of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.” Additionally, it resolved to “take 
appropriate action in connection with the annual reports of the Court and the Com-
mission, in the framework of the Permanent Council and the General Assembly of the 
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[OAS],” and linked this to the duty to guarantee observance of the obligations set forth 
in the relevant instruments of the Inter-American system. 
In 2003, the General Assembly again instructed the Permanent Council to con-
sider ways to encourage compliance by states parties with the judgments of the court.313 
In 2004, the General Assembly reiterated the need for member states to provide infor-
mation requested by the court to enable it to fully meet its obligation to report to the 
OAS on compliance.314 And in 2005, the General Assembly emphasized the importance 
of states’ dissemination of the court’s decisions.315
In June 2009, the General Assembly issued a resolution entitled “Observations 
and Recommendations on the Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights,”316 in which it recognized the “important and constructive practice begun by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights to hold private hearings on the monitoring of 
compliance with its judgments, and the outcomes thereof.” This positive development 
is discussed in greater detail below. The General Assembly reiterated that the “state 
parties to the American Convention on Human Rights undertake to comply with the 
Court’s decisions in all cases to which they are a party,” and also emphasized the need 
for parties to provide the information requested by the court so that it may fulfill its 
duty to report to the OAS on compliance with its judgments. The General Assembly also 
instructed the Permanent Council to continue to consider ways to encourage compli-
ance with the court’s judgments.
While these resolutions have not had a clear effect on implementation practices, 
there is one notable intiative to urge the General Assembly to more actively pursuie the 
stated goals of such resolutions. As president of the Inter-American Court from 1999 
to 2004, Judge Antonio Cançado Trinidade regularly presented reports to the political 
organs of the OAS (including the General Assembly and the Committee on Juridical and 
Political Affairs (CJPA) of the Permanent Council) in which he urged them to establish 
a permanent mechanism to monitor and promote compliance.317 Judge Cançado Trini-
dade argued that a Working Group of the CJPA could be modeled on the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, and that it would offer a political space for state rep-
resentatives to discuss and debate efforts to implement decisions of the Inter-American 
human rights bodies. While Judge Cançado Trinidade believed such a mechanism was 
essential to realize the “collective guarantee” represented by the American Convention, 
his calls went unheeded. Ultimately, it has been the Inter-American Commission and 
Inter-American Court that have made the most sustained efforts to realize the “collective 
guarantee.” Thus, it is essential to review the work that each body has done to develop 
mechanisms and procedures to monitor and promote implementation.
Inter-American Commission
Perhaps the most significant moment in the contemporary history of the Inter-American 
system was the passage of the 2001 reform to the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Amer-
ican Commission and Court. Indeed, that reform acted as a trigger for many changes 
in the Inter-American system. While the overall effect of the 2009–2010 reform to 
the Rules of Procedure is still unclear, these two moments of significant institutional 
reform provide a useful framework to examine each body’s development with regard 
to implementation.
The 2001 reform of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission 
represented, among many other things, the culmination of a process of institutional 
reflection about the implementation of the commission’s recommendations. This was 
reflected in Article 46, which provided that:
  Once the Commission has published a report on a friendly settlement or on the merits in 
which it has made recommendations, it may adopt the follow-up measures it deems appro-
priate, such as requesting information from the parties and holding hearings in order to 
verify compliance with friendly settlement agreements and its recommendations.
While the commission took the important step of formally establishing the basis 
for its follow-up work, because Article 46 merely provided that the commission “may 
adopt the follow-up measures it deems appropriate,” the commission’s follow-up activities 
under this provision have been carried out on an ad hoc basis, more in response to pres-
sure by advocates than on the commission’s own initiative. Nevertheless, this marked 
the beginning of the Inter-American Commission’s compliance reporting mechanism.
For its 2001 annual report, the Inter-American Commission collected data about 
implementation of its recommendations issued in 2000 and published that information 
for the first time.318 The commission created four categories for reporting compliance: 
full compliance, partial compliance, noncompliance (where the state presented infor-
mation), and noncompliance (where the state did not present information). Because 
of the objection of some states to these classifications, the 2002 annual report, which 
reported compliance data from 2000 and 2001, featured the three categories that con-
tinue to be used today: total compliance, partial compliance, and pending compliance.319 
In its 2003–2006 annual reports, the commission published compliance data for those 
friendly settlement agreements and merits decisions issued over the three preceding 
years;320 in its 2007 and 2008 annual reports, it published compliance data for those 
cases resolved within the preceding seven years;321 and, in its 2009 annual report, it 
published compliance data for cases issued in the previous nine years.322 Generally 
speaking, the commission collects this data by sending a letter in mid-November to 
the parties in all cases resolved in the relevant time period, giving them one month to 
update the official record of implementation.
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Article 46 specifically mentions compliance hearings as a means for the commis-
sion to follow-up on the implementation of its recommendations. However, such hear-
ings have been relatively uncommon. Requests for these hearings are considered with 
all other requests for case-specific and thematic hearings during the commission’s two 
sessions in Washington DC in February/March and October/November each year, and 
often there are more than 200 requests for as few as 50 hearing slots. Moreover, compli-
ance hearings are sometimes granted in the “working meeting” model,323 as opposed to 
the “public hearing” model, making it more difficult for advocates to draw attention to 
them and take full advantage of the opportunity to shame non-compliant states.
Significantly, it appears that when the Inter American Commission adopted new 
rules of procedure in 2009, it did not alter the existing framework so as to make certain 
follow-up activities mandatory. As a result, Article 46 of the 2001 Rules of Procedure 
simply became Article 48.1 of the new Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Com-
mission that took effect on December 31, 2009.324 Accordingly, there is no indication 
that the commission’s follow-up activities will develop in any significant way in the 
near future, and its reporting and hearing activities will likely continue to be limited 
in this regard. 
Another aspect of the 2001 procedural reforms germane to implementation is 
the decision of the Inter-American Commission to refer more cases to the jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court. Until 2001, the commission’s decision to submit a case 
to the jurisdiction of the court was largely a discretionary one, made with very little 
transparency. The 2001 reforms instituted a process of consultation with the parties 
regarding submitting the case to the jurisdiction of the court. The practical effect of 
this change was to transform the submission of cases to the court from the exception 
to the rule.325 This resulted in a rapid increase in the caseload of the Inter-American 
Court. Indeed, fewer than 20 merits decisions were issued by the Inter-American Court 
between 1989 and 1999, compared to more than 80 such decisions between 1999 and 
2009, an increase of more than 300 percent over one decade. Because states have his-
torically responded with more seriousness to orders of the court, this increase in the 
court’s output has translated into more implementation generally, if not better rates of 
implementation.326 
Inter-American Court
The Inter-American Court’s authority to issue binding decisions that are “final and not 
subject to appeal” arises from Article 67 of the American Convention. Article 68, in 
turn, requires that states “undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court,” and 
specifically provides that “part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages may 
be executed in the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing 
the execution of judgments against the state.” With regard to reporting, Article 65 pro-
vides that the court “shall” include in its annual report to the OAS “the cases in which 
a state has not complied with its judgments, making any pertinent recommendations,” 
and the court has concluded that this is the basis for its implementation monitoring 
activities, as it would not be possible to report to the OAS on compliance with its judg-
ments if it did not follow up with the state in question.327
In 1999, the court began the practice of issuing “compliance orders” against 
states that it determines have not adequately fulfilled their obligations to implement its 
reparations orders.328 These compliance orders, which are issued after the submission 
of written allegations by the parties to the cases, provide insight into implementation 
in different cases, as well as the justifications states give for their failure to implement 
decisions. The court has issued compliance orders in roughly 75 percent of the cases in 
which it has issued reparations decisions, and has issued multiple orders in a number 
of cases, providing substantial insight into the implementation process of those cases 
with which the court is more engaged.329 Interestingly, while the court had the oppor-
tunity to institutionalize its procedures for monitoring compliance when it reformed 
its Rules of Procedure along with the Inter-American Commission in 2001, it declined 
to do so.330 
Despite the court’s decision not to include explicit follow-up procedures in its 
Rules of Procedure in 2001, it has continued to develop such procedures. For example, 
in the reparations decisions issued in Barrios-Altos and Durand and Uguarte against Peru 
in 2001, the court required Peru to present a report on compliance within six months 
of the date that the decision was issued,331 and in Cantoral-Benavides it required such 
a report ”every six months” following the decision.332 In almost every decision since 
issued, the Inter-American Court has incorporated a reporting requirement, though it 
has fluctuated between six months and one year in 2002 and 2003, one year in 2004 
and 2005, one year and 18 months in 2006 and 2007, and six months and one year 
in 2008 and 2009.333 By 2002, the court had begun to attach timetables to the specific 
aspects of its reparations decisions, clearly establishing its expectations for when the 
state should pay pecuniary damages, issue public apologies, or engage in activities to 
guarantee non-repetition. 
In addition to its regular compliance reporting to the OAS General Assembly, the 
court can issue a more substantial report on non-compliance to the General Assembly 
under Article 65. Judge Cançado Trinidade has encouraged the “full application” of the 
Article 65 sanction in cases of severe non-compliance, citing the two examples of such 
application during his tenure on the court: when the court denounced the Fujimori 
regime’s non-compliance with the court decisions during the 2000 General Assembly, 
and when it denounced Trinidad and Tobago’s failure to comply with a court decision 
ordering the revision of its capital punishment regime during the General Assembly 
in 2003.334 According to Judge Cançado Trinidade, this sanction consists of the court’s 
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consistently and vocally expressing its concern about a particular country during the 
time it is given to address OAS member states during the General Assembly.
Interestingly, many advocates are disinclined to ask the court to apply the full 
force of the Article 65 sanction in their own cases, indicating that this is a final measure 
reserved for when there is no hope of implementation. For obvious reasons, few advo-
cates want to admit that their case has arrived at this point. Moreover, because the OAS 
General Assembly provides the court with a limited period of time to present its annual 
report every year, there are serious questions about the utility of having the court dedi-
cate that time to denouncing a state for its failure to implement one or more decisions, 
if such a denunciation could represent an end point of the court’s implementation work. 
There are active conversations at all levels about the possible form and impact of the 
“full application” of Article 65, but because the practice is so uncommon, there is very 
little frame of reference for such a discussion. Accordingly, advocates focus their efforts 
on utilizing the court’s compliance monitoring mechanisms.
The court continued the process of developing its compliance monitoring pro-
cedures with a 2005 resolution entitled “Supervision of Compliance with Sentences 
(Applicability of Article 65 of the American Convention on Human Rights).”335 That 
resolution outlined both the supervisory practices that the court had developed up to 
that point, as well as the normative bases for those practices.336 The resolution provided, 
presumably in the interest of judicial economy, that the court would make a final deter-
mination of non-compliance after the prescribed time-periods for implementation had 
lapsed, and then report that case to the OAS annually until the state in question had 
demonstrated to the court that it had fully implemented all ordered reparations.337 Pur-
suant to this procedure, the court will include in its annual report to the OAS a list of 
states that have failed to implement a decision of the court, and the state must inform 
the court of any progress towards implementation if it wants to be removed from that 
list. Significantly, the court retains the ability to require compliance reporting when it 
deems necessary so that it may issue compliance orders.338 In fact, since the issuance 
of the resolution, the court has progressively developed its practices in reporting on the 
compliance phase of litigation.
For example, the court will use compliance orders to increase a state’s reporting 
requirements. In Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the court initially 
ordered that, “[a]s long as the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community 
remain landless, the State shall deliver to them the basic supplies and services neces-
sary for their survival.”339 However, when the state failed to implement this order, and 
members of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community died, the court required more 
regular and explicit reporting, ordering that the state “submit information that will 
allow the Court to differentiate the goods and services supplied to the members of the 
Sawhoyamaxa Community from those supplied to other communities.”340 
The Inter-American Court has also taken the important step of ordering states 
to identify agents responsible for carrying out the implementation of decisions at the 
national level. Recently, the Presidential Commission for Coordinating Executive Policy 
on Human Rights (Comisión Presidencial Coordinadora de la Política del Ejecutivo en 
Materia de Derechos Humanos, COPREDEH)—the state agency that represents Guate-
mala before the Inter-American human rights bodies—confronted the court with its 
inability to implement certain aspects of the court’s decisions because the relevant 
state institutions were not responding to their requests for support. The court took the 
unprecedented step of ordering Guatemala to name state agents as interlocutors for 
implementation of orders to investigate and punish those responsible for the violations 
identified in the cases, and to develop legislative measures of non-repetition.341 Specifi-
cally, the court ordered the state to identify an agent from the National Commission 
for Follow-Up and Support on the Strengthening of Justice (Comisión Nacional para el 
Seguimiento y Apoyo al Fortalecimiento de la Justicia) to work with COPREDEH to develop 
a comprehensive plan for the investigation of the case within a four-month time-frame, 
at which point the state should submit the plan for the court’s review.342 Similarly, the 
court required that the state identify a member of the legislative branch to work with 
COPREDEH in developing a comprehensive plan to implement the administrative and 
legislative procedures called for in the court’s decision.343 While results of these efforts 
are not yet clear, expanded and more specific reporting has the potential to encourage 
state accountability and provide a potential means for overcoming bureaucratic bottle-
necks relating to implementation.
In 2008, the court began the practice of convening “compliance hearings.”344 
Since the first compliance orders were issued in 1999, the court had developed the 
official record of implementation exclusively though written submissions from the par-
ties. The compliance hearings now provide the parties with an opportunity to present 
their evidence and arguments orally. The court has held dozens of these hearings in 
the past two years. They have been very well received by advocates, and were acknowl-
edged in the resolution issued by the General Assembly in 2009.345 In addition, the 
setting for these hearings has grown increasingly dynamic. Whereas initially all such 
hearings were closed and presided over by one to three judges, the court recently began 
the practice of convening public hearings.346 In July 2009, the court held its first such 
public hearing in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, clearly intending to 
promote implementation by holding the state publicly accountable for its human rights 
failures in that case.347
The format of these hearings is also becoming increasingly dynamic. The court 
recently held a compliance hearing in eight Colombian cases, to hear submissions from 
the parties regarding the state’s implementation of the court’s orders to provide medi-
cal and psychological treatment.348 The request for this hearing arose from Colombian 
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human rights organizations frustrated by their limited success in pursuing implemen-
tation of the non-monetary aspects of the court’s reparations orders. In an attempt to 
better organize their advocacy on matters pertaining to implementation, Colombian 
organizations have entered into a collaborative agreement and authorized an individual 
to coordinate certain aspects of their implementation strategy. The recent request by 
this collective for a compliance hearing on a common element in multiple cases is a 
novel approach to compliance litigation, and the Inter-American Court’s decision to 
grant the hearing is an indication that it is open to more dynamic uses of such hear-
ings. It is also a sign that the court will continue to develop its monitoring compliance 
procedures generally.
The Inter-American Court’s new Rules of Procedure, which entered into force 
on January 1, 2010, provide the basis for the implementation procedures the court has 
developed over the past decade.349 Article 69.1 provides that “[t]he procedure for moni-
toring compliance with the judgments and other decisions of the Court shall be carried 
out through the submission of reports by the State and observations to those reports 
by the victims or their legal representatives,” and that “[t]he Commission shall present 
observations to the state’s reports and to the observations of the victims or their repre-
sentatives.” Article 69.2 empowers the court to request expert opinions about issues 
relating to compliance where appropriate. Article 69.3 provides that “the Tribunal may 
convene the State and the victims’ representatives to a hearing in order to monitor 
compliance with its decisions,” when it deems appropriate, and that “the Court shall 
hear the opinion of the Commission at that hearing.” Finally, Article 69.4 provides that 
“[o]nce the Tribunal has obtained all relevant information, it shall determine the state 
of compliance with its decisions and issue the relevant orders.” 
One important procedure established by the rules, which had not previously been 
implemented by the court, is the Article 30.5 procedure permitting the joinder of moni-
toring compliance proceedings in related cases. While the court likely established this 
procedure in the interest of judicial economy,350 joined monitoring compliance pro-
ceedings may provide a mechanism to discuss important systemic changes that arise 
consistently in cases against a certain state. Such consolidated proceedings provide the 
opportunity for advocates to combine their efforts, and force states to consolidate their 
responses. In the event of such joined proceedings, the court’s 2010 rules provide in 
Article 25 for the designation of a “common intervener,” or up to three interveners in 
the event that consensus cannot be reached. While it is not clear how this new model 
for monitoring compliance will aid in efforts to improve implementation, it presents an 
important strategic opportunity for advocates that should be explored.
National Implementation Laws and Mechanisms
Perhaps even more important than the efforts to develop implementation mechanisms 
at the regional level are the efforts by states themselves to develop implementation 
machinery within their national legal framework. One of the best examples of this 
development is in Peru. 
Under President Alberto Fujimori, the government of Peru regularly contested 
the decisions of the Inter-American Court, refusing to implement any aspect of the 
court’s reparations orders in Neira-Alegria v. Peru, Castillo-Paez v. Peru and Castillo-
Petruzzi, et al. v. Peru. Peru attempted to withdraw from the contentious jurisdiction 
of the court in 1999, arguing that the court was interfering with its sovereign right to 
control a terrorist threat. Questions were raised, however, about Peru’s true motivation 
in attempting to withdraw when it contested court decisions in the Ivcher Bronstein and 
Constitutional Court cases, where the court found violations of human rights related to 
the state’s efforts to silence criticism rather than confront terrorism. When a corruption 
scandal led to the Fujimori regime’s demise, the Peruvian Congress named Valentin 
Paniagua as interim president. 
Paniagua entered power on a platform of respect for human rights, and after a 
month in power he issued a decree regulating procedures for following up on recom-
mendations of international human rights bodies.351 Under that presidential decree, the 
government committed to processing the recommendations of bodies with non-binding 
jurisdiction, such as the Inter-American Commission, in good faith and in accordance 
with its international obligations.352 The decree further charged the National Human 
Rights Advisory (Consejo Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDH) of the Ministry of 
Justice with the responsibility of following up on all recommendations, and directed 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry to communicate all such recommendations to the CNDH’s 
Secretariat along with its observations.353 It further provided that the secretariat should 
communicate the recommendations to the full CNDH along with all relevant observa-
tions (including its own), so that the president of the CNDH could determine which 
actions corresponded to different executive offices. However, the decree limited the 
authority of the president of the CNDH to implement general remedies, permitting the 
president to merely make recommendations to the legislative and judicial branches and 
request that they inform the CNDH of any actions taken.354
While the framework established in this decree may not be ideal, it resolves the 
question of what process the state should follow when the Inter-American Commission 
issues a decision against it. Further, just over a year later, in April 2001, interim Presi-
dent Paniagua approved the CNDH’s regulations through presidential decree, which 
inter alia, created the Special Commission to Follow-Up on International Procedures 
(Comision Especial de Seguimiento y Atencion de Procedimientos Internacionales, CESAPI).355 
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CESAPI, in charge of participating in all international human rights proceedings, is 
composed of the president of the CNDH, a representative from the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, and an international law expert named by the Ministry of Justice.356 CESAPI 
has a technical committee, and is responsible for receiving and responding to all com-
munications from international human rights bodies established under the auspices 
of the UN, the OAS, or another multilateral organization in which Peru participates.357 
CESAPI is responsible for forming policies with regard to these proceedings together 
with the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and may name a state official to respond in specific 
proceedings.358 The decree also charges CESAPI with supervising the implementation 
of the decisions and recommendations of international human rights bodies.359 This last 
element is significant, as it expands the scope of the earlier presidential decree to cover 
the binding decisions of regional human rights bodies. In terms of implementation, the 
decree specifically directs CESAPI to spearhead compliance activities, coordinate rela-
tions with NGOs, and recommend compliance measures, such as legislative proposals, 
to the president of the CNDH.360 
While these presidential decrees were extremely important in shifting the policy 
of the Peruvian state after the fall of the Fujimori regime, it is important to note that 
they are only decrees of the executive and, unlike legislation, can be overturned by 
another executive act. For this reason, it is particularly significant that President Alejan-
dro Toledo, who won the July 2001 elections in Peru, oversaw the passage of a law regu-
lating the procedure for the execution of sentences issued by supranational courts.361 
That law establishes the specific steps that should be taken in order to give effect to 
those decisions of supranational courts that require either the payment of pecuniary 
damages or declaratory relief.362 First, the Foreign Affairs Ministry should transmit such 
a decision to the Supreme Court, which will then be responsible for transmitting it to 
the appropriate national court with jurisdiction to comply with the sentence.363 If the 
decision requires the payment of a specific monetary amount, the national court judge 
referred to the case should order the Ministry of Justice to pay the amount within ten 
days.364 If the decision requires the payment of an undetermined amount of money, 
the national court judge will initiate a process to determine an appropriate amount that 
should take no longer than thirty days.365 The law further provides a process for the 
resolution of conflicts that arise between national law and the decision of the relevant 
supranational court, as well as procedures to find individual responsibility for human 
rights violations and sanction those state officials responsible.366 
While at least one lawyer who has worked within this framework on the imple-
mentation of Inter-American Court decisions found it to be overly general in many 
circumstances,367 the Peruvian law provides what is possibly the most comprehensive 
model of national implementation legislation in the Americas. Such legislation is signif-
icant because it provides a framework for specific actions that can be taken by advocates 
after the Inter-American Court issues a decision. Indeed, while no Peruvian case has 
been fully implemented, the Inter-American Court has decided more cases against Peru 
than any other country, and there are numerous important examples of the implementa-
tion of both individual and general measures, including the only order by the court to 
investigate the circumstances of a human rights violation and punish the perpetrators 
ever to be fully implemented. While there are legitimate complaints about Peru’s failure 
to adequately institute measures of non-repetition, a condition that leads to continued 
violations and increasing reliance on the Inter-American Commission and Court,368 the 
Inter-American system has provided a concrete and reliable option for the people of 
Peru to pursue justice when they are denied it at the national level. For this reason, the 
Peruvian implementation mechanisms could provide a blueprint for how the regional 
community can work to improve implementation in a systematic manner.
Similar to the implementation framework in Peru, Colombian legislation provides 
a process for the payment of pecuniary damages ordered in decisions by international 
human rights bodies.369 In 1996, Colombia passed Law 288 on the indemnity of victims 
of human rights abuse.370 The law covers all of those cases in which the UN Human 
Rights Committee or the Inter-American Commission have determined Colombia to 
be responsible for a violation of human rights and ordered money damages, and where 
a committee composed of representatives of the Interior Ministry, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, the Justice Ministry, and the Defense Ministry has approved implementa-
tion.371 The law sets forth the process by which the committee will consider whether to 
implement the recommendations of the international body, and provides the process by 
which the decision to indemnify should be effectuated in the event that the committee 
approves payment.372 This law provides a framework for Colombia to engage in a good 
faith effort to implement the recommendations of those quasi-judicial bodies that it 
does not otherwise consider to have the authority to issue binding decisions. 
In contrast, Colombia gives the decisions of the Inter-American Court ordering 
pecuniary damages full effect, because the state recognizes such decisions as legally 
binding.373 However, there is no legal mechanism under which Colombia implements 
such decisions, and some problems inherent in that process are illustrative of problems 
throughout the region. 
With regard to monetary compensation, which is less controversial in the Colom-
bian context, the state will identify the responsibility of each ministry in a particular 
human rights case and require it to pay its share of the damages. As an example of 
how uncontroversial this process has become, the Colombian Ministry of Defense has 
incorporated a line item in its annual budget for the payment of international human 
rights decisions.374 The procedures for the implementation of other measures ordered in 
an Inter-American Court decision are less systematized. Generally, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry will convene a compliance meeting following the court’s decision, inviting 
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representatives from the other ministries with a stake in implementation, which usu-
ally include the Defense Ministry and the Public Ministry among others. However, 
because the process is not formalized under the law, the Foreign Affairs Ministry must 
rely on its political influence to bring representatives from the different ministries 
together. Accordingly, shifts in the political will or attitudes of public officials influ-
ence the implementation process. For example, the head prosecutors in charge of the 
investigations used to attend the compliance meetings, which the representatives of the 
victims thought to be very positive, but they stopped attending because they are often 
investigating officials from the Defense Ministry, which often sends representatives 
to the meetings.375 However, the dynamic of including the relevant ministries in the 
implementation process, as a matter of law when pecuniary damages are involved, and 
as a matter of fact with regard to other reparations, is generally considered a positive 
development. 
In addition to the implementation laws in Peru and Colombia, Costa Rica has 
signed an agreement with the Inter-American Court establishing that resolutions issued 
by the latter will have the same effect as sentences handed down by the national courts 
upon transmission to domestic administrative or judicial authorities.376 Moreover, a 
number of countries have ongoing processes that are worth noting. Argentina in par-
ticular has been debating a law on compliance for the past decade, and at least five 
legislative proposals have been presented suggesting frameworks for implementation 
of Inter-American Court and Commission decisions.377 Legislative proposals were simi-
larly presented in Brazil in 2000 and 2004.378 Such legislative processes are promising 
expressions of an interest in institutionalizing a willingness among certain state sectors 
to implement human rights obligations, particularly those arising from contentious 
Inter-American proceedings.
Conclusions and Recommendations
There is little question that there is an implementation crisis in the Inter-American 
system that threatens its legitimacy and its viability as a method to obtain redress for 
violations of human rights. The initiatives outlined above should all be considered as 
different aspects of an integral approach to promote broader implementation of the 
decisions of the Inter-American system. Below are some conclusions about the impor-
tance of these initiatives, and recommendations for their progressive development and 
to coordinate related activities.
Urge the OAS to Develop Its Mandate to Promote Implementation
As was discussed above, the General Assembly of the OAS has consistently issued 
resolutions on the importance of implementing the decisions of the Inter-American 
human rights bodies and called on states to act in accordance with their treaty obliga-
tions. However, none of these resolutions have established a mandate to take concrete 
actions to improve implementation. Interested parties should see these resolutions as 
a possible framework within which they can focus their regional activities to promote 
implementation. There are numerous activities that the General Assembly could order 
in relation to implementation; below are a few ideas drawn from the types of human 
right-related activities ordered in other General Assembly resolutions.
In the interest of accelerating the discussion on implementation, the General 
Assembly could require the Permanent Council to hold an annual, day-long conference 
at the OAS headquarters, with the participation of states, representatives from the com-
mission and court, and civil society, to discuss matters pertinent to the implementa-
tion of decisions. In this context, state representatives from Peru and Colombia could 
make presentations about their implementation laws, Argentina and Brazil could speak 
about their legislative processes, the commission and court could speak about their 
implementation activities, and civil society organizations could talk about their imple-
mentation successes and frustrations. This would create a record of the implementation 
challenge at the regional level, as well as provide the basis for more active conversations 
among interested parties.
Either prior to the event on implementation described above, or after the first such 
meeting and in anticipation of the second, the General Assembly could order the Depart-
ment of Legal Services of the OAS to produce a report on implementation. Such a report 
could have numerous purposes and goals. One could be to collect a broad range of imple-
mentation experiences, surveying the different ways in which states incorporate the obli-
gations that arise from commission and court decisions into their national legal order.
Finally, the General Assembly could order the Permanent Council to establish 
a working group on implementation within the Committee on Juridical and Politi-
cal Affairs (CJPA), in line with the proposal made by Judge Cançado Trinidade in his 
addresses to the OAS. The goal of such a working group would be to create a space for 
a sustained discussion about the implementation of commission recommendations 
and court orders in the political sphere of the OAS. The CJPA is the body within the 
OAS responsible for matters relating to the human rights practices of member states, 
and there is precedent for the General Assembly to require the establishment of work-
ing groups in the CJPA through its resolutions. Accordingly, the General Assembly 
could establish a working group in the CJPA to discuss implementation challenges 
and exchange best practices, with one possible objective being the production of model 
directives on how to implement the decisions of the Inter-American Commission and 
Inter-American Court at the national level.
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Boost the Implementation Activities of the Commission
It is clear from a review of the commission’s activities that there has not been a sus-
tained effort to develop its implementation procedures and mechanisms since the 2001 
reform to its Rules of Procedure. The progress made at the time of that reform, however, 
was not insignificant. It established a reporting mechanism that, while imperfect, has 
provided the basic data for numerous quantitative implementation analyses. The rules 
further provided the basis for other implementation activities, such as hearings during 
the sessions of the commission and promotional visits by commissioners, although 
these activities have not been carried out in a sustained manner. The commission does 
emphasize the virtue of friendly settlement negotiations, and regularly refers cases to 
the Inter-American Court, partially in recognition of the advantage of each of these 
procedures in achieving implementation. Nevertheless, it is crucial that the commission 
continue to develop its implementation mechanisms and procedures.
While the commission began reporting in 2001 on implementation of decisions 
issued since 2000, it wavered between 2004 and 2006 when it only reported on imple-
mentation of those decisions issued during the three years prior. However, in 2007 
the commission resumed collection of implementation data for all of the cases it had 
decided since 2000, and it will provide a full decade of implementation data in its 2010 
annual report. Nevertheless, the commission has not substantially developed its meth-
ods of data collection since it began this initiative; it passively collects information and 
includes the version of each party in a report, without taking the opportunity to decide 
which party’s assessment of implementation is more accurate. The commission does 
not issue resolutions condemning states that are not fulfilling their obligations. Were 
the commission to follow the example of the court and create a contentious phase of 
implementation litigation, it would certainly create a more accurate record of actual 
implementation, and it might pressure states to improve their practices.
Similarly, the commission should consider increasing the number of implementa-
tion hearings it holds, and making implementation a more integral and predictable part 
of its country visits. Were the commission to take steps to convert its implementation 
reporting mechanism into a contentious phase in litigation, it may find that by exer-
cising its power to hold states accountable in private hearings, or to embarrass states 
in public hearings, it would achieve higher rates of implementation. However, even if 
the commission does not create a more rigorous system of implementation reporting 
across the board, interested parties can urge it to grant more implementation hear-
ings in their specific cases. In most cases, states will feel compelled to present reports 
on implementation measures when called to such hearings, and in that way a more 
complete implementation record can be created on a case-by-case basis. The only way 
that the commission will begin to prioritize compliance hearings is if interested parties 
request them consistently.
Finally, the possibility of establishing a rapporteurship on implementation within 
the Inter-American Commission should be considered. Such a rapporteurship would 
likely need to be funded independently, like the Rapporteurship on Freedom of Expres-
sion, but it is an idea that merits study as it could provide the exact means for the com-
mission to step up its implementation activities without further stretching its already 
overextended budget. It would also be able to give the appropriate attention to the issue 
of implementation, and coordinate with other regional and national compliance mecha-
nisms to realize the “collective guarantee” of the American Convention. While this is 
not a proposal that has been taken up in the past, it should certainly be considered in 
the context of the growing dialogue on regional implementation mechanisms.
Develop Dynamic Implementation Litigation before the Court
Of the OAS bodies, the court is without question the most committed to the mission of 
improving the rates of implementation of its decisions. Over the past decade, the court 
has actively developed an implementation phase of litigation, such that it now takes 
written submissions and holds hearings, both private and public, on matters pertaining 
to implementation of its orders. Worth special mention are the efforts of the court to 
identify where impediments to compliance exist on the national level, and require states 
to specifically address them. Litigants should recognize this as one of the initiatives with 
the most potential to boost implementation in the Inter-American system, and assist in 
the dynamic evolution of these procedures.
Some specific examples that show promise are requests that the court require 
more detailed reporting from different state agencies and order states to identify agents 
responsible for particular aspects of implementation. The court has demonstrated its 
willingness to issue such orders recently in a series of Guatemalan cases in response 
to frustration voiced by COPREDEH, which is itself a state agency. Litigants should test 
the court’s resolve in this regard, requesting specific orders in a range of cases and on a 
variety of issues. Similarly, litigants should push the court to order that states construct 
national mechanisms to implement court orders in specific cases, such as the “inter-
institutional committee to define and execute the training programs on human rights 
and treatment of inmates” it ordered in Tibi v. Ecuador. Court orders of this nature 
are significant because they recognize that implementation often requires buy-in by 
multiple state agencies, and demonstrate the court’s willingness to exercise its binding 
jurisdiction to instruct the state on the best way to implement its decision. 
The problem of unresponsive or uncooperative state agencies is currently being 
addressed by Colombian civil society organizations within the context of implementa-
tion litigation. Colombian organizations that have litigated favorable outcomes before 
the Inter-American Court have recently spearheaded a new initiative by designating an 
individual who will coordinate certain activities to promote the implementation of Inter-
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American Court decisions. In their first collective act, they have requested a hearing in 
eight cases simultaneously to address the court’s order that the state provide medical 
and psychological care to the victims. Other civil society actors in states against which 
multiple cases have been issued on similar matters could use this technique. This 
technique can be combined with the other litigation strategies mentioned above, such 
that collaborating civil society organizations can make collective requests to the court to 
order the state to identify individuals responsible for implementation, require them to 
form an inter-agency task force, and then provide specific reports on concrete matters 
to be debated during both private and public hearings.
Promote the Articulation of National Implementation Legislation
Ultimately, implementation litigation before the court is a substitute for the initiative 
at the state level to identify those agents responsible for giving the court’s order effect 
at the national level. While the court can help to structure state initiative and pressure 
the state to make progress when it is not inclined to do so, the ideal scenario is for the 
state to structure its own initiatives for implementing the decisions of the commission 
and court.
National legislation is the clearest way for states to structure their efforts to 
implement Inter-American decisions. Some examples of national laws that provide a 
framework for compliance or implementation activities are provided above, and laws 
from Peru and Colombia have been discussed in considerable detail. The consensus 
of almost all of those individuals interviewed for this report is that the proliferation of 
national legislation establishing permanent mechanisms for the implementation of 
Inter-American Commission and Court decisions is the best hope for improvement in 
the rates of implementation. A complete implementation advocacy agenda, therefore, 
should include an effort to promote individual legislative processes to elaborate compli-
ance laws and policies. Moreover, efforts to develop model legislation, or guiding prin-
ciples for the establishment of national implementation mechanisms (akin to the Paris 
Principles for NHRIs), could be an important step to assist countries considering such 
a legislative proposal. Such model legislation could also aid civil society organizations 
pushing for legislative change.
Civil society groups that regularly work before the Inter-American system should 
advocate in their respective countries for a serious legislative process. These organiza-
tions should collaborate regionally in order to share experiences and prospects for such 
laws, so that best practices and mutual support networks can develop. This regional 
collaboration should also target the OAS and the Inter-American bodies in an attempt 
to foster the natural link between their work on the national level and the efforts to 
develop regional compliance mechanisms. 
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III. The African System on 
 Human and Peoples’ Rights
Introduction
The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established as a regional 
human rights body with the mandate to promote and protect human rights in the Afri-
can continent upon the entry into force of the African [Banjul] Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights in 1986.379 The central feature of the commission’s protective mandate 
is its review of “individual communications” submitted by persons or entities alleging 
violations by states of their human rights obligations under the charter.380 In 1998, in 
hopes of expanding the regional system of human rights protection, the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) promulgated the Protocol to the African Charter of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.381 The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights entered into force in Janu-
ary 2004 upon the ratification of the protocol by fifteen member states of the OAU’s 
successor, the African Union (AU).382 In January 2006, eleven judges were elected to 
the African Court,383 and a Host Agreement was signed between the AU and Tanzania 
that established the seat of the court in that country.384
The African Commission and African Court constitute the youngest of the regional 
human rights systems reviewed in this report, and both bodies have been of limited 
use to individuals seeking redress for human rights violations in the African continent. 
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Indeed, according to a review of those communications published in the commission’s 
seventh through 26th activity reports,385 it has found violations of the charter in only 60 
cases against less than half of the 53 AU member states.386 The African Court, which 
represented an exciting hope for enforcement of regional human rights obligations at 
the time of its establishment, has only decided one case to date, which it disposed of 
on admissibility grounds.387 Many factors contribute to the system’s underutilization; 
two often cited reasons are the exceedingly low rates of implementation of commission 
decisions and the commission’s reluctance to refer unimplemented decisions to the 
jurisdiction of the African Court, making the process appear futile to many. Partly in 
response to the frustration of practitioners with the system’s apparent ineffectiveness, the 
commission and court in 2010 reformed their rules of procedure to establish processes 
for the commission to follow-up on the implementation of its recommendations and to 
refer cases to the jurisdiction of the court when it has exhausted its follow-up activities. 
This chapter explores both the nature of the African Commission’s implementa-
tion crisis and the potential of the new rules of procedure to improve implementation 
and breathe new life into this regional system of human rights protection. In so doing, it 
looks at the past implementation successes of the commission and explores the relation-
ship between implementation and the rights at issue in a case, the remedies ordered, 
and the follow-up activities carried out during the implementation phase. It goes on to 
explore the reform to the rules of procedure of the African Commission and Court, iden-
tifying strengths, weaknesses, and potential ambiguities. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with concrete recommendations for how interested parties can encourage the commis-
sion and court’s work under the new rules with the goal of improving implementation 
in the African System on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
The Implementation Problem and the Institutional 
 Response
Distinguished observers Frans Viljoen, Lirette Louw, and Obiora Chinedu Okafor have 
discussed seven implementation successes in their writings on the African system.388 
Considering that the African Commission has issued 60 decisions on the merits find-
ing countries to have violated their human rights obligations under the African Charter 
in the roughly 25 years of its existence, these seven cases—which will be discussed 
below in more detail—represent a 12 percent rate of implementation.389 However, this 
does not account for some cases of “partial compliance,” which former Communica-
tions Reform Expert Abiola Ayinla calculated at 34 percent in her report, “Suggested 
Reforms of the Communications Procedure of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights”,390 produced under the auspices of the Expertise Program.391 The basis 
for Ayinla’s calculation is not clear, however, and because the commission does not keep 
implementation data, it is difficult to substantiate.
While there may be some debate over how to measure implementation of the 
commission’s recommendations, there is little argument that the overall rate of imple-
mentation is poor.392 Ayinla and George Mukundi Wachira provide various explanations 
for this poor rate of implementation, which “include the lack of political will on the part 
of state parties, a lack of good governance, outdated concepts of sovereignty, a lack of an 
institutionalized follow-up mechanism for ensuring the implementation of its recom-
mendations, weak powers of investigation and enforcement and the non-binding char-
acter of the Commission’s recommendations, the last of which is the most cited reason 
why states have not been inclined to enforce its recommendations.”393 While questions 
of political will, good governance, and concepts of sovereignty are serious impediments 
to implementation, they manifest differently in each case, are fairly unpredictable, and 
will likely continue to be a challenge for the African system. The African Commission 
and African Court are currently working to address the other issues highlighted by 
Ayinla and Wachira, namely the non-binding nature of the commission’s decisions and 
its lack of an institutionalized follow-up mechanism, but it is important to acknowledge 
at the outset that the African system’s evolving powers are not uncontroversial; they 
have been, and will continue to be, met with resistance. 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that there has been some debate about 
the authority of the commission to process individual communications.394 This debate 
arises, in part, because the charter provides in Articles 47–54 an explicit mandate for 
the commission to consider state communications alleging violations of the charter 
and to issue recommendations, and provides under Article 55 that it may consider 
“other communications,” but that it should only issue recommendations in limited 
circumstances. Specifically, Article 58 provides that “the Commission shall draw the 
attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to … special cases which 
reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and peoples’ 
rights,” and that “[t]he Assembly of Heads of State and Government may then request 
the Commission to undertake an in-depth study of these cases and make a factual 
report, accompanied by its findings and recommendations” (emphasis added). Regard-
less of what could be interpreted as a very limited mandate for the consideration of 
individual communications, the commission processes “other communications” under 
Article 55 of the charter in the same way it processes communications submitted by 
states. Moreover, all but one of the communications presented to the jurisdiction of 
the African Commission have been “other communications” filed under Article 55.395 
Nevertheless, the commission’s insistence on exercising its contentious jurisdiction in 
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the face of objections by states puts the discussion about its evolving follow-up powers 
in an important historical context. 
Adding to the implementation challenge is the fact that the commission deci-
sions are commonly considered to be non-binding.396 The commission itself acknowl-
edges that its recommendations are not legally binding when they are issued in activity 
reports. However, the commission argues that once the AU Assembly of Heads of State 
adopts the activity report, the recommendations therein become legally binding on the 
states parties.397 This position is fairly controversial, however, as there is nothing in 
the charter itself establishing that the recommendations of the commission are legally 
binding. Further, it does not appear that the AU Assembly makes any independent 
assessment of the commission’s findings in adopting its decisions; rather, it merely 
acknowledges the work of the commission and makes it public.398 There is little ques-
tion that the binding nature of the commission recommendations will continue to be a 
source of contention and act as an impediment to implementation.
In contrast, the African Court Protocol provides that the court will exercise bind-
ing jurisdiction over states in cases that involve violations of human rights guaranteed 
by the charter.399 Accordingly, with a reliable procedure for the African Commission to 
refer cases to the court, the African system could provide an institutional response to 
those states that cite the non-binding nature of commission decisions as a reason for 
declining to implement its recommendations. Ironically, many observers opine that the 
principal problem in getting the African Court to hear a meritorious case has been the 
commission’s lack of initiative in presenting such a case to the jurisdiction of the court. 
As noted above, however, the commission and the court in 2010 adopted new 
rules of procedure that will govern, inter alia, the commission’s referral of cases to 
the court.400 This new procedural framework represents the potential for improved 
implementation of African Commission decisions because states will likely want to 
avoid being among the first to be condemned by the African Court for their human 
rights practices, a sentiment that may induce good faith efforts by states to implement 
the commission’s recommendations. Additionally, if the commission does refer an 
unimplemented case to the court, and the court finds a state in violation of its charter 
obligations, there will certainly be added pressure to implement the court’s decision 
due to the binding nature of its jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the new rules address Ayinla and Wachira’s concern regarding the lack 
of any institutionalized follow-up mechanism to support implementation of African 
Commission decisions. As will be discussed in greater detail, the commission’s new 
follow-up mechanism provides specific direction to the commission and interested par-
ties as to how it will work to promote implementation of its decisions. Before specifically 
reviewing this new follow-up mechanism, it is important to review the commission’s 
experience with actual cases over the past 25 years to identify those elements of cases, 
such as rights and remedies, which may influence implementation and inform follow-
up activities.
Implementation Successes, Rights, Remedies, 
and Follow-Up Activities
It is important to acknowledge at the outset those cases in which states have imple-
mented the recommendations of the African Commission. While they constitute the 
exception rather than the rule, identifying positive trends will aid efforts to improve 
implementation moving forward. The seven commonly cited examples of implementa-
tion success are: Pagnoulle v. Cameroon,401 Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria,402 Centre 
for Free Speech v. Nigeria,403 Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone,404 Modise v. Botswana,405 
Amnesty International v. Zambia,406 and Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani 
Lakwot and 6 Others) v. Nigeria.407 An overview of the issues involved in these cases is a 
useful place to begin an analysis of implementation in the African system.
In Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, the government arrested five men, 
accused them of serious offenses ranging from armed robbery to kidnapping, and 
detained them without charge.408 The commission found that Nigeria had violated the 
men’s rights to personal liberty (Article 6) and fair trial (Article 7) protected under the 
charter, and recommended that it charge the men or release them. Nigeria ultimately 
charged them.409 
In another case against Nigeria, Centre for Free Speech v. Nigeria, four journalists 
were imprisoned and denied the right to select their own counsel for a trial before a 
military tribunal on charges related to unfavorable reporting.410 The commission found 
that Nigeria had violated the journalists’ rights to personal liberty, a fair trial, and the 
guarantee of the independence of the courts (Article 26), and recommended that the 
government release them. The government subsequently released them.411 In the third 
Nigerian implementation success, Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani 
Lakwot and 6 Others) v. Nigeria, the commission found that Nigeria had violated the 
charter’s fair trial protection when it tried seven prominent leaders of the Kataf ethic 
minority in a military tribunal and sentenced them to death.412 After the commission 
announced grave violations of due process and recommended that Nigeria release the 
men in 1996, they were released later that year.
In Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone, the commission reviewed a communica-
tion submitted by a human rights organization on behalf of 24 soldiers who were sen-
tenced to death for their alleged role in a coup attempt, and executed without a right to 
appeal.413 The commission found that Sierra Leone had violated the charter’s guarantees 
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to life (Article 4) and judicial protection. Sierra Leone subsequently altered its laws to 
provide for a right to appeal in such cases.
Pagnoulle v. Cameroon concerned a magistrate who was imprisoned by order of 
a military tribunal without proper judicial protections.414 Pagnoulle was ultimately 
released after a five-year term, but was not reinstated as required under an applicable 
amnesty law. The commission found that Cameroon had violated Pagnoulle’s rights to 
personal liberty, fair trial, and to work (Article 15) under the charter and recommended 
that it “reinstate the victim in his rights.” In 2002, Cameroon reported in its Article 
62 report that it had reinstated Pagnoulle to the judiciary, and that it had offered him 
compensation, which he refused to accept because he considered it to be inadequate.415
In Modise v. Botswana, the commission found that Botswana had arbitrarily 
deprived Modise of his nationality because of his political activity, and on several occa-
sions deported him to South Africa without trial in violation of the rights to equal pro-
tection under the law (Articles 3), physical integrity (Article 5), freedom of movement 
(Article 12), political participation (Article 13), property (Article 14), and family unity 
(Article 18).416 The commission urged Botswana to recognize Modise’s right to nation-
ality, and it agreed to do so after protracted negotiations. However, no agreement has 
ever been made with regard to compensation because Modise insists that he deserves 
much more than the state is willing to pay.417 Nevertheless, Modise is commonly cited 
as a case of implementation success.
Finally, in Amnesty International v. Zambia, the commission reviewed Zambia’s 
politically motivated arbitrary detention and deportation to Malawi of William Steven 
Banda and John Luson Chinula.418 The commission found that Zambia had violated 
the complainants’ rights to be free from discrimination (Article 2), fair trial, freedom of 
conscience (Article 8), freedom of speech (Article 9), freedom of association (Article 10), 
and family unity, enshrined in the charter. Three years after the commission’s decision, 
the Zambian government overturned Banda and Chinula’s deportation orders, invited 
Banda to return unconditionally, and allowed for the return of Chinula’s remains after 
he had died in exile. 
Observable Trends in the Rights at Stake
The rights at stake in the cases that have been resolved by the African Commission can 
be divided into some general categories: (1) civil and political rights such as due process, 
personal liberty, and physical integrity (Article 1–7); (2) civil and political rights, such as 
the rights to free expression and association (Articles 8–13); (3) economic, social, and 
cultural rights (Articles 14–18); and (4) group rights (Articles 19–24).
A review of the rights at issue in these cases is telling. Almost every case decided by 
the commission has concerned category (1) rights, many of which involved the arbitrary 
detention of a specified number of individuals and accompanying mistreatment, but 
in some circumstances involved more systemic due process violations as well. Approxi-
mately 50 percent of the cases issued by the commission also implicate category (2) 
rights, involving political participation and association and also free expression related 
to journalism and other speech.419 Approximately 25 percent of the commission’s cases 
involve economic, social, and cultural rights from category (3), while just five percent 
can be considered group rights cases under category (4). For the most part, the cases of 
full implementation principally involved violations of the rights to due process, personal 
liberty, physical integrity, and political rights. A closer review, however, reveals that the 
only rights not implicated in any of the seven cases are category (4) group rights. 
Notwithstanding the multiple violations found by the commission in these cases, 
it is not accurate to call any of these cases economic, social, and cultural rights cases, as 
the findings of violations of those rights were largely incidental to the violations of the 
civil and political rights at issue. This phenomenon is fairly common in African Com-
mission cases, where a substantial number of deportation and nationality cases also 
implicate economic, social, and cultural rights.420 For example, in Amnesty International 
v. Zambia and Modise v. Botswana, the commission found that by deporting Banda and 
Chinula, Zambia had deprived them of the right to family unity. Interestingly, the com-
mission also addressed the fact that Modise was left homeless for a substantial period 
of time as a violation of his Article 5 right to be free from inhumane treatment.421 Simi-
larly, in cases of mass expulsion, such as Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, et 
al. v. Angola and Malawi African Association, et al. v. Mauritania, the commission found 
violations of the rights to property, the right to work (Article 15), the right to education 
(Article 17), and the right to health (Article 16).422 While many of the same rights are at 
issue in these cases, the commission’s recommendations in the two cases that involve 
isolated incidents have been successfully implemented; however, its recommendations 
in the second two, which involved substantial numbers of people, have not. 
This trend is also apparent in the few cases that do involve group rights, such as 
The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
v. Nigeria, where in addition to finding violations of the rights to life and equal protec-
tion, the commission found violations of the rights to property, health, family unity, 
natural resources (Article 21), and a generally satisfactory environment (Article 24) 
based on ample evidence of the degradation of the environment of the Ogoni people.423 
Like the mass expulsion cases, this case has yet to be successfully implemented. This 
is likely attributable in part to the group nature of the right that the case addresses, but 
also the marginalization of Nigeria’s Ogoni people and the complexity of the remedy 
set forth by the commission.
From this brief review, it is apparent that it is difficult to draw useful conclusions 
from rights-based comparisons, because almost every case involves a violation of core 
civil and political rights, and that a subset involves social, economic, cultural, and group 
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rights, often only incidentally. Thus, rights do not appear to be determinative of whether 
the commission’s recommendations will be implemented.424 Cases that require states 
to respect the traditional civil and political rights of small numbers of individuals have 
a better chance of being implemented than cases involving larger groups. Similarly, 
the complexity of the case itself and attendant complexity of the remedies ordered by 
the commission, also affect implementation. To develop a more complete picture of 
the factors that influence implementation, a review of the remedial framework of the 
commission follows.
Types of Recommendations and their Relationship to Implementation
As the above discussion on rights suggests, the nature and complexity of the commis-
sion’s proposed remedy is equally if not more determinative of implementation. Inter-
estingly, the form and substance of the commission’s recommendations has changed 
over time. Among the 60 final merits decisions, the commission has, in some cases, 
offered no recommendations, while in others it has detailed a wide range of individual 
and general measures.
As an initial matter, it is interesting to review those cases in which the commis-
sion failed to provide recommendations. Of the nine cases decided before the publica-
tion of the Tenth Activity Report, five did not include any specific recommendations, 
while the other four provided specific recommendations to remedy the violation identi-
fied, including Pagnoulle v. Cameroon. In the 51 cases published since the Tenth Activity 
Report, the commission has failed to provide explicit recommendations in only five 
cases; interestingly, Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone and Amnesty International v. Zam-
bia, two of the examples of successful implementation described above, were among 
them. Accordingly, while there may be a temptation to associate the specificity of a 
recommendation with implementation, it does not in fact appear that this relationship 
is particularly important. This is a somewhat troubling proposition, which calls for a 
more in depth inquiry.
One example of a case in which the commission did not provide a recommen-
dation is Rights International v. Nigeria, where the commission found that the state of 
Nigeria had violated Charles Baridorn Wiwa’s rights under the charter when it arrested 
him and tortured him at a Nigerian military detention camp in Gokana.425 At the end 
of its report on the case, the commission merely concluded that Nigeria had violated 
certain provisions of the charter without suggesting a remedy. Similarly, in Huri-Laws 
v. Nigeria, the commission found that Nigeria had violated the charter’s guarantee to 
humane treatment, the freedom from arbitrary detention, the right to judicial protec-
tion, as well as the freedoms of expression, association and movement, as a result of its 
security services persecuting the Civil Liberties Organization, and specifically the arrest 
and mistreatment of the organization’s leadership.426 After noting that the government 
of Nigeria had neither responded to the commission’s requests for additional informa-
tion or arguments on the merits of the case, the commission announced that Nigeria 
had violated its obligations under the charter, but failed to recommend steps it should 
take in order to come into compliance with those obligations. Finally, in Interights, et al. 
v. Islamic Republic of Mauritania, the commission found that Mauritania had violated 
rights protected under the charter when it issued Decree No. 2000/116.PM/MIPT in 
October 2000 in order to dissolve the “Union of Democratic Forces—New Era” political 
party.427 The commission found that the dissolution decree was not “proportional to the 
nature of offences and breaches by the political party,” and concluded that Mauritania 
had violated the freedom of association enshrined in the charter; however, it did not 
provide recommendations for how it should remedy the troubling situation.
Arguably, the remedy in each of these cases is implicit under generally accepted 
norms of international human rights law. Indeed, if a country is found to have violated 
the human rights of an individual or a community, such a finding requires that the 
state, at a minimum, cease or undo all activity contributing to the violation. For this 
reason, a decision by the African Commission finding a state in violation of its obliga-
tions under the charter would put the state on notice that some reparative measures 
must be taken. In fact, while the commission did not provide explicit recommendations 
in its final decisions in Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone428 and Amnesty International 
v. Zambia,429 the states ultimately implemented the implicit reparative measures that 
arose from the commission’s adverse findings. Also significant is that the first of these 
two cases resulted in a change to the law in Sierra Leone, making it the only general 
measure to be implemented as the result of a commission decision. This somewhat 
unpredictable relationship between the nature of the remedies that the commission 
recommends and their implementation urges an inquiry into the range of recommen-
dations that the commission has made over time. 
A review of the commission’s decisions carried out for this study reveals that the 
occasions when the commission has not issued recommendations are in the minority, 
constituting approximately 15 percent of the cases decided. In most cases, particularly 
those issued since the commission began publishing its decisions in activity reports, 
do include explicit recommendations. However, such recommendations are usually to 
institute a very specific measure in order to address the immediate problem faced by the 
victim(s) of human rights abuse featured in the communication(s). In a sense, these rec-
ommendations merely declare what was implicit in the decisions discussed above that 
were issued without recommendations. About 25 percent of the commission’s decisions 
merely conclude that states have violated their charter obligations and recommend that 
they adopt measures consistent with the commission’s findings. In about 10 percent of 
its cases, the commission provided slightly more specific recommendations, ordering 
a retrial, recognition of citizenship, or readmission to a country after deportation. In 
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another 10 percent of its cases the commission found that persons illegally detained 
should be released. In approximately 15 percent of its cases the commission ordered 
compensation of some sort, only once specifying the amount, and in approximately 20 
percent of its cases the commission recommended some type of legal reform, in one 
case recommending a constitutional amendment. 
In less than 10 percent of its cases, the commission has issued broader recom-
mendations. For example, in Purohit and Moore v. the Gambia, the commission reviewed 
a challenge to the “Lunatic Detention Act” and found violations of the rights to equality 
before the law, human dignity, judicial protection, political rights, health, and family 
unity, arising both from how people were deemed mentally ill under the act as well as 
the conditions of their internment.430 The commission “strongly urged” the Gambian 
government to: (1) repeal the Lunatic Detention Act and develop new legislation; (2) 
pending this repeal, establish an expert body to review all cases in which people have 
been detained under the act; and (3) provide adequate care for persons suffering from 
mental health problems in the country. Further, the commission urged the government 
of the Gambia to report back on implementation of such measures when submitting its 
next periodic report, required under Article 62 of the charter.
The commission has also articulated community remedies in The Social and Eco-
nomic Rights Action Center and the Center for Social and Economic Rights v. Nigeria, a 
case that denounced the activities of the Nigerian military dictatorship, which violently 
oppressed the Ogoni people in order to guarantee Shell the opportunity to engage in 
oil exploration in Ogoni territories.431 The commission found a range of violations of 
the charter, including the rights to life, property, health, family unity, and the collec-
tive enjoyment of natural resources. The commission recommended that the Nigerian 
state: (1) cease attacks against the Ogoni people and permit third parties to enter their 
territory; (2) conduct investigations into the human rights abuses that had taken place; 
(3) provide compensation and resettlement assistance to the victims of human rights 
abuse and undertake a comprehensive cleanup of their lands; (4) prepare the neces-
sary environmental and social impact assessments before future oil exploration; and 
(5) provide information on the health and environmental risks of oil operations to the 
communities and guarantee them access to relevant regulatory agencies. 
In contrast to the decisions that simply draw conclusions about the states’ viola-
tions of their charter obligations, the commission in the Ogoni case articulated a wide 
variety of individual measures, ranging from pecuniary damages to investigations as 
well as general measures such as a guarantee of access to regulatory agencies. Further, 
the commission took the additional step of urging the government to inform the African 
Commission about the work of the Federal Ministry of Environment, the Niger Delta 
Development Commission, and the Judicial Commission of Inquiry, all national insti-
tutions that had been mandated, in part, to investigate environmental disasters in the 
Niger Delta and/or the human rights violations against the Ogoni people. This second 
aspect of the reparations decision is important, because in addition to extensive specific 
and general measures ordered in the case, the commission made an effort to direct 
certain national level follow-up activities. The value of this model of creating a report-
ing requirement for a specific case through the reparations decision will be explored 
in more detail below.
A number of observations are possible based on the above review. The first, and 
most obvious, is that the commission has no standard remedial scheme. The commis-
sion’s baseline approach appears to be recommending that a state resolve the specific 
problem, without necessarily making recommendations about the general situation. For 
example, if a case concerns an unfair trial, or arbitrary denaturalization or deportation, 
the commission may request that the state reverse the earlier decision or reopen the 
proceedings. In rare cases, money damages are also associated with the harm suffered; 
equally rare are general remedies, which are designed to address what are often sys-
temic problems. However, money damages and general remedies appear to be growing 
increasingly common in the commission’s more recent decisions. Notably, the com-
mission almost never orders the investigation and punishment of those responsible for 
charter violations. A number of practitioners in the African system attribute the inclu-
sion of remedies in commission orders to pressure applied by advocates who specifically 
articulate the remedy that they are seeking.432 Thus, the recent increase in the range and 
complexity of ordered remedies might be due to the work of experienced advocates who 
have prioritized the remedial phase of litigation before the commission. 
The trends explored above, and common sense, indicate that implementation is 
more feasible when there is less that a state must do in order to comply with a deci-
sion of the commission. Accordingly, those commission decisions that isolate actions 
by the state in question and merely recommend that the state undoes or repairs the 
effects of those actions are logically easier to implement, for example by granting citi-
zenship documents previously denied, or permitting an appeal from a conviction that 
was previously deemed final. However, there is little question that such actions are 
generally insufficient to make the victim whole. In the limited number of cases that 
order compensation, implementation becomes exponentially more complicated because 
the commission will not specify an amount, leaving room for significant differences of 
opinion.433 More complicated still are the handful of cases that require amendments to 
existing laws or the passage of new legislation. Ultimately, those few cases that incor-
porate all of these components to address systematic or generalized human rights viola-
tions are the most difficult to implement. 
The seven cases of full implementation either did not include a recommenda-
tion or the recommendation was for a very specific remedy. Furthermore, all of these 
cases remedied the situations of a finite number of complainants, except for Forum of 
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Conscience v. Sierra Leone, which could not feasibly remedy the situation of the executed 
men, but did result in a change in law. However, the cases that address generalized 
situations of human rights abuse are arguably more significant in the scope of the prob-
lems that they address. Practitioners should use this insight to shape their requests for 
certain recommendations, and ask for specific measures so as to strengthen the com-
mission’s mechanisms for follow-up. The importance of having an accurate remedial 
blueprint is particularly important as the commission begins to incorporate reporting 
requirements into its decisions.
The Importance of Follow-Up Activities
Of the seven successes described above, three involve Nigeria, which is commonly con-
sidered one of the richest case studies of the work of the African Commission. During 
the repressive dictatorship of General Sani Abacha (1993-1998), multiple cases were 
brought before the African Commission by NGOs challenging a variety of systematic 
human rights abuses aimed at Abacha’s opposition. Chidi Odinkalu, one of the lawyers 
who worked on the Abacha-era commission cases, describes the process of trying to con-
vince the Nigerian government to release political prisoners as like “horse trading,”434 a 
description that is inconsistent with the way that one might ideally imagine follow-up 
procedures to work. Nevertheless, it paints an important picture, which Obiora Chinedu 
Okafor describes in some detail in his book on the importance of “activist forces” in 
bringing about compliance with charter obligations, and how the commission, “with the 
facilitative contribution of local activists,” was able to raise the profile of public outcry 
against Abacha’s regime on the national and international levels.435
The importance of intense advocacy is also apparent in Modise v. Botswana, which 
had been closed by the commission and which lawyers petitioned to reopen in 1993. 
What followed was years of litigation that led to the guarantee of Modise’s nationality. 
In order to achieve this ministerial act, however, Chidi Odinkalu, Ibrahima Kane, and 
other advocates had to travel multiple times to Botswana to meet with high-level officials 
in the Justice and Foreign Affairs Ministries, among others. In an attempt to resolve the 
last point of implementation, payment of compensation, protracted negotiations took 
place over the course of many years and ended in an offer of 30,000 pounds by the 
government of Botswana to Modise, who rejected the offer because he felt he was due 
much more. Aside from being a testament to the need for a clear remedial framework 
for African Commission cases, the Modise case is a lesson in the importance of zeal-
ous follow-up, and the level of access advocates need in order to do so effectively. The 
African Commission can play a key role in creating both the ways and the means for 
such follow-up work to promote implementation.
Indeed, in Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone436 and Amnesty International v. Zam-
bia, no specific remedy was articulated by the commission, but the topic of the cases 
was raised during promotional visits by the commission to each respective country.437 In 
Forum of Conscience, the commission recommended that Sierra Leone fulfill its obliga-
tions under the charter even if the soldier applicants themselves were already deceased. 
The commission specifically raised the subject of the case with the government of Sierra 
Leone during a promotional visit in February 2000, and subsequently the state passed 
legislation that guaranteed soldiers the right to appeal the decisions of court-martial 
proceedings.438 Similarly, the commission noted in its decision in Amnesty International 
v. Zambia that Zambia should allow Banda to apply for citizenship and grant Chinula’s 
family’s request that his remains be repatriated, acknowledging that he had passed away 
while in Malawi. While these reparations were not explicitly ordered in the operative 
section of the decision, as is the commission’s general practice, they turned out to be 
significant. Indeed, in September 2002, during a promotional visit of the African Com-
mission to Zambia, Commissioner Andrew R. Chigovera raised the issue of implemen-
tation in a conversation with the Ministry of Justice. In that conversation, the ministry 
indicated that the deportation order had been revoked, Banda had been permitted to 
return to Zambia unconditionally, and Chinula’s remains had been repatriated.439
For the commission to make such promotional visits, or engage in real and rigor-
ous discussions with relevant state agencies about the implementation of recommen-
dations requires that commissioners have the capacity and the independence to do so. 
Fortunately, over time, the commission has begun to value these qualities more, and it 
has become more proactive in terms of its mandate. A particularly significant example 
of this can be found in the coordinated work of the African Commission and advocates 
to follow up on the commission’s recommendations in Malawi African Association, et al. 
v. Mauritania, presented below as a case study of implementation activities.440 
Malawi African Association, et al. involved 26 consolidated communications which 
arose from events that took place in the late 1980s, when the Mauritanian government 
initiated a policy of “Arabisation” that resulted in widespread repression of black Mau-
ritanians. In 1986 and 1987, those who protested against the wave of repression were 
arrested, tried summarily, and even executed. Activists were detained incommunicado, 
often in solitary confinement. In 1989, following an outbreak of cross-border violence 
with Senegal, the Mauritanian government expelled 70,000 black Mauritanians to Sen-
egal and Mali. Many of those expelled were government employees, or villagers occu-
pying fertile farmland in the south. Thousands were arbitrarily detained, particularly 
those who resisted the confiscation of their property. Entire villages were emptied, and 
the land given to Moors, some of whom formed militias to defend their newly acquired 
property. Expellees who attempted to reoccupy the villages were often arrested or even 
executed. In the villages that were not emptied, curfews were imposed, and sometimes 
enforced through violence—including torture and rape—by the army and militias. 
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In 1991, the Mauritanian government made superficial attempts at reconciliation 
with the remaining black Mauritanians. It announced the release of some of the arrest-
ees, but others were unaccounted for, and some had died in custody. The government 
then set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the arrests and expulsions, but the 
commission was not independent, did not disclose its methodology, and never made a 
public report of its findings. Mauritania did not contest the allegations of widespread 
human rights violations. In 1992, the government declared that displaced Mauritanians 
could return to their homes and promised to assist returnees, but failed to acknowledge 
the citizenship or rights of expellees who attempted to repatriate.
The commission issued a decision against Mauritania in May 2000, finding viola-
tions of numerous charter guarantees and recommended that the state:
1) arrange for the commencement of an independent enquiry in order to clarify the 
fate of persons considered as disappeared, identify and bring to book the authors 
of the violations perpetrated at the time of the facts arraigned;
2) take diligent measures to replace the national identity documents of those Mau-
ritanian citizens, which were taken from them at the time of their expulsion and 
ensure their return without delay to Mauritania; 
3) ensure the restitution of the belongings looted from the [persons expelled] at the 
time of the said expulsion; 
4) take the necessary steps for the reparation of the deprivations of the victims of 
the above-cited events; 
5) take appropriate measures to ensure payment of a compensatory benefit to the 
widows and beneficiaries of the victims of the above-cited violations; 
6) reinstate the rights due to the unduly dismissed and/or forcibly retired workers, 
with all the legal consequences appertaining thereto; 
7) [a]s regards the victims of degrading practices, carry out an assessment of the 
status of such practices in the country with a view to identify with precision the 
deep-rooted causes for their persistence and to put in place a strategy aimed at 
their total and definitive eradication; and 
8) take appropriate administrative measures for the effective enforcement of Ordi-
nance nº 81–234 of 9 November 1981, on the abolition of slavery in Mauritania. 
Three years after the African Commission’s decision, the Mauritanian govern-
ment had not complied with the recommendations, despite pressure from civil society 
and human rights organizations. In 2003, the commission’s Special Rapporteur on 
Refugees was mandated to undertake a fact-finding mission to document the situation 
of the expellees in Senegal.
In 2004, the Open Society Justice Initiative and partners visited the camps along 
the Senegal-Mauritania border where 25,000 Mauritanians were living and obtained 
sworn statements from expellees regarding the confiscation of their identity documents 
and loss of citizenship. This was followed by another visit by the Justice Initiative in 
2005, this time with the Special Rapporteur to document the situation of expellees 
in Senegal. The Special Rapporteur met with the Senegalese High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and members of the Senegalese Foreign Ministry. The team also met 
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative, 
NGO partners, and expellees in the settlements. 
In August of 2007, the Special Rapporteur, the Justice Initiative, and the Institute 
for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) visited Mauritania and Mali, 
where expellees reiterated their demands to return and to be given their citizenship. 
In November of that year, a tripartite agreement was signed by Mauritania, Senegal, 
and the UNHCR for the return and reintegration of expellees. The government subse-
quently committed to compensating former civil servants with reinstatement of retire-
ment benefits and designated a loan of $2.18 million to support reintegration through 
micro-credit loans for farming and other development projects. In order to facilitate 
this process, UNHCR officers visited the refugee sites and opened two coordination 
offices, and a local NGO was designated to support expellees crossing the Senegal River, 
and four refugee associations were established as mediators. The Justice Initiative and 
IHRDA participated in a follow-up consultation in Senegal to explain the conclusions 
of the national consultation and agreement. 
All of this work began to yield results in January 2008, when the first convoy of 
103 refugees from Senegal arrived in Mauritania. Returnees benefited from an assis-
tance package and food rations, and civil society partners worked to build infrastruc-
ture to benefit the returnees and local communities. By November 2008, over 5,000 
displaced Mauritanians had returned. However, there were concerns about the lack of 
transparency in repatriations, and delays in the issuance of identification papers. The 
Justice Initiative and IHRDA organized a workshop in Dakar in December, bringing 
leaders of expellees to express their views and concerns to UNHCR and government 
officials.
A coup caused delays, as a result of which only 10,000 Mauritanian expellees 
had been repatriated by April 2009, although 25,000 should have been repatriated by 
that time. By October 2009, UNHCR committed to the repatriation of approximately 
700 people per day to Mauritania. At the same time, the government proposed a com-
prehensive census and the immediate reinstatement of 144 teachers and support staff 
already identified. 
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Many of the commission’s recommendations in this case are still pending imple-
mentation, not only within the states, but also at the regional and institutional level. 
Nevertheless, while the Mauritania case remains one of only partial implementation, it 
highlights the importance of the guidance of expansive remedial orders, and provides 
an excellent example of what can be achieved through persistent follow-up activities. 
Moreover, it provides specific examples of what types of activities have been useful, such 
as promotional visits by commissioners, coordinated activities with civil society and UN 
agencies, workshops and trainings for local actors, and government consultations. All 
of these activities are institutionalized in the follow-up framework recently promulgated 
by the commission.
The New Rules of Procedure and the Follow-Up 
Framework
It is important to acknowledge the history of the African Commission’s struggle with 
implementation. Past initiatives to address the problem of implementing the commis-
sion’s recommendations include the formation of a working group on implementation 
and proposals for follow-up mechanisms such as a rapporteurship. Specifically, the 
commission issued a resolution in its 37th session on “The Creation of a Working 
Group on Specific Issues Relevant to the Work of the African Commission” (Resolution 
77) which specified that the newly established working group “deal with” a number of 
“specific issues,” including the “mechanism and procedure of the follow-up on deci-
sions and recommendations of the African Commission.”441 Resolution 77 provided that 
the working group should be composed of three members of the African Commission 
and three external experts from Interights, the Justice Initiative, and the IHRDA, and 
provided that the working group would report its findings in the 38th session, during 
which its mandate was renewed.442 While the issue appears to have been dropped in 
subsequent sessions, a resolution reported in the 23rd Activity Report again renewed 
the working group’s mandate.443 
The Communications Reform Report, presented to the commission during its 
40th session in Banjul, contained a proposal for a follow-up mechanism.444 The proposal 
included the establishment of a follow-up database, which would centralize information 
about compliance with commission recommendations, as well as the appointment of 
a follow-up rapporteur among the commissioners who would be empowered to, inter 
alia, call follow-up meetings with states, perform site visits focused on implementation, 
and publish its findings in the commission’s activity reports.445 During that session, 
the commission approved a “Resolution on the Importance of the Implementation of 
the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,”446 
which incorporated the principal suggestions of the Communications Reform Report.447 
However, none of the functional aspects of this resolution, such as the database or rap-
porteurship on implementation, were ever implemented by the commission, and the 
recommendations in the Communications Reform Report have not been implemented 
in any other way.448
Important aspects of many of these initiatives have been consolidated in the Afri-
can Commission’s new Rules of Procedure, which were adopted in 2010.449 Under Rule 
115 of the commission’s new rules: (1) the Secretariat shall notify the parties after one 
month of the dissemination of a decision; (2) if the decision finds a state in violation of 
its charter obligations, the state shall inform the commission in writing in six months 
of all of the measures it has taken to implement the decision; (3) the commission may 
request more information about follow-up measures taken by the state three months 
after the initial report; (4) the commission may send reminders every three months if 
there is no state response; (5) the commissioner assigned to the case, or “Rapporteur 
for the communication … shall ascertain the measures taken by the state party to give 
effect to the Commission’s recommendations on each communication;” (6) the rappor-
teur may take such actions and make such recommendations for further action by the 
commission as may be necessary; (7) the rapporteur will report on the implementation 
of the commission’s recommendations in a public session during the ordinary session 
of the commission; (8) the commission shall call the attention of the Sub-Committee 
of the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Executive Council on the Imple-
mentation of the Decisions of the AU to incidents of non-compliance; and (9) the com-
mission shall include information on any follow-up activities in its activity report. It 
remains to be seen how this new follow-up framework will be operationalized, as there 
is no apparent increase in the commission’s budget to support these activities in every 
case, but it represents a significant opportunity for progressive development. 
In essence, Rule 115 provides that commissioners will be assigned as rapporteurs 
on the implementation of recommendations in final decisions of the commission and 
will carry out what could be considered three categories of implementation activities. 
First, the rapporteur “shall” ascertain the state’s activities with regard to implementation, 
report on those activities during the regular session of the commission, and include 
such a report in the annual activity report of the commission. This is essentially a 
mandatory reporting mechanism that provides for the publicity of states’ recalcitrance 
with regard to implementation. Second, the rapporteur “may” take action on behalf of 
the commission to further implementation; this non-mandatory provision could act as 
the basis for a wide range of implementation-related activities. Finally, the draft rules 
provide that the commission “shall” report on non-compliance to the Sub-Committee 
of the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Executive Council on the 
F R O M  J U D G M E N T  T O  J U S T I C E   1 0 9
1 1 0   T H E  A F R I C A N  S Y S T E M  O N  H U M A N  A N D  P E O P L E S ’  R I G H T S
Implementation of the Decisions of the AU. This requirement creates a mandatory 
reporting mechanism that provides for communication between the commission and 
the political organs of the AU with regard to implementation.
While a framework for the commission to follow-up on its recommendations is 
exceedingly important, perhaps even more significant is the prospect for the commis-
sion to refer cases to the jurisdiction of the African Court.450 Rule 117 of the new rules 
of the commission provides that “the Court shall complement the protective mandate 
of the Commission” in accordance with Article 2 of the court protocol and Articles 30 
and 45(2) of the African Charter. In this regard, Rule 118 establishes that the commis-
sion and the court shall meet at least once a year so as to maintain a “good working 
relationship,” that the bureaus of each body shall meet regularly, and that any conclu-
sions from those meetings adopted by the commission shall be published in its activity 
report. Specifically, Rule 121(1) of the new rules suggests that the commission will begin 
referring cases of non-implementation to the African Court: 
  If the Commission has taken a decision with respect to a communication submitted under 
article 48, 49, or 55 of the Charter and the Commission considers that the State has not 
complied or is unwilling to comply with its recommendations in respect of the communica-
tion within the period stated in Rule 115 [approximately 9 months], the Commission may 
submit the Case to the Court pursuant to Article 5(1) of the protocol and inform the parties 
accordingly.
The new rules also provide for referral to the court in cases of non-compliance 
with provisional measures issued by the commission, or in those instances in which a 
situation of serious and massive violations of human rights as provided under Article 
58 of the charter.451 Further, the new rules include the extremely broad provision that 
“[t]he Commission may seize the Court with any other case and at any stage of the 
proceedings.”452 This last rule could easily be read to mean that the commission is not 
restricted in any way in its decision to refer cases to the court; for example, it could 
refer cases that it decided before the entry into force of the new rules, or cases that it 
has yet to decide. However, this broad reading is not supported by discussions with the 
commission’s Secretariat, which indicate that there is an internal policy to refer cases 
resolved by the commission after the entry into force of the new rules.
As for the African Court itself, some commentators have opined that the African 
Court Protocol addresses many of the failures of the commission by creating a judicial 
body that will issue legally binding decisions after publicly conducted hearings.453 The 
new Rules of Procedure of the African Court provide that, once it has issued a deci-
sion in a case “the Court shall duly notify the parties to the case, the Commission, the 
Assembly, the African Union Commission and any person or institution concerned 
of the judgment by certified true copies thereof.”454 Beyond this mechanism to shame 
governments, the new rules provide that: “The Executive Council shall also be notified 
of the judgment and shall monitor its execution on behalf of the Assembly.”455 This 
would indicate that the AU aspires towards an enforcement mechanism like that used 
in the European system, and that a political body akin to the Council of Europe’s Com-
mittee of Ministers will oversee the enforcement of judgments. This is a possibility that 
should be further explored.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The new rules of procedure for the African Commission and African Court represent 
an opportunity to substantially increase the commission’s follow-up activities and the 
chances of referral to the court, which in turn could improve the rate of implementation 
in the African system. However, this is by no means a foregone conclusion. Coordina-
tion and strategy will be necessary if interested parties are to take full advantage of this 
opportunity, and discussions should begin immediately about what the commission’s 
priorities should be in implementing its new follow-up mandate so as to have the great-
est impact.
The Working Group on Specific Issues Relevant to the Work of the African Com-
mission, already in existence, represents an established institutional forum for civil 
society actors to convene with the commission and discuss those issues of particular 
relevance to the functioning of the regional human rights system. Organizations that 
participate in this working group should encourage it to establish a forum to discuss the 
operationalization of the new rules of procedure and emphasize increased implementa-
tion as a goal of these discussions.
What follows are four agenda items that should be central to the discussions 
about the new rules of procedure, whether such discussions occur within civil society 
organizations, across coalitions of interested organizations and institutions, or in the 
context of the meetings of the working group with the participation of the commission:
Establish a Rigorous and Comprehensive Implementation Reporting Mechanism
As noted above, Rule 115 of the new rules requires that a state must inform the commis-
sion of the measures it has taken to implement recommendations after six months. The 
rule further provides that the commission shall call the attention of the Sub-Committee 
of the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Executive Council on the Imple-
mentation of the Decisions of the AU to incidents of non-compliance. The procedure, 
while fairly straightforward, could be instrumental in creating a record of implementa-
tion of decisions; however, the utility of that record in advancing implementation is 
still unclear. 
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Ideally, this reporting procedure would provide the individual or organization 
that brought the case an opportunity to comment on the state’s report of its efforts 
to implement the commission’s recommendations and then provide the commission 
itself an opportunity to evaluate the positions of the parties. This is important so as to 
avoid situations, all too common, in which states make empty claims of taking seriously 
their obligations to comply with their human rights commitments. Giving interested 
parties the opportunity to comment on a state’s assertions with regard to implementa-
tion will, it is hoped, compel a state to provide a more complete and accurate version 
of its efforts to implement the commission’s recommendations. Finally, it is important 
for the commission to evaluate the assertions of the parties in writing and determine 
whether recommendations have been implemented. Without this official version, states 
can continue to claim that they are fulfilling their human rights obligations when that 
might not be the case.
There is reason to believe, however, that these reporting activities will not be well 
organized or consistently documented, which could severely limit their utility. Accord-
ingly, as a general matter, interested parties should encourage the establishment of 
some type of registry within the commission’s Secretariat to track compliance with 
Rule 115. One possibility could be that, just as the commission reports in its activity 
reports on state compliance with the Article 62 human rights reporting requirements, 
the commission could commit to reporting on implementation in the same way. In 
order to facilitate such monitoring, it would be important to establish some type of 
central repository for these reports at the commission’s Secretariat, akin to the database 
that was recommended in the Communications Reform Report. Arguably, the working 
group could act as the central repository for the information on implementation col-
lected in the reports, as well as supplemental information collected by the new case-
specific implementation rapporteurs. 
Support Meaningful and Consistent Work by Implementation Rapporteurs
In addition to requiring implementation reporting by states, Rule 115 also provides that 
a commissioner will be assigned to each case decided by the commission and that he 
or she will act as the rapporteur for implementation in that case. The rapporteur “may” 
engage in activities to support implementation and may make recommendations for 
further action to the commission. Finally, the rapporteur will report during the sessions 
of the commission on the state of implementation in those cases he or she is assigned 
to follow, and the commission should report all such activities in its activity reports.
It is important to note that this rule actually falls short of the proposal by advocates 
that the commission establish a permanent rapporteurship on follow-up. A permanent 
rapporteurship is arguably superior to having multiple rapporteurs because one indi-
vidual cultivates an expertise in the process of promoting implementation, and central-
izes all of the information relevant to his or her follow-up activities in one office, which 
facilitates comparative analysis. That said, there are benefits to the system proposed in 
the commission’s new rules, inasmuch as it does not overburden one individual with 
all implementation activities, and it prevents the possibility that all follow-up activi-
ties cease when an inactive rapporteur is appointed. The goal of those committed to 
improving implementation should be to foster a tradition of implementation expertise 
and centralization of information in the case-specific rapporteur system. Because the 
new rules require the rapporteurs to report on follow-up activities during the sessions 
and to publish this information in activity reports, it would take relatively little effort 
to centralize that information. Further, it would be important to compile this informa-
tion with the implementation reports, and create a space in which all rapporteurs can 
exchange experiences and best practices. Once again, the working group could serve the 
function of both acting as a central repository and convening discussions about trends 
in implementation during the sessions. 
With regard to the work of the rapporteurs themselves, the provision that they 
“may” develop those activities they deem appropriate offers both the potential for cre-
ative advocacy as well as the risk of inaction. For example, while Rule 115 only provides 
a procedure for the submission of reports on implementation by states, it is certainly 
within the rapporteur’s discretionary powers under the new rules to request comments 
on the state report from the victims’ representative or another interested party, and 
then to issue his or her written findings. The rapporteur could then present these 
written findings to the commission during the sessions as outlined in Rule 115, and 
include them in his activity reports. There also exists the possibility that a rapporteur 
might entertain a request to hold a hearing on implementation during the commis-
sion’s session, where it would hear from the state and interested parties about efforts 
to implement the commission’s recommendations, and the findings from such hear-
ings could similarly be included in the activity reports. Additionally, a precedent already 
exists for commissioners to make implementation a priority during their promotional 
visits to countries. This practice should become more common and consistent, and 
commissioners should schedule trips in their capacity as implementation rapporteurs, 
and produce specific reports on the matter that could be presented with other written 
findings during the sessions.
Elaborate a Strategy for Litigation and Implementation of Court Decisions
Because the possibility of a decision by the African Court represents a potential leap 
forward for implementation in the African system, there will surely be a rush on the 
court now that the new rules of procedure have been ratified. However, experiences 
from the other regional human rights systems suggest that there is no guarantee that 
a decision from the African Court will be implemented. Because a positive experience 
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will help to foster future litigation, litigants should therefore think very carefully about 
the first matters they intend to take to the court.
There are a number of considerations to keep in mind. First, it is important to 
remember that the court will likely operate very slowly at first, as it negotiates its way 
around its procedures and the vast body of human rights jurisprudence that will inform 
its decisions. Because it will receive a lot of attention regionally during this extended 
period of deliberation, it would be best that the first cases represent problems endemic 
to the region, leading many different communities to look to the court for a possible 
resolution of their situation. Second, the first cases will determine in many ways how 
the court will treat subsequent cases, which could have an impact on implementation. 
Accordingly, litigants should consult lawyers that practice before international tribunals 
to identify important issues to highlight for the court’s resolution. For example, the 
scope of the court’s temporal jurisdiction will be extremely important in its first years, 
and the lawyers who litigate the first cases should be prepared to argue for the most 
progressive interpretation of the court’s authority to hear cases arising from temporally 
remote events. For all issues of this nature, there will be ideal test cases, and practitio-
ners should work together with the commission to find them. Finally, even if a case has 
public appeal and involves important legal issues, it would be a mistake to believe that 
the decision of the African Court will be easy to implement; therefore, those that bring 
the first cases would be well advised to develop implementation strategies alongside 
their litigation strategies. 
An implementation strategy for a court case should involve, at a minimum, sen-
sitizing the population about the issues that the court will address, reaching out to gov-
ernment officials who may be open to working on those issues, and creating a domestic 
advocacy platform, which could include such specific measures as a retrial or an investi-
gation, or general measures such as a legislative or policy proposal. Also very significant 
is the fact that Rule 64.2 of the court’s Rules of Procedure provides that the Executive 
Council of the AU Assembly will monitor the implementation of court decisions. There 
is little question from the wording of this rule that the intention is to create a political 
monitoring mechanism; however, it is unclear exactly what the executive council is will-
ing to do with regard to the implementation of decisions, and there will likely have to be 
extensive dialogue among regional actors to devise operating procedures in this regard. 
That said, this possibility presents a tremendous opportunity for the advancement of 
human rights protection in Africa, and interested parties should begin to support this 
process from the moment the first case is submitted to the court’s jurisdiction.
Encourage the Retroactive Application of Rules on Follow-Up and Referrals
It appears at this stage that the African Commission has not made a decision whether 
it should apply the follow-up procedure retroactively to those 60 cases it has decided 
to date; however, persons interviewed for this study indicate that the commission has 
made a decision that it will only refer cases to the court that it decides after the entry 
into force of the new rules. As to the retroactive application of the commission’s new 
implementation framework, including implementation reporting requirements and the 
assignment of a follow-up rapporteur, interested parties should encourage the com-
mission to begin this process in those cases it has already decided. There is apparently 
room for such advocacy, either on a case-by-case basis, or as a matter of policy, and it 
would only benefit the integrity of the follow-up procedures to begin implementing 
them now. This could involve, as a first step, a letter from the commission asking a 
state to report on the implementation of a decision under Rule 115. Such a letter would 
bring the case into the new procedural framework and decisions about how to proceed 
could then be made.
Another advantage in getting the commission to retroactively apply its Rule 115 
procedures is that it increases the chance that the commission might rethink—or make 
an exception to—its rumored position that it will only refer cases to the court that have 
been decided after the entry into force of the new rules. If there is potential for the 
commission to become invested in the process of implementing a specific decision, 
it may be receptive to the idea of broaching referral with the court during one of their 
planned meetings to discuss matters of common concern. Because there is no apparent 
drawback to trying to convince the commission to submit a case that was decided before 
the new rules take effect, interested parties may wish to extend their advocacy to include 
the retroactive application of the commission’s rules on referral.
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IV. United Nations Treaty Bodies:
 The Human Rights Committee
Introduction
The United Nations’ treaty bodies are treaty-based institutions that run on a paral-
lel track to those human rights bodies established under the United Nations Charter. 
Composed of independent experts, the treaty bodies undertake two principal activities: a 
reporting procedure, wherein states must periodically report on the conformity of their 
domestic standards and practices with the respective human rights treaties to which 
they are party, and an individual communications procedure.456 Although both activities 
are broadly designed to monitor state compliance with treaty obligations, the commu-
nications procedure is distinct from the reporting requirement in that it is an optional 
mechanism that permits the treaty bodies to receive and consider, in a quasi-judicial 
manner, the complaint of any individual within the jurisdiction of a ratifying state 
who claims to be the victim of a human rights violation over which the committee has 
competence. In addition, all of the treaty bodies periodically publish general comments, 
sometimes referred to as “general recommendations,” which serve to clarify the content 
of treaty provisions, give procedural advice, and define the scope of state obligations. 
Currently, there are five treaty bodies, or committees, competent to receive indi-
vidual communications: the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee Against 
Torture (CAT), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
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the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and 
the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). In the case of the 
HRC, CEDAW, and CRPD, only those states that have ratified the Optional Protocols 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, respectively, participate in the individual 
communications procedure.457 The CAT and CERD may only consider individual com-
munications relating to those states parties that have made the necessary declarations 
under Article 22 of the Convention Against Torture and Article 14 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.458 
Of the five treaty bodies, the Human Rights Committee, which first started its 
work in 1977, has adjudicated the vast majority of individual communications to date. 
The HRC was the first treaty body to begin monitoring the implementation of its deci-
sions (or, in the committee’s parlance, its “Views”) in the form of a Special Rapporteur 
for the Follow-Up of Views, a mechanism on which the other UN treaty bodies have all 
largely modeled their follow-up activities as well. For these reasons, this chapter pri-
marily examines the compliance record and follow-up activities of the HRC, although 
reference is made, where relevant, to the jurisprudence and follow-up procedures of 
the other committees as well.459 
To that end, this chapter assesses the compliance rates of the Human Rights 
Committee as they stood at the time of its 2009 annual report, while highlighting 
several areas in which this data remains unclear. It then examines the procedures for 
monitoring compliance with the treaty bodies—particularly the Special Rapporteur for 
Follow-Up—as well as relevant factors that influence implementation rates, with a par-
ticular emphasis on the remedial framework of the HRC as compared to other treaty 
bodies such as CEDAW. Several broad trends in compliance over time are then identi-
fied, followed by recommendations for the treaty bodies and other UN Charter-based 
bodies in the future. 
Compliance Rates of the Treaty Bodies 
Human Rights Committee
Any attempt to categorize follow-up replies is “inherently imprecise,” as the Human 
Rights Committee itself has noted.460 Nevertheless, a review of the data compiled by 
the Petitions Section of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR), the UN office that services the treaty bodies, reveals that the state of imple-
mentation is grim. This assessment is based on data contained in the committee’s 2009 
Annual Report to the UN General Assembly, which is the most recent data currently 
available. A review of the chart compiled therein shows that there are currently 546 
cases against 71 states being monitored by OHCHR’s Petitions Section; however, of 
these 546 cases, “satisfactory” responses—those defined as “the willingness of the State 
party to implement the Committee’s recommendations or to offer the complainant an 
appropriate remedy”—have been received in only 67.461 
Those cases not deemed “satisfactory,” that is, where compliance has been insuf-
ficient or not obtained at all, are either the result of a state failing to respond to the 
committee’s finding of a violation or those that, according to the annual report, were 
received but “do not address the Committee’s Views at all or relate only to certain 
aspects of them.”462 Such replies might “challenge the Committee’s Views and findings 
on factual or legal grounds, constitute much belated submissions on the merits of the 
complaint … or indicate that the [s]tate party will not, for one reason or another, give 
effect to the Committee’s recommendation.”463 
In almost all cases where a state party’s response is recorded as “unsatisfactory,” 
and in certain cases where no response from the state party was received, the com-
mittee considers follow-up dialogue with the state to be “ongoing.” Importantly, how-
ever, many “no response” cases are categorized without further elaboration, making it 
unclear whether any follow-up is still being pursued or ever was pursued. Similarly, a 
small number of cases are registered as having received a response to the committee’s 
decision, but without elaboration as to the nature of that reply or the status of follow-up. 
The following table breaks down these categories and statistics further: 
DESIGNATION NUMBER OF CASES PERCENTAGE
“Satisfactory” Response 67 12.27
Follow-Up “Dialogue Ongoing” 283 51.84
• Response Received but “Unsatisfactory” 85 15.57
• Response Received without Designation 119 21.80
• No Response Received 79 14.47
Follow-Up Status Unclear 196 35.89
• Response Received without Designation 8 1.46
• No Response Received 95 17.40
• Miscellaneous464 93 17.03
TOTAL 546 100.00
Based on this data, the HRC’s compliance rate hovers slightly above 12 percent, 
a low figure by any measure. Several qualifications should, however, be noted in evalu-
ating this data. First, there are a number of oversights in the annual report’s record 
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keeping. For instance, in the significant number of cases where dialogue is consid-
ered to be ongoing, over 20 percent of the state parties’ replies are not described at all 
(unsatisfactory, incomplete, unresponsive, etc.). Moreover, there is no indication as to 
the status of implementation monitoring in more than a third of those cases where a 
violation was found. 
Second, neither the category of “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory” is clearly defined 
in the committee’s annual report. For instance, a satisfactory response might encom-
pass a state’s expressed willingness to implement the committee’s decision, such as a 
promise to investigate a particular human rights violation, while others might indicate 
that, although the state does not consider itself legally obligated to provide a remedy, 
one will nevertheless “be afforded … on an ex gratia basis.” Still other cases have been 
deemed “satisfactory” when the committee has determined that the finding of a cov-
enant violation was in itself an adequate remedy.465 These distinctions underscore the 
fact that, although the committee might deem a state’s response to the finding of a 
violation “satisfactory,” in actuality the state may only have partially implemented the 
committee’s decision. Some of these cases are discussed in further detail below. 
Third, the category of “unsatisfactory,” which all of the treaty bodies use, is itself 
ambiguous because compliance, even in the best of circumstances, is rarely immediate. 
Accordingly, there are a number of cases in which compliance remains outstanding but 
where follow-up dialogue is genuinely ongoing between the committee and the state 
party, as examples highlighted later in this chapter attest. At the same time, however, the 
designation of “ongoing dialogue,” which is also employed by all of the treaty bodies, 
raises questions as to the criteria for legitimately continuing dialogue. Such criteria are 
not evident in the annual report, particularly as OHCHR’s data indicates that a number 
of cases that are twenty to thirty years old are still considered on-going. Nevertheless, 
given that some “unsatisfactory” cases are certainly the subject of continuing follow-
up and sincere attempts by the state party to implement the committee’s Views, the 
“satisfactory” rate may be somewhat higher than the 12 percent statistic alone suggests. 
Finally, it should be noted that implementation of HRC decisions appears to have 
actually deteriorated over time. Indeed, although compliance presently hovers between 
12 to 15 percent, the committee’s 1999 report to the General Assembly doubled that 
figure, noting that, “roughly 30 percent of the replies received could be considered sat-
isfactory.”466 Similarly, in her 2001 report on the UN human rights treaty system, Anne 
Bayefsky characterized the HRC record of compliance as “extremely poor,” noting that 
remedies were forthcoming by states parties in only 21 percent of the cases.467 Although 
troubling, this downward trend is, to some extent, explained by the fact that the HRC’s 
individual communications workload (in addition to its state reporting workload), has 
increased in absolute terms in the past ten years, often outpacing the number of cases 
the committee can conclude in a year. In 1999, for instance, 59 new cases were reg-
istered with the committee, whereas recent years have seen the number of registered 
cases range from 100 in 2004 to as high as 206 in 2007. As a result, not only does 
the committee face a significant backlog in adjudicating its petitions (399 cases are 
currently listed as pending), but the number of cases per year in which ICCPR viola-
tions have been found has increased sharply.468 To that end, it has been estimated that 
the committee will not reach a decision on the merits of a communications until after 
almost three years from when the case was first filed.469 
CAT, CEDAW, CERD, and CRPD
The only other treaty body to have adjudicated a comparably large number of cases 
under the communications procedure as the Human Rights Committee is the Commit-
tee Against Torture. As of May 2009, the CAT’s annual report to the General Assembly 
states that it has received 384 petitions against 29 states parties, and has adopted final 
decisions on the merits in 158 complaints, while 67 remain pending.470 Of the 158 cases 
that have been adjudicated, violations of the convention were found in 48 cases, 22 of 
which were closed following a determination by the committee that the respondent state 
had fully complied. In 17 other cases, however, dialogue remains “ongoing” and in six 
cases the committee has not received any response to its follow-up requests.471 (Like the 
HRC, the CAT is also suffering from a case backlog of “some 100 cases.”472) Thus, at 
present, there is nearly a 50 percent rate of compliance with the CAT’s Views, which is 
significantly higher than the HRC’s. Although this higher rate does not appear to have 
been previously remarked upon, a number of interlocutors attributed it, in part, to the 
nature of the cases the CAT hears, the majority of which concern the Article 3 duty of 
non-refoulement.473 
With respect to the remaining treaty bodies, CEDAW has only registered 24 com-
munications to date, eight of which are pending and 11 of which have been either 
declared inadmissible or discontinued. Of the remaining five cases, four—two against 
Hungary and two against Austria—have resulted in a violation finding; follow-up in 
three of those cases remains ongoing, while one, A.T. v. Hungary, was deemed closed 
as of July 2009.474 As for CERD, it has adjudicated 24 admissible cases to date, 10 of 
which resulted in findings of a violation.475 Of those 10, satisfactory responses have 
only been received in three cases thus far, all of which concerned Denmark.476 Finally, 
given the fact that it has only recently come into effect, no communications have been 
registered with the CRPD to date.
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Procedures for Monitoring Compliance
Prior to 1990, the HRC was seldom informed of actions taken by states parties with 
respect to its Views. Markus Schmidt notes that the issue of follow-up to Views was 
discussed for the first time in 1982 but, “[a]gainst the backdrop of Cold War polar-
ization,” discussions made little progress until 1989, at which point the committee 
commissioned a working paper from the UN Secretariat “on possible approaches to 
monitor compliance with its views under the Optional Protocol.”477 Finally, in July 1990, 
the HRC established a monitoring procedure by creating the position of Special Rap-
porteur for Follow-up on Views, whose two-year, renewable mandate it is to monitor 
implementation of the committee’s decisions.478 The committee spelled out the Special 
Rapporteur’s competencies in its annual report for 1990 as follows:
a) To recommend to the Committee action upon all letters of complaint henceforth 
received from individuals held, in the Views of the Committee under the Optional 
Protocol, to have been the victims of a violation, and who claim that no appropri-
ate remedy has been provided;
b) To communicate with States parties, and, if he deems appropriate, with victims, 
in respect of such letters already received by the Committee;
c) To seek to provide information on any action taken by States parties in relation to 
Views adopted by the Committee to date, when such information has not other-
wise been made available. To this end the Special Rapporteur will communicate 
with all States parties and, if he deems appropriate, victims in respect of whom 
findings of violations have been made, in order to ascertain what action, if any, 
has been taken. This information, when collected, will also be made available in 
a future annual report;
d) To assist the Rapporteur of the Committee in the preparation of the relevant sec-
tions of the annual report that will henceforth contain detailed information on 
the follow-up of cases;
e) To advise the Committee on the appropriate deadline for the receipt of informa-
tion on remedial measures adopted by a State party found to have violated provi-
sions of the Covenant;
f) To submit to the Committee, at suitable intervals, recommendations on possible 
ways of rendering the follow-up procedure more effective.479
In 1997, the modalities of the special rapporteur’s duties were formalized (and 
later amended) under the HRC’s Rules of Procedure. They provide that the rapporteur 
“may make such contacts and take such action as appropriate for the due performance 
of the follow-up mandate,” including making recommendations as necessary for further 
action by the committee, regularly reporting to the committee on follow-up activities, 
and including information on those activities in the committee’s annual report to the 
UN General Assembly.480 The rules note that neither the decisions of the committee 
relating to follow-up activities, nor information furnished by the parties within the 
follow-up framework are subject to confidentiality, unless the committee decides oth-
erwise.481 
In recent years, the CAT, CERD, and CEDAW have instituted a similar procedure 
to monitor implementation, although, unlike the HRC, CEDAW does not have a per-
manent special rapporteur; rather, it assigns committee members to serve as follow-up 
rapporteurs for specific cases on an ad hoc basis.482 The procedural rules of the other 
committees also formalize the special rapporteur’s duties, which largely mirror those of 
the HRC. For instance, under Rule 114 of the CAT, the rapporteur is expected to monitor 
the responses of states parties to the committee’s request for information on the rem-
edy provided, and to meet with representatives of selected states parties that have not 
responded to the committee’s request; CERD provides the same in its Rule 95.483 Unlike 
the other treaties, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women’s Optional Protocol codified states parties’ obligations to consider the 
committee’s Views and provide information in the treaty itself, although Rule 73 of the 
committee’s rules formalizes this procedure.484
When the HRC finds a violation, it states in the closing portion of its decision that 
it “wishes to receive from the State party … information about the measures taken to 
give effect to [its] Views,” whereupon the state has six months to submit a reply explain-
ing how it intends to undertake implementation.485 This rarely occurs, however, and 
often states, after having failed to engage in the consideration of the merits of a case, 
will submit replies that simply contest the factual basis for the committee’s decision, 
or challenge its interpretation of the covenant.486 In Marques v. Republic of Angola, for 
instance, a case brought by the Open Society Justice Initiative concerning the unlaw-
ful detention and conviction of a journalist for publishing a news article critical of the 
Angolan president, Angola failed to submit information on either the admissibility or 
merits of the communication when it was under consideration. However, when it finally 
submitted a follow-up reply in January 2006 (a year and a half past due), it merely chal-
lenged the merits of the committee’s decision by requesting that the case be deemed 
inadmissible.487 
When a state’s reply is received, it is transmitted by OHCHR’s Petitions Section 
to the member(s) of the committee who authored the decision and to the victim or his/
her representative(s), who may then provide observations on the state’s submission. 
(Housed within the OHCHR’s Human Rights Treaties Division, one of the office’s four 
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divisions, the Petitions Section is presently comprised of eleven lawyers and three sec-
retaries who provide technical assistance to the committees.488) Ordinarily, the special 
rapporteur presents a summary of these responses, and the committee makes a recom-
mendation for further action, which, as noted, is published in its annual report to the 
UN General Assembly. (As of this year, the committee also publishes periodic follow-
up progress reports of individual communications on the HRC’s website.489) These 
recommendations, however, are often limited to stating that the state party’s response 
is inadequate and that the committee regards the dialogue as ongoing. For example, 
in Marques, following the Justice Initiative’s reply to Angola’s submission, the HRC 
published its follow-up decision in the annual report for 2006, noting that Angola had 
“failed to address the violations found or even to acknowledge the Committee’s find-
ings.”490 Unfortunately, as a Justice Initiative officer who helped litigate Marques noted, 
the HRC did not even notify the parties of its formal decision; it was merely published 
in the report without further recommendation.491 
Where a state’s reply is either unsatisfactory or not forthcoming, the Petitions 
Section will typically address a reminder to the state party in an effort to engage them 
in the follow-up process. If that proves unsuccessful, the special rapporteur, having been 
informed of the state’s failure to comply, may then organize direct follow-up consulta-
tions with diplomatic representatives of the state party (typically its permanent represen-
tative in Geneva or New York) to discuss the facilitation of implementation. In Marques, 
after Angola missed its first deadline to respond, the special rapporteur met with a state 
representative in 2005, during the committee’s 84th session. The notes of that meeting 
indicate that he was informed that the reason for Angola not having replied was because 
it “had limited capacity to deal with all human rights issues before it.”492 
While one, or even several, unsatisfactory replies may be sufficient to trigger the 
Follow-Up Rapporteur’s attention, those states most targeted for monitoring are repeat 
offenders, in that they have had a number of decisions against them in which compli-
ance has been lacking.493 If the alleged violation concerns a particularly serious matter, 
however, the gravity of the issue alone may flag a decision for follow-up. Furthermore, 
although the special rapporteur is the one who conducts the follow-up discussion, the 
Petitions Section coordinates the rapporteur’s agenda. These discussions take place 
almost exclusively during the committee’s three annual meetings, two of which are 
held in Geneva in July and October, and the other in New York in March. Notably, these 
discussions need not be limited to when the HRC is in session—the Special Rappor-
teur may seek to pursue his/her follow-up activities at other points during the year, for 
instance—but because the rapporteur has no independent budget to undertake such 
visits, this almost never occurs.494 
These limitations on the rapporteur’s functions are seldom discussed in earlier 
literature on the subject. Schmidt, for instance, notes that it is possible for the rappor-
teur to organize a follow-up mission to a state party that has experienced difficulties 
with the implementation of the committee’s recommendations; however in the HRC’s 
annual report from 2005, the committee “again expresse[d] its regret that its recom-
mendation, formulated in its four previous reports, that at least one follow-up mission 
per year be budgeted by the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights, has still 
not been implemented.”495 Indeed, only one such mission—to Jamaica, in 1995—has 
been conducted to date. In that instance, the committee determined that a follow-up 
visit was required in the wake of a number of decisions that found the application of 
Jamaica’s death penalty to violate Article 6 of the covenant.496 (Other missions were 
apparently planned, including to Peru, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and, more 
recently, Tajikistan, but were never carried out.497) At the same time, the Jamaican expe-
rience serves to underscore the limitations of the communications procedure: the large 
number of follow-up requests that Jamaica received in the wake of the HRC’s decisions 
led to its ultimate withdrawal from the Optional Protocol in 1997.498
Factors Affecting the Implementation of Decisions
Legal Status of Treaty Body ‘Views’
One enduring challenge to the implementation of UN treaty body decisions is the fact 
that they are not legally binding. Schmidt, for instance, contends that the “major lacuna 
of UN individual complaints procedures … remains the absence of binding and thus 
legally enforceable decisions,” and that, as a result, the committees have “little leverage to 
ensure that states comply with recommendations.”499 Similarly, of the ICCPR’s Optional 
Protocol, Henry Steiner notes: “[It] speaks in a guarded language … that suggest[s] the 
political compromises in its formulation. Its principal terms—‘communications’ rather 
than complaints, ‘Views’ rather than decisions or opinions—express a cautious strategy 
in defining the Committee’s functions and powers by distancing the Protocol from the 
more direct and forceful language … used to describe adjudication.”500 
Yet although many states have premised their refusal to implement the Human 
Right Committee’s Views on the basis that they are not legally binding, the treaty bod-
ies have continued to advance the principle that states parties nevertheless have a good 
faith duty to comply with their decisions. At the Vienna World Conference on Human 
Rights in 1993, for instance, the bodies unsuccessfully proposed the insertion into 
the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol of a provision that “states parties undertake to comply 
with the Committee’s Views under the Optional protocol.”501 More recently, the Human 
Rights Committee took the opportunity to address this subject in General Comment 
33, stating that, although it is not a judicial body, “the views issued by the Committee 
… exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision” and that a “duty to 
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cooperate with the Committee arises from an application of the principle of good faith 
in the observance of all treaty obligations.”502 Further, the HRC has said that there is 
an “obligation to respect” the Views of the committee and a “duty to cooperate,” which 
“arises from an application of the principle of good faith to the discharge of treaty obli-
gations.”503 Unsurprisingly, this general comment was reportedly met with resistance 
by a number of state parties.504
While debate over the legal status of treaty body opinions is unlikely to abate, little 
optimism has been expressed for the possibility that treaty body Views will ever possess 
the force of law, although they do possess considerable hortatory force. Furthermore, 
rather than attempt to render the treaty bodies’ opinions legally binding, the consensus 
of most experts appears to favor working within the system’s legal constraints.505 To that 
end, David Kretzmer, a former member of the HRC, has argued that the treaty system 
“reflects the weakness of the international system. The fact that the Optional Protocol 
does not state that the Human Rights Committee’s Views under the Protocol are legally 
binding, and that there are no enforcement mechanisms, was a clear policy decision by 
the international community.”506 Kretzmer also contends, as other commentators have, 
that even if the legal basis of the treaty bodies’ opinions were to be strengthened, “it is 
unlikely that the decision-makers within the United Nations [would] commit signifi-
cantly greater resources to the communications system.”507 
Rights Adjudicated and their Relationship to Compliance
The HRC’s annual report, like those of the other treaty bodies, does not index follow-up 
cases by the right(s) that the committee found to be violated (although this would be a 
useful undertaking for future research). Nevertheless, a general review of the commit-
tee’s jurisprudence suggests that cases implicating personal liberty and discrimination 
have been the most successfully implemented, particularly where a strong domestic 
constituency exists to draw public attention to the case. For instance, in Toonen v. Austra-
lia, laws criminalizing consensual sex between adult men, which the committee found 
to violate the applicant’s privacy rights, were repealed, while in Lovelace v. Canada, the 
state amended a law that unfairly discriminated against Aboriginal women who married 
non-Aboriginal men.508 
Immigration and citizenship is another area in which there has been a moderate 
level of compliance—particularly in cases where states have satisfied the committee’s 
findings by permitting non-citizen applicants to remain in the country rather than 
be deported. In Madafferi v. Australia, for instance, the committee found Australia’s 
impending deportation of the applicant to Italy (for crimes committed in Australia) to 
constitute an “interference” with his Article 17 right to family life.509 In its reply, the 
Australian government made clear that it did not accept the committee’s decision, but 
stated that it had since issued Madafferi a “spouse (migrant) permanent visa,” permit-
ting him to remain on a permanent basis.510 While “regretting the state party’s refusal to 
accept its Views,” the HRC stated that the visa was a satisfactory remedy to the violations 
found.511 Similarly, in Byahuranga v. Denmark, the committee found that the applicant’s 
impending deportation to Uganda would constitute a violation of the prohibition against 
refoulement.512 
Notably, implementation has frequently been successful in cases where the impli-
cated right is negative, meaning compliance resulted from repealing or amending cer-
tain legislation. Marques is a good example of this: in 2006, Angola amended certain 
provisions of its Press Law, which previously did not allow journalists to defend against 
charges of defamation by arguing the truth of facts they had reported. Similarly, in Leir-
vag v. Norway, the committee found that Norway’s introduction of a mandatory Christian 
education subject called “Christian Knowledge and Religious and Ethical Education” 
violated the applicant’s expressive rights under Article 18 (a determination that had also 
been reached by the European Court of Human Rights), which led Norway to amend 
its Education Act.513 
Ultimately, however, the relationship between the rights protected by the ICCPR 
and other human rights treaties, and the degree to which the Views of the treaty bodies 
are enforced, is far from clear. For many of the cases that the HRC has adjudicated, 
the violation of a particular right might be remedied in one instance but not another. 
Furthermore, it is not clear how much the committee’s follow-up procedures are driven 
by the nature of the rights violated, given that monitoring occurs in cases raising very 
different issues. 
Competing Approaches to Remedies: HRC and CEDAW
As a general matter, the Human Rights Committee takes a non-prescriptive approach 
to remedies, typically limiting its remedial language to the effect that states parties are 
“under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy for the violation 
suffered.”514 While the committee’s reluctance to offer greater specificity in this regard 
is likely due, in part, to the fact that the decisions of the treaty bodies are not legally 
binding, several HRC members criticized the remedies-related portions of the HRC’s 
decisions as insufficiently pragmatic and lacking in specificity. One committee member 
noted, for instance, that the remedies suggested can be “excruciatingly vague”—attrib-
utable, in part, to the committee’s frequent struggles to even reach a consensus on 
whether or not there has been a violation, much less on what a state should do to rectify 
it.515 In addition, while the HRC has gradually created its own jurisprudence on rem-
edies, no digest of this jurisprudence exists. As one committee member noted, the HRC 
too often “reinvents the wheel” with each new case, and fails to give sufficient guidance 
to states. This point has been raised by states, too, in their follow-up meetings with the 
special rapporteur.516 Indeed, several cases decided against Colombia were apparently 
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never implemented because, according to Colombia’s Ministerial Committee (which 
was set up to ensure implementation of HRC and Inter-American Court decisions), the 
“absence of a specific remedy recommended by the [HRC]” led it to not recommend 
that compensation be paid to the victims.517 
Emblematic of these tensions is the committee’s recent decision in Sankara v. 
Burkina Faso, in which the family of Thomas Sankara, the former president of Burkina 
Faso who was assassinated in 1987, complained that the state had failed to organize a 
public inquiry into his death and to institute legal proceedings against his assassins. 
In 2006, the committee found, in part, that the state was “required to provide Ms. 
Sankara and her son with an effective and enforceable remedy in the form, inter alia, 
of official recognition of the place where Thomas Sankara is buried, and compensation 
for the anguish suffered by the family.”518 It declined, however, to specify or suggest the 
amount of such compensation. In a similarly vague decision in Williams v. Spain—a 
case concerning racial discrimination—the committee noted only that, in addition to a 
public apology, Spain was “under an obligation to take all necessary steps to ensure that 
its officials do not repeat the kind of acts observed in this case.”519 
It is the preventative dimension of many of the committee’s decisions that is 
least often enforced, as states are more willing to either pay damages or offer resti-
tution to an individual complainant, rather than reform larger structural issues. In 
a number of cases against Colombia, for instance, the committee has recommended 
such preventive actions as public investigations, amending laws, and “ensuring non-
repetition of the violation;” in fact, however, compensation (in certain cases) is all that 
the state has offered.520 Furthermore, often the committee will accept as satisfactory a 
state response that repairs the violation done to an individual petitioner, regardless of 
whether or not the state undertakes any general remedies. In Sankara, for instance, 
Burkina Faso promptly responded to the committee’s Views, noting that it was prepared 
to officially acknowledge President Sankara’s grave and make compensation. But the 
state declined to address the issue of investigating the cause of his death, which the 
applicants maintained was the only appropriate remedy.521 In response, the committee 
noted that, although it had recommended such an inquiry, “it did not include a specific 
reference to it;” accordingly, it did “not intend to consider [the] matter any further under 
the follow-up procedure.”522 Similarly, in a case against Cameroon, where the applicant 
successfully argued that he had been unlawfully removed from his position as a mag-
istrate judge, the committee declared that the state has “an obligation to reinstate the 
author of the communication in his career, … and must ensure that similar violations do 
not recur in the future.”523 Seven years later, the committee’s special rapporteur received 
confirmation from Cameroonian authorities that the applicant had been reinstated to 
his position, but failed to offer any information (publicly, at least) as to any preventive 
measures taken.524 Nevertheless, the response was deemed satisfactory. 
While CAT and CERD largely follow the HRC’s approach to remedies, CEDAW 
has taken a more prescriptive approach. In this regard, two cases brought before 
CEDAW deserve mention. One is A.T. v. Hungary, decided in 2005, in which the com-
mittee held that Hungary had violated its convention obligations by failing to protect 
the applicant against domestic violence, despite her attempts to seek shelter and pub-
lic services.525 In so doing, the committee affirmed that gender-based violence against 
women is a form of discrimination that states are obligated to eliminate and, in contrast 
to the HRC’s approach to remedies, recommended an array of proposed remedies that 
Hungary should undertake to achieve this goal, in addition to compensating the appli-
cant.526 Since that time, Hungary, which responded in a timely manner to the commit-
tee’s Views, has taken a number of steps to address domestic violence, including the 
development of a national strategy on violence and the establishment of domestic vio-
lence shelters.527 Indeed, after the ad hoc special rapporteurs held a follow-up meeting 
with Hungarian representatives in May 2006, the case was closed in August, with the 
instruction that any further information on follow-up be conducted under the conven-
tion’s state reporting procedure.528 
Another important CEDAW case is A.S. v. Hungary, which, while not yet closed, 
involved the sterilization of a Roma woman while she was undergoing surgery in con-
nection with a miscarriage.529 A.S. marked the first time an international human rights 
tribunal held a government accountable for failing to provide necessary information to a 
woman to enable her to give informed consent to a reproductive health procedure. Here, 
too, CEDAW provided a detailed list of proposed recommendations, including compen-
sation and reform of domestic legislation on the principle of informed consent, as well 
as monitoring of public and private health centers.530 As in A.T., Hungary submitted 
its responses in a timely fashion and, to date, there have been three follow-up ses-
sions with the special rapporteurs. At the most recent such session, Hungary indicated 
that legislative amendments are pending, as is the development of a legal framework 
enabling the state to provide compensation to complainants following a finding of a 
convention violation.531 
Broad Trends in Compliance and Lessons Learned 
The countries of Western Europe commonly regarded as strong rule of law states—
France, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Sweden—have been the most prompt and respon-
sive in implementing the HRC’s Views. Unsurprisingly, these states also have the fewest 
number of communications against them. However, certain states, such as Spain, that 
are generally regarded as having a sophisticated approach to the rule of law have only 
selectively complied with the committee’s decisions.532 Others have often expressed out-
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right disagreement with its conclusions. Australia533 and Canada,534 for instance, both 
of which have an overall record of satisfactory implementation, have made clear their 
disagreements with the committee in several recent cases and stated that they either 
“cannot accept” the HRC’s Views or do not intend to implement them. By this same 
token, there are also cases of compliance with the committee View’s in which the state 
has implemented a remedy while making clear that it did not consider itself legally 
bound to do so. As noted, Australia did this in the Madafferi case, and did so again in 
2007, in a case brought by eight Iranian asylum seekers who had been detained in 
mandatory immigration detention, some for three or four years.535 Although Australia 
did not accept the committee’s finding that its detention system violated Article 9, nor 
that it was obligated to compensate the applicants, all of the complainants were later 
granted permanent protection visas (and in one case, citizenship).536 
Even where implementation has been forthcoming, the path to implementation 
is not always clear. Marques is an example of partial compliance, insofar as the amend-
ments to Angola’s Press Law partially remedied portions of the criminal law under 
which Marques had been convicted, but those changes were never attributed to the com-
mittee’s Views; indeed, Angola failed to even highlight the amendment in its follow-up 
reply to the special rapporteur. In a similar case, Zeljko Bodrozic, a well-known Serbian 
journalist who had been convicted of “criminal insult,” applied to the committee on the 
basis that his expressive rights under Article 19 had been violated.537 The committee 
recommended that Bodrozic’s conviction be quashed and that he be compensated, but 
the Serbian government failed entirely to respond to the HRC’s decision for three years. 
In June 2008, however, the Petitions Section was informed through the United Nations 
Development Programme that the author had signed an agreement with the Serbian 
Ministry of Justice for reparations and restitution in the amount of 10,000 Euros.538 
Thus, even though the committee was effectively ignored by Serbia in the formal follow-
up process, the decision itself was apparently not. 
In light of these developments, some commentators have cautioned that it may 
not be productive to think of non-implementation as a categorical failure because, even 
though states might not concede the merits of a particular decision or formally engage 
with the follow-up process, that does not mean they are not influenced by them. A cur-
rent member of the committee notes, for instance, that the HRC’s engagement with 
Iceland in a case involving fisheries quotas is important because, although Iceland has 
yet to implement the HRC’s recommendation that compensation be paid to the com-
plainants, it provided a detailed, thoughtful response that demonstrated an appreciation 
of the committee’s conclusions and committed itself to, at a minimum, undertaking a 
review of the state’s fisheries management system.539 Furthermore, Iceland’s response 
pressed the committee to offer more specific, practical guidance with respect to its pro-
posed remedies.540 As noted earlier, this sort of productive state-committee “dialogue” 
suggests that, even in cases where states are technically regarded as non-compliant (as 
Iceland presently is), the committee’s decision and its follow-up procedure have the 
potential to positively influence state behavior. 
Despite these qualified successes, the failure to achieve a fuller measure of com-
pliance with the Views of the UN treaty bodies is substantial. The cases in which imple-
mentation has been the least effective are those where the state party has failed to 
respond at all to the committee’s Views or, indeed, failed to participate in the proceed-
ings themselves. A review of the committee’s 2009 report reveals that a number of 
states—Algeria, Cameroon, Guyana, Philippines, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Jamaica, Madagascar, Russia, Uzbekistan, Sierra Leone, and Trinidad and Tobago—have 
serially disregarded their obligations under the Optional Protocol by either failing to 
respond at all to the committee’s decisions, or by doing so only after years of delay. Still 
other countries have responded to the committee (though often belatedly), yet have 
merely taken the opportunity to contest anew the basis for the application in question, 
or raise objections that they failed to raise when the case was first under the commit-
tee’s consideration.541 These failures are the most troubling for the treaty body system 
to confront, because they represent a fundamental refusal on the part of the state to 
engage in the communications procedure. Indeed, it would appear that certain states 
do not even understand the purpose of the communications procedures. For instance, 
the notes of a 2006 meeting with representatives from Equatorial Guinea, concerning 
that state’s failure to reply to the three HRC decisions issued against it (two of which are 
twenty years old), indicate that the representatives were not aware of the committee’s 
functions, or even that the communications existed.542 
It is important to distinguish between cases of blatant disregard and other cases 
in which the state party at least makes an effort to give effect to the committee’s deci-
sion. In such cases, advocates have played a key role in keeping the states, in Markus 
Schmidt’s words, “engaged in the follow-up process as long as humanly possible.”543 
Here, the position of the special rapporteur has had some success in moving states 
forward, even if full implementation has not been achieved. For instance, the Czech 
Republic and Colombia have both had a number of outstanding cases decided against 
them, many of which date back to the mid-1990s or earlier. Previous annual reports 
indicate that the special rapporteur(s) have met repeatedly with Czech and Colombian 
representatives over the years to follow-up on these cases, some of which have resulted 
in partial implementation, typically in the form of ex gratia payments.544 
In light of these shortcomings, the CEDAW cases highlighted earlier stand out 
not only for their comparatively impressive record of responsiveness and implementa-
tion, but also because the special rapporteurs’ follow-up appears to have been more 
rigorous and systematic than the follow-up achieved by the HRC Follow-Up Rapporteur. 
Undoubtedly, this is due, in part, to CEDAW’s smaller caseload, which allows commit-
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tee members to assume rapporteurship over individual cases on an ad hoc basis, rather 
than assigning one follow-up rapporteur for all outstanding cases. Moreover, A.S. was 
successful, in part, because the committee’s decision and follow-up activities dovetailed 
with larger litigation efforts focusing on discrimination against Roma women.545 For 
instance, the European Court of Human Rights also decided a case involving forced 
sterilization in 2009, which coupled with CEDAW’s work, elevated the political visibility 
of the intersection between women’s health rights and Roma rights.546 
Perhaps one of the most crucial lessons to be learned regards resources. The 
lack of an independent budget to support follow-up severely limits the special rap-
porteur’s role. Markus Schmidt notes that, since 1993, the Human Rights Committee 
“has asked for regular budget support to its follow-up activities in its Annual Report, 
but the request has fallen on deaf ears with the UN’s budgetary authorities.”547 As a 
result, he contends, follow-up activities under the Optional Protocol “suffer from very 
scant Secretariat assistance” and, until 2003, “no staff member was assigned full-time 
to assist with follow-up … under individual complaint procedures.”548 (Currently, the 
staff responsible for follow-up consists of “one half of one person.”) Likewise, the com-
mittee has repeatedly emphasized the “reduction in the ability of staff to find resources 
and personnel to support [its] attempts to follow up on cases where violations have been 
found.”549 In addition to more administrative support, greater resources would also 
allow for in situ visits by the special rapporteur, more intersessional follow-up meetings, 
or more meeting time during committee sessions, a possibility favored by several of 
the treaty bodies.550 
Unfortunately, it appears that the lack of funding is symptomatic not only of 
larger financial constraints on OHCHR, but a larger devaluation of the treaty bodies as 
well.551 One HRC member noted, for instance, that the shifting of resources away from 
the treaty body system is part of a larger shift that has devalued the UN’s supervisory 
bodies. Similarly, Dame Rosalyn Higgins, a former member of the committee, noted as 
early as 1996 that “Effective treaty bodies seem of less interest today to those who plan 
the UN’s human rights [programs] and allocate its resources. The flavor of the moment 
is mega-conferences on human rights—whether in Vienna, or Stockholm or Beijing. 
They do indeed raise the public profile of human rights—but they also allow [s]tates to 
avoid all legal entanglement.”552 
Conclusions and Recommendations
Like the regional human rights systems profiled in this report, the individual commu-
nications procedure used by UN treaty bodies suffers from an implementation deficit. 
Due in part to this concern, reform of the treaty monitoring bodies has been a topic 
of debate for many years, and there is a general consensus amongst UN officials and 
civil society actors that, as currently constituted, the bodies are operating unsustain-
ably. Consolidation of the treaty bodies, or at least of certain elements of their activities, 
continues to be discussed.553 Indeed, in response to the UN Secretary General’s renewed 
call for a “more effective and responsive” treaty system,554 OHCHR published in 2006 
a “Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty 
Body,” which endorsed the view that integration of the treaty bodies was the only route 
to secure the system’s objectives.555 
Notably, support for this proposal has been varied, with much debate focusing on 
whether these changes would be implemented by legal or non-legal means—the latter 
being recognized as a difficult, time-consuming route, the former likely offering too 
limited a scope for reform.556 Furthermore, specific unification models that have been 
proposed range from a “Super Human Rights Committee” combining the ICCPR and 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to the possibility of a World Court 
of Human Rights, whose jurisdiction “would encompass all communications received 
by existing [treaty bodies], and which might either substitute their adjudication func-
tions, or operate as an appellate tribunal.”557 These models, it is argued, would pose both 
risks and rewards to the individual communications procedure (and to enforcement 
monitoring), insofar as unification might undermine the specialized, treaty-specific 
consideration of the bodies, while, on the other hand, a “unified [treaty body] might be 
able to act more powerfully on individual complaints.”558 
While it is clear that any framework for treaty body unification would have impor-
tant consequences for the individual communications procedure, both operationally and 
in terms of the enforcement of treaty body findings, this debate has complexities that 
cannot be fully addressed here. These proposals continue to be debated, as they recently 
were in November 2009, and the strengthening of the treaty body system remains 
an OHCHR strategic priority for 2010-11, one which should be monitored closely.559 
Ultimately, whatever reform measures are pursued, it is essential that the treaty bodies 
themselves be actively engaged in broad-based consultation, in order to “complement 
and strengthen existing achievements in the harmonization of working methods.”560 
In the meantime, there are a number of other steps that can be undertaken under 
the treaty bodies’ present institutional arrangement to improve implementation and 
follow-up of their decisions:
Enhance the Financing, Visibility, and Efficacy of the Follow-Up Mandate 
The ability of the special rapporteur to carry out his or her mandate is inhibited by a lack 
of funding and, in the context of the Human Rights Committee, a caseload of over 450 
unimplemented cases—more than one individual can adequately address. As a result, 
despite some modest achievements owed to the follow-up efforts of the special rappor-
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teur, the position remains poorly matched to the challenge that effective monitoring 
poses. Greater resources must therefore be allocated to support follow-up activities, and 
UN member states—particularly those that are party to the ICCPR Optional Protocol—
should increase their voluntary contributions to OHCHR, as should other funding bod-
ies. Ultimately, without increasing the capacity of OHCHR’s Treaties Division, follow-up 
continue to suffer and the entire communications procedure itself may wither.
With respect to the Human Rights Committee, it may be advisable to consider 
the appointment of several follow-up rapporteurs who could handle a smaller portfolio, 
perhaps on a country-by-country or thematic basis. An early article raised this possibility 
in the broader context of the treaty body complaints procedures, noting that the HRC 
has, in the past, appointed special rapporteurs for “particularly contentious cases or cer-
tain categories of cases,” although this practice had been “experimental and ad hoc.”561 
Certainly, there are limitations in the rapporteur approach—one can only remind a 
state of its obligations so many times—but, in the particular case of the committee, it is 
clear that one person alone cannot undertake the amount of follow-up that is required. 
Improving the visibility and accessibility of information pertinent to implementa-
tion is also essential. While all of the treaty bodies should endeavor (in conjunction with 
their respective secretariats), to improve the methods by which they collect and make 
available follow-up data, the Human Rights Committee is particularly in need of reform 
given the sheer volume of cases it has adjudicated. Until recently, follow-up informa-
tion on the implementation of individual communications was not prioritized in the 
annual reports, which are themselves dense, long, and difficult to digest. Fortunately, 
the HRC’s Secretariat has begun posting interim “Follow-Up Progress Reports on Indi-
vidual Communications,” which are greatly improved in both format and content; it is 
recommended that these reports continue. At the same time, however, much of the sta-
tistical data as it is presented in the HRC’s annual report needs updating and revising, 
starting with more accurately classifying the character of state replies received, as well as 
clearer criteria for what constitutes satisfactory implementation. OHCHR should thus 
consider a new method for presenting follow-up data, one capable of centralizing all 
compliance-related information, but with greater detail on the status of implementation 
and the quality of state parties’ replies to the Follow-Up Rapporteur’s inquiries.562 The 
inclusion of data as to whether states have complied with interim measures ordered by 
the committee (such as moratoriums imposed on the carrying out of capital sentences) 
would also be a useful addition.563
Finally, several interviewees noted that the Human Rights Committee lacks any 
digest of its remedies jurisprudence, which would be a useful tool for improving what is 
too often a cursory treatment of remedies in the committee’s decisions. This is a project 
that the OHCHR (or perhaps an NGO, in cooperation with it) should carry out. Simi-
larly, a compendium of best practices or “good news stories” on follow-up to individual 
communications, such as the UN Special Procedures currently compiles, could serve 
as a useful resource for follow-up mandate holders moving forward.564
Promote a Sustained Approach to Follow-Up throughout the UN Protection System 
Both the OHCHR and human rights advocates should seek to create a more sustained 
approach to follow-up overall. For example, the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
should continue to raise the non-implementation of treaty-body Views in her meetings 
with state representatives as regularly as her functions permit. Where appropriate, advo-
cates should also encourage members of the other treaty monitoring bodies to raise the 
issue of unimplemented decisions during the state reporting process as well, and devote 
greater attention to the failure to implement in their concluding observations. Liaison 
should likewise be established with OHCHR field offices in countries where there are 
a significant number of non-implemented judgments, so that communication may be 
made with officials on the ground as well as in Geneva.
More broadly, greater collaboration must also be built between the treaty-based 
bodies and the UN’s charter-based bodies, particularly the UN Human Rights Council. 
As Manfred Nowak has argued, “One of the major shortcomings of UN human rights 
treaties is the missing link between independent expert bodies and political decision-
making bodies.”565 To that end, OHCHR should provide the Human Rights Council 
with information on state compliance with individual communications and/or interim 
measures, as it currently does with respect to the state reporting procedures of the treaty 
bodies and the findings of the Special Procedures mandate-holders.566 This information 
might inform the council’s work in a number of ways, including during the Universal 
Periodic Review process, where it could serve as the basis for questions posed to the 
state under review and for future recommendations by the council. Similarly, there 
should be systematic coordination between the treaty bodies and the UN Special Pro-
cedures mandate-holders so that they can address the issue of implementation in the 
course of their duties.567 
Examine Forum Desirability as a Tool to Increase Implementation
Because there are numerous means by which individual complaints may be registered 
with the UN system, human rights advocates must approach the system with caution, 
having fully considered which forum could best secure the implementation of their 
desired ends. In light of the backlog of cases facing the HRC and the large number of 
decisions currently under follow-up review, advocates should carefully consider whether 
the committee, as well as the treaty body system generally, is the best forum for litiga-
tion. Although the HRC might have the advantage of being the oldest and best known 
of the treaty bodies, it simply cannot continue to function effectively under the weight 
of its caseload.568 As noted, there are over 300 cases pending before the committee; by 
a conservative estimate, it takes at least three years for a merits decision to be issued. 
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By contrast, other treaty bodies have the comparative advantage of smaller casel-
oads (although the CAT’s remains substantial) and, consequently, there is an increased 
chance that cases can be decided faster and monitored more rigorously. CEDAW and 
CERD, in particular, are forums worthy of consideration, provided the state in question 
has accepted the committees’ jurisdiction over individual complaints. Consideration 
should also be given to the UN’s Special Procedures, including the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention and Working Group on Enforced Involuntary Disappearances.569 
Although both of these working groups suffer from many of the same compliance-
related challenges as the treaty bodies (and also lack a formal follow-up procedure), 
they have achieved successful results in a number of cases. In addition to having more 
flexible admissibility requirements, the working groups are generally able to adjudicate 
cases more quickly than treaty bodies can.570 
Develop the Relationship between Domestic Enforcement Bodies and Treaty Bodies 
Just as the treaty bodies play a crucial role in nurturing and facilitating domestic sup-
port for human rights, so too is the strength of a state’s domestic institutions crucial 
to determining the degree of compliance with treaty body decisions. To this end, “ways 
must be found to get the treaty norms and the treaty system on national agendas and 
to mobilize their logical domestic constituencies.”571 While this recommendation is 
taken up in greater detail in this book’s concluding chapter, the fact that the treaty bod-
ies possess little ability to enforce their own decisions underscores the importance of 
using national judicial systems, particularly those in monist states, as a way to enforce 
judgments and promote awareness of a state’s international legal obligations. This is 
especially significant for victims because as domestic courts are more likely to obtain 
an effective remedy than the treaty bodies themselves.572 
Advocates should therefore consider assisting or urging litigants to plead the deci-
sions of the Human Rights Committee and other treaty bodies before their own domes-
tic judiciaries, in order to press more aggressively for implementation at the national 
level. Even where this approach is not successful, it may serve to highlight deficiencies 
in a state’s judicial apparatus, which can serve as a basis for additional advocacy and 
clarification.573 At the same time, the HRC and other treaty bodies should endeavor to 
ensure thorough and comprehensive reasoning in their decisions and, where appropri-
ate, rely on pertinent national jurisprudence. Such an approach would not only increase 
the credibility of the treaty bodies in the eyes of domestic judges, but would also encour-
age a “mutually-reinforcing dialogue” between national judiciaries and international 
bodies.574 To this end, it remains incumbent on states to concentrate resources at the 
national level—in the training of judges, government officials, legislatures, lawyers, 
and through the development of effective national level institutions575—in order to give 
greater effect to international human rights norms at the domestic level.
V. Next Steps
Improving Implementation through Cross-System 
Dialogue
The European, American, and African human rights systems exist within distinct socio-
political contexts, and the experience of each continent in crafting a legal framework for 
protecting international human rights has varied significantly. But despite their differ-
ences, the systems share a common element: the struggle to ensure full implementation 
of their decisions. If the systems are to successfully fulfill their mandates, they must 
address their respective implementation crises. One promising way to address these 
crises is cross-system dialogue: the sharing of information, experience, and best practice 
to ensure more thorough and effective implementation in all four systems. 
Cross-system dialogue among international and regional human rights bodies is 
already underway. Several interlocutors, for instance, spoke approvingly of their expe-
riences engaging in cross-system communication and collaboration, and described 
a number of productive exchanges between the professional staff, judges, and legal 
advocates of the systems surveyed in this report. In terms of collaboration between the 
OAS and the African Union, an important precedent was the jointly organized confer-
ence known as the “OAS-AU Democracy Bridge.”576 Similarly, the United Nations has 
recently hosted international workshops on enhancing cooperation among the regional 
human rights systems and the UN treaty bodies.577 Academic institutions, too, have a 
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crucial role to play in helping bring together human rights scholars and practitioners to 
address common issues of concern within and among the various systems.578 
In this spirit, the Justice Initiative hopes that this report can serve as a basis for 
situating implementation-related discussions within a larger cross-system dialogue, 
particularly as many of these systems are themselves undergoing periods of significant 
reform. This chapter identifies three areas around which such implementation discus-
sions should take place, and highlights particular points of difference and commonality 
as a basis for further dialogue.
 
The Structure and Resourcing of Human Rights 
Systems
Implementation is one part of an effective system for adjudicating human rights and it 
exists in relation to a variety of factors, such as the institutional design of these systems 
and their capacity to efficiently and fairly judge cases. To that end, it is interesting to 
note that each regional organization, first the Council of Europe, then the Organiza-
tion of American States, and most recently the African Union, have at some point in 
their histories promoted a two-tier, commission-court model for adjudicating human 
rights complaints. In 1998, with the passage of Protocol 11 to the European Convention, 
Europe’s commission and court model was dissolved and replaced with a permanent 
European Court, in order “to maintain and improve the efficiency of [the convention’s] 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”579 Since that time, however, 
the court’s docket has continued to swell, threatening the system’s continued success. 
Moreover, many critics have noted that the sheer number of repetitive applications 
challenging the same state behavior is indicative of the extent to which the issue of 
successful implementation and caseload are now linked.580 As a result of this dilemma, 
a number of European Court watchers have proposed a return to some version of the 
two-tiered filtering system, or for increased judicial discretion in dismissing inadmis-
sible complaints.581
By comparison, the Inter-American system has retained the commission-court 
model and, while the court is purportedly up-to-date in its review of all cases under con-
sideration, the commission has a backlog of hundreds of cases. The commission and 
court recently completed a coordinated reform of their respective rules of procedure, 
in part to minimize the role of the commission in court litigation.582 This reform did 
not articulate any additional implementation activities for the commission. The court, 
however, used the same reform as an opportunity to codify numerous innovations in its 
implementation monitoring procedures. The different approaches demonstrate again 
the link between caseload and implementation: the commission, burdened by its back-
log, was simply not in a position to address implementation. 
The African system is something of a hybrid of the European and Inter-American 
systems, in that it will maintain a two-tiered commission-court model, but the court’s 
protocol also provides the possibility for victims of human rights violations to file cases 
directly with the court if the respondent state has acceded to direct action. This is one 
indicator that the African system is being proactive and taking prophylactic measures 
to address a possible future caseload crisis. For its part, the UN treaty body system dif-
fers substantially from the regional systems in structure but, like the other systems, 
the Human Rights Committee (and, to a lesser extent, the Committee Against Torture) 
shares the problem of an overwhelming caseload, one that will also have to be consid-
ered as debates over the institutional design of the treaty bodies continue.
Thus, even as the Council of Europe and OAS continue to grapple with balancing 
the number of cases coming in against those being successfully disposed of, their com-
paratively greater experience in managing expectations in this regard, and dealing with 
rapidly expanding caseloads, will likely prove valuable to the African Union and United 
Nations. For instance, in the context of the African system, new rules of procedure bring 
the hope of broader and more consistent follow-up powers for the commission, and 
are intended to herald a new era of consistent referrals to the African Court, allowing 
the tribunal to begin the fundamental work of issuing merits decisions. And yet, if this 
system develops along the lines of its European and American counterparts, it is likely 
that, as its caseload grows in both volume and complexity, it too will start to experience 
a backlog. As noted, certain UN treaty bodies have already reached that point. Similarly, 
as the European system contemplates a return to some process of filtering as a means 
of bringing its input and output into greater balance, it could benefit significantly from 
the experience of the Inter-American system as it works to make the communications 
and interactions between the commission and court more efficient. 
Assessing the Design of Implementation 
Mechanisms and Procedures
One of the most critical topics for cross-system dialogue is the design and structure 
of implementation procedures and mechanisms. In this regard, it is important to 
recognize that Europe’s enforcement mechanism, which is widely considered to be 
one of the most effective to date, is quite different from those of the other systems. 
Most significantly, the monitoring and enforcement of European Court judgments is 
carried out almost exclusively by the Committee of Ministers, which reflects the fact 
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that implementation is often a political matter. While the general procedures that the 
Committee of Ministers follows with respect to implementation are understood, the 
committee meetings themselves are closed to the public. Moreover, other than recent 
amendments to the rules of procedure, which permit written submissions from victims 
and their advocates on certain measures, there has never been serious consideration of 
a proposal to open ministerial proceedings to the victims’ representatives, much less to 
concerned civil society organizations or the public at large. 
By contrast, in the Inter-American system, the vast majority of implementation 
activities is administered by the court and the commission, and relies on the active 
participation—if not initiative—of the victims’ representatives. To collect data, both the 
court and the commission rely completely on the responsiveness of the parties. The 
interactions of the bodies with the political organs of the OAS on matters of implemen-
tation are almost exclusively limited to the transmission of this data in their annual 
reports to the General Assembly. Compliance hearings before each of the bodies are the 
principal way for interested parties in a case to confront the state about implementation 
shortcomings, and while these hearings are increasing in both frequency and com-
plexity before the court, they are extremely rare at the commission level. Historically, 
there has been some success in appealing states’ substantial compliance failures to the 
General Assembly of the OAS, but calls for a more systematized political response to 
implementation have generally gone unheeded.583
While it is unlikely that the Committee of Ministers will enlarge the scope of 
victims’ participation, or that the political bodies of the OAS will take up the call to 
actively intervene in implementation proceedings in the near future, there is certainly 
value in addressing these topics. There is a need to identify the common elements in 
the European and Inter-American implementation mechanisms and generate dialogue 
about their specific successes and failures, so as to expand the pool of common experi-
ences and identify best practices that may transcend systems. For example, the interim 
resolutions and recommendations of the Committee of Ministers could be compared 
with the reports and compliance orders of the Inter-American Court in order to provide 
guidance for other systems. Additionally, the Inter-American Court’s practice of holding 
private compliance hearings, and the more recent practice of holding such hearings 
publicly, could be a useful model for the European Court as it begins work to implement 
Protocol 14’s new provisions for “infringement proceedings.” 
While this discussion has thus far centered on the European and American expe-
rience, the African system and UN treaty bodies could also benefit from participating in 
a similar dialogue. First, there is some indication that unimplemented decisions of the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights may be referred to the political bodies of 
the African Union. Communicating with the European Court system could help identify 
a proper procedure for such referrals. The Inter-American system has not yet taken up 
the call for a method of referrals to the political domain of the OAS, but might find 
greater support for doing so if this becomes the trend among other systems. Similarly, 
there have been proposals, which this report supports, that the UN treaty bodies refer 
information on unimplemented decisions to the Human Rights Council, which many 
observers recognize as carrying more political influence than the treaty bodies them-
selves. The African Court should pay attention to the other regional systems’ experience 
in developing designs for compliance proceedings, as there is little question that it too 
will face resistance to implementation from member states. Inter-American “compli-
ance hearings,” and perhaps European “infringement proceedings,” will thus be very 
important experiences for the African Court to monitor; ideally, there should be a formal 
channel between the systems to carry out dialogue on such a topic. 
The UN treaty bodies boast the important example of the Special Rapporteur for 
Follow-Up on Views, who is charged with monitoring implementation of treaty body 
decisions. While this rapporteurship, in the context of the Human Rights Committee, 
has not accomplished many marked gains, it seems likely that greater attention to its 
design and resourcing would yield better results. There have been similar calls for such 
a rapporteurship in the African Commission for some time, and while the new rules of 
procedure do not contemplate a permanent position in this regard, there is a mecha-
nism by which individual commissioners could be assigned as implementation rap-
porteurs in specific cases. As this mechanism has yet to become operative, it is difficult 
to say whether this is a better model than having only one rapporteur, but both systems 
would do well to think comparatively about these models. Indeed, as this report noted, 
there may be an advantage for the Human Rights Committee in designating more than 
one individual to undertake implementation-related duties, given the magnitude of 
work that effective follow-up on recommendations requires. 
As a separate but not unrelated matter, these discussions should also involve 
remedial frameworks, given that there is a general correlation between remedies and 
levels of implementation. Yet, as this report makes clear, each system approaches rem-
edies in a different manner. The past decade has seen a rise in remedies of a general 
nature from the European Court, which has only recently begun to be more prescriptive 
in its approach to remedies; moreover, victims’ representatives have little to no role in 
this process. This approach lies in stark contrast to the Inter-American Court, which 
offers a robust remedies phase to the litigation, through which victims’ representatives 
can request a wide variety of individual monetary and symbolic remedies, as well as 
a range of general remedies that touch on social policy and legislation. Despite these 
differences, the relationship between the scale of remedies required and implementa-
tion is very similar between these two systems, and it would behoove them to explore 
their respective approaches more fully. For example, considering the high rates of states 
that pay pecuniary damage orders, the potential for ordering other types of monetary 
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sanctions for delayed implementation is a topic that is ripe for review. While the Inter-
American system has rejected the punitive damages regime, and the European system 
ultimately discarded the possibility of fining states for non-compliance during negotia-
tions over Protocol 14, many continue to argue that additional damages or other mon-
etary sanctions should be imposed on states that fail to implement binding decisions.584 
Such a discussion could benefit the African Commission, which has not devised a set 
remedial framework, and the African Court, which has yet to issue a reparations deci-
sion; similarly, the approach of some UN treaty bodies to remedies is quite rudimentary.
Elaborating Criteria for National Implementation 
 Initiatives
A third topic for cross-system dialogue is how different countries, as member states 
of the relevant regional or international organizations, structure their implementation 
efforts domestically once a decision is issued by a human rights body. The interlocutor 
for the state in such interactions is often the foreign ministry; the issue, then, is how 
the ministry communicates the obligations arising from an international decision to 
the state apparatus. Inasmuch as the decisions of human rights bodies often include 
recommendations or orders directed to the executive, judicial, or legislative branches 
of a state’s government, a lack of formalized channels of communication among these 
different branches in matters relating to implementation—combined with a lack of 
domestic political pressure—often results in inaction. Discussion about these commu-
nication challenges also represents, perhaps, a more productive way to talk about “politi-
cal will,” the amorphous concept that provides an easy (sometimes too easy) response 
to the question of why states fail to fulfill their international legal obligations. To that 
end, the experiences of individual states in establishing a coordinator for the execution 
of judgments at the national level should be discussed, as should the development of 
better communication mechanisms, so states that have yet to devise such systems can 
better understand their importance to implementation.
Perhaps the most effective model for creating a national implementation mecha-
nism is the Human Rights Act of the United Kingdom. Passed in 1998, it was enacted 
with the goal of giving effect to the European Convention by “engaging the responsibil-
ity of all three branches of government to act in a way compatible with fundamental 
civil and political rights.”585 Moreover, an added provision of the Human Rights Act 
established the United Kingdom’s Joint Committee on Human Rights, a “rare example 
of a special parliamentary body with a specific mandate to verify and monitor the com-
patibility of a country’s law and practice with the ECHR.”586 Other than the United 
Kingdom, only five parliaments within the Council of Europe’s member states possess 
a similar body for supervising the implementation of judgments, and fewer than half 
of Council member states have procedures that would at least ensure parliamentarians 
are informed of adverse ECHR judgments.587
In the Inter-American system, a number of countries have taken up the call to create 
some type of implementation mechanism, though their forms vary significantly. Peru’s 
implementation law establishes a process by which the Foreign Ministry communicates 
the decisions of regional and international bodies to the Supreme Court, which is then 
responsible for transmitting the decision to the courts that have jurisdiction over the 
matter.588 A different model exists in Colombia, where an implementation law provides 
a process for the consideration and payment of orders of compensation issued by the 
Inter-American Commission and the UN Human Rights Committee.589 The Colombian 
law further provides an important example of why collaboration between the regional 
human rights systems and the United Nations is so important, since any law that 
provides a procedure for a state to implement the decisions of regional human rights 
courts can conceivably be modified to recognize the decisions of UN treaty bodies. 
Thus, the regional and international human rights systems should analyze the 
extent to which national implementation laws have been useful in coordinating the 
implementation of decisions, and to what degree they have increased the rates of imple-
mentation. Because each system has a vested interest in identifying the most successful 
models for implementation, discussing how certain implementation laws can be modi-
fied and adapted to different legal systems and country contexts could be useful. While 
comparing laws from common law systems to those in civil law systems is not easy, the 
insights gained would aid implementation, even in those states whose human rights 
regimes remain embryonic.590 
It is also important to note that there are many modes of ad hoc communication 
that can advance the implementation process. While such communications are more 
diffuse and harder to put into practice, there should nevertheless be an effort to incorpo-
rate these examples into discussions of more formalized mechanisms. Indeed, because 
ad hoc implementation activities are often easier to execute, they can serve as examples 
for certain state officials who may be committed to implementation in countries where 
the state apparatus itself is otherwise resistant. 
Finally, an important topic of cross-system dialogue about implementation mech-
anisms is the potential role of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) and human 
rights ombudspersons. NHRIs vary enormously in structure and function but it is 
clear that the idea of NHRIs has moved forward at the international level, such that 
they have become key actors in bridging the gap between international standards and 
domestic implementation. Indeed, where an NHRI established in accordance with the 
Paris Principles exists within the national legal framework of a country, that institution 
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can be assigned a specific and perhaps central role in implementation.591 Furthermore, 
the personnel who generally administer NHRIs often (or should) have a professional 
background in international human rights, and many of them come from other state 
agencies; therefore, they are knowledgeable about the challenges of implementing 
international court decisions. In this way, NHRIs are uniquely qualified to carry out 
implementation efforts and they should be consistent partners in any cross-system 
communication. 
At the same time, however, precisely because of the diversity in form and func-
tion of NHRIs, their “status is often unclear at the national level.”592 Therefore, states, 
both independently and in the context of their regional human rights systems, should 
exchange information about how NHRIs, given their hybrid nature, can best monitor 
the implementation of judgments. For instance, would it be desirable that the regional 
human rights treaties formally require national institutions to play a monitoring role in 
the implementation of judgments, as the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
Torture and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities now do? Or is 
it best to endow NHRIs with the power of legislative initiative, so that they themselves 
might provide the catalyst for establishing domestic implementation laws? The answers 
to these questions may well be different depending on the state in question, but a pro-
cess of inter-state and inter-system dialogue would do much to build an understanding 
of what implementation strategies have worked in different contexts. 
Clearly, cross-regional collaboration is needed to address the implementation 
crisis currently afflicting human rights systems. The question is what shape such col-
laboration should take. As Philip Leach has written, “It is pertinent to question whether 
the set-piece conference model, with a small number of speakers delivering papers on 
pre-determined topics, with only minimal time for discussion amongst the other par-
ticipations, is the most productive way of debating reform.”593 Leach notes, for instance, 
that a significant flaw in the reform debates in Europe thus far has been their failure to 
meaningfully engage with the “users” of the court system, in addition to the failure of 
governments to welcome real civil society involvement. This approach cannot continue. 
Indeed, for the process of collaboration proposed herein to be meaningful, it will not 
be enough to only make speeches; rather, the focus must be on developing sustained 
exchanges between government officials and experienced representatives from across 
the civil society spectrum, premised on a genuine commitment to reform law, institu-
tions, and practice. Making good on the promise of our evolving international human 
rights system demands no less.
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International and regional human rights systems have 
the potential to provide powerful rights protections to 
individuals while compelling states to live up to their 
legal obligations. Yet too often, the decisions of human 
rights bodies suffer from a lack of implementation. 
In fact, it is fair to say that an implementation crisis 
currently afflicts the regional and international bodies 
charged with protecting human rights.
From Judgment to Justice examines the challenges 
of implementing the decisions of international and 
regional human rights bodies, with separate chapters 
focusing in detail on the European, Inter-American, 
and African systems, as well as on the UN treaty body 
system. The book notes where implementation has 
succeeded and where it has fallen short, examining 
specific cases, rulings, and remedies. From Judgment to 
Justice concludes by offering timely recommendations 
on specific steps to improve implementation and to 
ensure that human rights bodies fulfill their potential.
